Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted his Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida for the 14th bilateral annual summit between the two countries on Saturday, 19 March. This was a resumption of such high-level deliberations after the last meeting in Japan in 2018. The Delhi summit was also the first India visit for PM Kishida since he assumed office in October 2021.
The visit was brief (a few hours) and clearly put together at short notice. It also comes at a time when both countries are seeking to grapple with the fallout of the war in Ukraine and its tumultuous consequences that are still unfolding and whose global impact is yet to be comprehended.
The India-Japan bilateral relationship is broad-spectrum and covers a wide swathe, which includes many areas of cooperation, as also shared concerns in relation to China, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, among other issues.
This was reflected in the over 3,300-word joint statement of 23 paragraphs. But while it was comprehensive and ticked many boxes, the tentative conclusion about the outcome of the Kishida visit is that it is more in the nature of a new Japanese Prime Minister ‘touching-base’ with his Indian host and reviewing what had been agreed to in the past.
Same Concerns, Different Strategies
The fact that India and Japan share security and strategic concerns but have very divergent approaches in dealing with them was manifest in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In their meeting on Saturday, the Japanese Prime Minister was emphatic in asserting that Russia’s actions in Ukraine must not be ‘condoned.’
In a press statement after the meeting, PM Kishida said:
“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a grave development that shakes the fundamentals of the international order. And we need to resolutely respond to the situation. I spoke to PM Modi about this and said we should not condone or allow this kind of attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force in any region of the world. ”
This assertion is unexceptionable. However, PM Modi was more circumspect and did not use the word ‘invasion’, but noted that “geopolitical developments are presenting a new set of challenges”. He said, “In this context, the deepening of India-Japan partnership is not only important for the two countries, but also for the Indo-Pacific region, and [it] will encourage peace, prosperity and stability for the world.”
While neither Russia nor China was referred to explicitly, it is instructive to note that the joint statement “highlighted their commitment to working in tandem towards a peaceful, stable and prosperous world, based on a rules-based order that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations, and emphasised the need for all countries to seek peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law without resorting to threat or use of force or any attempt to unilaterally change status quo”.
The subtext clearly alluded to Russia in relation to Ukraine, and China in relation to the Galwan incident in Ladakh and the South China Sea dispute. One inference that may be arrived at is the urgency of the Beijing factor for both Delhi and Tokyo. The recent Biden-Xi virtual conversation and the limited progress made in relation to Ukraine points to a more brittle US-China relationship. If the Moscow-Beijing partnership becomes an anti-US/West axis, the manoeuvring room for both India and Japan will become more complex.
The 21st Century's Policy Dilemma
Strategic and security considerations and economic and trade drivers for evolving effective national policies often overlap with contradictory compulsions that defy binary resolutions, and this characteristic has become the overarching policy dilemma of the early 21st century.
The war in Ukraine is a case in point. Even as Europe is seeking to square the energy dependency circle in relation to Russian hydrocarbons, India is engaged in a balancing act apropos its relations with Moscow and Washington. Concurrently, Kishida-led Japan has firmed up its support to Ukraine while preparing for a potential Taiwan-related turbulence and North Korean belligerence.
Reading the Chinese tea leaves in an astute manner is a shared India-Japan priority, and it merits notice that the Chinese Foreign Minister is expected to visit Delhi later this month, reportedly at Beijing’s initiative. The Quad will be high up on the radar for all three nations. While PM Kishida will be preparing to host a summit-level, in-person meeting in May-June with US President Joe Biden, PM Modi and the Australian PM Scott Morrison, Beijing will seek a dissolution of this grouping, which it sees as a mini maritime NATO in the Indo-Pacific.
China refuses to accept this formulation and uses Asia-Pacific, which is part of the strategic tension that animates the major power relationship in the extended Asian canvas.
India-Japan & the Reality of 'Ease of Doing Business'
China and the US remain in the top tier of trading partners for both Japan and India, and in this context, while the Kishida visit has led to an investment target of ‘five trillion yen’ ($42 billion) over the next five years, this has to be contextualised against recent trends. In the period April-September 2021, India recorded the following FDI equity inflow (all in US $ billion): Singapore 8; US 4.63; Mauritius 4.33; Cayman Islands 2.15; Netherlands 2.14; UK 1.15 and Japan $804 million.
Many domains were flagged for bilateral cooperation and agreements inked during the Kishida visit, and this is a positive sign – particularly in relation to ecologically sustainable development projects, HR training, supply chains and regional connectivity. But the fact that India is not part of any major regional trading blocs, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), imposes a constraint.
And while the Maruti-Suzuki automobile success story remains an abiding example of the transformative power of engaging with Japan, the many delays that plague the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor merits mention.
Even though the joint statement notes that “the Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction on the progress in the flagship bilateral cooperation project of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (MAHSR)”, the reality is disappointing. The MoU for this mega project was signed in February 2013, but the current estimated date of completion is late-2028. This points to the reality of the ‘ease of doing business’ in India.
Even though the joint statement notes that “the Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction on the progress in the flagship bilateral cooperation project of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (MAHSR)”, the reality is disappointing. The MoU for this mega project was signed in February 2013, but the current estimated date of completion is late-2028. This points to the reality of the ‘ease of doing business’ in India.
Whether the Kishida visit will be able to infuse muscle and mission to the Quad will be evident later this year. In the interim, Tokyo, presumably, will be monitoring India and its proposed summit-level meetings with China and Russia. The contradictory policy compulsion will, in all likelihood, remain the leitmotif of the current times.
(Commodore C Uday Bhaskar, Director, Society for Policy Studies, has the rare distinction of having headed three think tanks. He was previously Director at the National Maritime Foundation (2009-11) and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2004-05). He tweets @theUdayB. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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