Wayanad | Centre-State Blame Game is Emblematic of Shoddy Disaster Preparedness

It is difficult to accurately predict when and where a landslide will occur without constant on-ground monitoring.

Massive landslides levelled three villages in Vythiri taluk in Wayanad, Kerala, in the early hours of 30 July.

As of now, more than 300 people have been deemed killed by this tragic disaster, with another 1,600 being rescued, and over 8,300 displaced persons lodged in relief camps in Wayanad. Rescue teams include members of the National Disaster Response Force, the Indian Army, the Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard, the Defence Security Corps, the Kerala Police, and the state’s Fire and Rescue Service.

Amidst heart-wrenching scenes of bodies being pulled out from massive amounts of debris, and distraught relatives searching desperately for their loved ones, a political row has broken out between the Government of Kerala and the Union Home Ministry (under whom the Disaster Management Department functions).

As per Kerala’s Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, the forecasts by the India Meteorological Department (IMD), the Geological Survey of India (GSI), the Centre Meteorological Centre (CMC), and Central Water Commission (CWC) were inaccurate and “none of the agencies had issued a red alert for Wayanad ahead of the 30 July landslides.”  

The Union Home Minister Amit Shah rebutted in Parliament, “Had those blaming the government read the warnings, the situation would have been different,” adding that the Centre had proactively dispatched nine NDRF teams to Kerala on 23 July.

Vijayan contested this, stating that the GSI had indicated only minor landslips or rock bursts, while the CWC, responsible for monitoring river water levels, did not issue flood warnings for the Iruvazhinji or Chaliyar rivers. Against a forecast of 115 mm-204 mm of rain, 572 mm of rain fell in the 48 hours preceding the disaster – and the Centre dispatched those NDRF teams at the Kerala government’s request.

The Central government funds several very capable, natural hazard early-warning agencies, for example, the IMD, CWC, GSI, National Centre of Seismology (NCS), and the Indian National Centre for Oceanic Information Services/Indian Tsunami Early Warning System.

In addition, there are meteorological and hydrological sensors within the state — the Regional Specialised Meteorological Centres, the Tropical Cyclone Warning Centres for different regions, and the State Irrigation and Water Departments, etc. The information and warnings issued by these agencies are replicated and displayed in near-real-time on many governmental web portals, for example, the National Database for Emergency Management (NDEM), Bhuvan, and the NDMA’s website.

The IMD has a far better record in weather and cyclone prediction as compared to that of the USA and a few countries in Europe. Founded in 1875, it has a wealth of weather and climate-related data – and utilises both US and European models while juxtaposing its historical data to crunch out forecasts.

The CWC, another premier technical agency with a wide range of sensors, looks at issues like river flows, glacial lakes, dam reservoirs, water resources, etc. The GSI, set up in 1851 primarily to find coal deposits for the Railways, has grown into a repository of geo-science information required in various fields, with its main functions being to create and update national geo-scientific information and mineral resource assessment. Presently, it is an attached office of the Ministry of Mines.

This blame game is therefore emblematic of the levels of disaster preparedness in many states of India, with five vexing issues meriting attention.

Disaster Management Continues to Be a 'State Responsibility'

The roots of India’s Disaster Management (DM) lie in the Great Famine of 1876-1878 and the associated Famine Relief Code.

After India's independence, Disaster Management was not mentioned as a ‘subject’ in any List (Central, State or Concurrent) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Hence, Disaster Management remained the ‘responsibility’ of the States and Union Territories of India, with the Ministry of Agriculture being the nodal agency.

After the 1999 super-cyclone and 2001 Bhuj earthquake, Disaster Management was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs except for drought, epidemics, and disasters specifically allotted to other Ministries. The December 2004 Tsunami gave an impetus and in December 2005, the Centre enacted the Disaster Management Act.

However, Disaster Management continues to be a ‘state responsibility’, with the Centre supplementing the efforts of the states or UTs in five ways:

• Sustaining early-warning agencies; these agencies are connected to the Control Rooms or Emergency Operations Centres at the MHA, the States and Districts, NDRF, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), nodal Ministries, Public Sector Undertakings, HQ Integrated Defence Staff and the Ministry of External Affairs

• Nominating Nodal Central Ministries with disaster-specific responsibilities for National-level coordination of the response and mobilisation

• Maintaining an NDRF

• Providing aid, funds, and resources on a required basis

• Formulating guidelines and policies; rendering advice and technical assistance; and assisting in capacity building

Both the Disaster Management Act 2005 and the National Policy on Disaster Management 2009 enjoin all States to establish State Disaster Response Forces (SDRF) and State Emergency Operations Centres (SEOC).

SDRFs: The Disaster Management Act is an expensive proposition. While most states have raised SDRFs, in many cases, these amounts are not commensurate with the size of the state. Besides, many are poorly equipped. Hence, there is an overwhelming reliance on the NDRF for most disaster response operations.

SEOCs: Although the Centre provides some funds for the setting up of SEOCs and one or two consultants – and Kerala has set up a good SEOC – the fact remains that many SEOCs yet cannot accurately interpret the information and warnings sent by the early-warning agencies, but want to be spoon-fed with specifics about what may transpire even within districts.

Poor Spending on Disaster Risk Reduction

Although the Centre has been allocating funds for (Disaster Risk Reduction) DRR and mitigation, their utilisation remains incomplete.

This is because investments and spending on DRR are not as politically visible as a road, bridge or school, and hence, it doesn’t get the same attention. The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction correctly outlines that every $1 spent on DRR can lead to a saving of $15 in recovery, and yet, in 2021, only 12 percent of disaster-related aid funding was spent globally on DRR.

There Are Also Forecasting Limitations

The IMD derives a large part of its weather forecast by comparing fresh, incoming information with data related to past events or trends.

With climate change and inordinate heating-up of the Indian Ocean, the associated Extreme Weather Events are not conforming to past trends – and on many occasions, a season’s rainfall is pouring down in two to five days. In turn, this uncertainty is making it difficult to prepare accurate weather forecasts.

While the Landslide Early Warning System is one of the mandates of GSI, and landslide-prone areas can be identified, it is difficult to accurately and precisely predict when and where a landslide will occur without constant on-ground monitoring. The February 2019 Proceedings of the Symposium on Landslides in Kerala 2018, clearly identified “landslides...major hazard in Wayanad, Kozhikode, Idukki and Kottayam districts,” and outlined that over 3,000 major and minor landslides had hit the districts of Wayanad and Idukki during June-August 2018 flood season.

To summarise, given the 2018 landslides, the 2019 rains and floods, and the 2021 landslides, the Government of Kerala should have been prepared for such an eventuality and the Wayanad District Disaster Management Authority should have been far more proactive.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)