As per reports, one important demand of the Janata dal (United), which is one of the crucial allies of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance holding power in the central government, is to scrap the Agnipath scheme for defence forces. Reportedly, Nitish Kumar has always been against the scheme.
Perhaps, sensing the anger of the youth, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced that the government was open to reviewing the scheme. Similar indications also emanated from the headquarters of the defence forces.
My personal view is that while its objectives may have been honourable, how the scheme was conceived and implemented has left much to be desired. It is a blunder as monumental and sudden as demonetisation or the abrupt COVID lockdown.
The youth, in many states, consider joining the defence forces as an honourable career option. They, therefore, got disenchanted when recruitment did not take place for a couple of years before the implementation of the scheme. This, coupled with a high unemployment rate, made the youth extremely restive.
The Agnipath scheme, thus, became one of the several important factors for the loss of many seats and a large reduction in vote share for the ruling party in all those states where joining the defence forces are a major source of employment for youth.
The Scheme is Not Popular At All Within the Defence Forces
Ex-Army Chief General Naravane in his book Four Stars of Destiny has more or less confirmed that the Agnipath scheme in its present form was not what was recommended by the defence services. Excerpts of the book appearing in the press bring out that the scheme was originally intended only for the Army, but was then extended to the Navy and the Air Force.
Another point highlighted in the excerpts is that the government ignored the original recommendation of the retention of 75 percent of Agniveers, and opted for the retention of only 25 percent. The book has failed to get approval from the government for publication.
That the scheme is unpopular within the defence forces too is borne out by what many serving officers and personnel say in private, besides public statements by several retired service personnel. I had the occasion to visit a forward position in the Army a few months ago, where I interacted with the personnel of different ranks.
The post had 10 odd Agniveers, but I did not get the opportunity to interact with them, thus depriving me of their viewpoint. However, the operational level commanders, both officers and JCOs, clearly stated that the Agniveers were not suitable for the Army.
They opined that the Agniveers were prone to making all kinds of excuses to avoid tough duties, often saying that they were only here for four years and should not be detailed for hard duties, especially those involving risk of life. My conclusions may be based on anecdotal experience but the general view, indeed, is against the scheme, both among serving and retired service personnel.
One officer from the Corps of Signals also echoed to me the above views, further adding that a four-year term is too short for the Agniveers to become proficient in undertaking repair and maintenance of equipment and grasp the technical aspects of providing and ensuring continued communication in the forward areas.
This also applies to other important arms like the armoured and artillery, which have equipment requiring intensive advanced training that cannot be imparted during basic induction training because the goal here is to make a soldier physically fit and bring about attitudinal change. The absence of such specialised training will adversely impact the efficiency of these important arms. The same applies to the Air Force and Navy.
It is said that the defence forces have circulated internal instructions placing many restrictions on the employability of Agniveers, confirming the lack of confidence of the leadership in their ability. Reportedly, these instructions ask units and formations not to nominate them for training courses at the army level, or detail them for Extra Regimental Employment (ERE) and attachments to special detachments.
Independent deployment of Agniveers as guards and sentries is reportedly not permitted besides restrictions on being employed as buddies of officers and JCOs. Such restrictions impose heavy costs on the human resources within the units and subunits, as the burden of such duties falls on the remaining regular soldiers, affecting their rest, relief, training, and leave plan.
The test of a good policy relating to defence should be whether it enhances national security and the efficiency of the forces. The Agniveer scheme appears to fail on both counts.
The Government Says It Wants to Enhance the Availability of Funds
The initial reason given by the government for introducing the scheme was that it was faced with a fund crunch for modernisation and acquiring better weaponry because of the heavy outgo for pensions. It was articulated that the Agnipath scheme would lead to savings on pension.
On the face of it, an outgo of almost Rs 12 lakh annually for every Agniveer for 75 percent of Agniveers (starting from 2026 onwards), may not have much impact on the availability of funds. While more funds are indeed required for acquiring equipment, it should not happen at the cost of adversely impacting combat effectiveness. Agnipath is not an optimum solution towards achieving that end.
If the idea was to enhance the availability of funds, the government should have focused on improving the teeth-to-tail ratio in the defence services. There are many support arms which can be trimmed to achieve this end. Whether the top brass of the defence forces highlighted this and why the government rejected it is something not available in the public domain. Perhaps the book of General Naravane may throw light on this once it sees the light of the day.
When questions about the impact of Agnipath on the efficiency of defence forces were raised, the narrative changed and it was advocated that the scheme was necessary to reduce the age profile of the defence forces. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said in January 2023 that “Agnipath is a game changer for the Armed Forces… [and make them] youthful, high-tech and ultra-modern”.
At the time the scheme was brought in, the average age in the armed forces was 32, which Agnipath will bring down to 26 if implemented. While it might happen in the long run, it is important to note that there is minimal difference in the physical efficiency of personnel between ages 26 and 32. That is why all the physical efficiency parameters for defence forces personnel are similar from the age of entry up to 35.
A reduction in the age profile, therefore, is not a very strong argument in favour of the scheme.
As stated above, combat effectiveness should have been the basic consideration which will be severely affected because the training of Agniveers has been shortened. Training gives confidence and motivation which an inadequately trained Agniveer is unlikely to have, more so because of a lack of certainty about his future. An inadequately trained and demotivated soldier is likely to be the first to desert his comrades.
Final Thoughts — What About Agniveers After They Are Released?
The Agnipath scheme also needs to be analysed in the context of its impact on society. Firstly, it is likely to discourage the youth from joining the armed forces, a phenomenon which is already visible in the reported lack of crowds at recruitment rallies.
There are several reasons for this, the most important of which is the uncertainty over tenure within the organisation. Not only will they have spent four formative years of their lives in the forces, but they will face the prospect of finding another job in the open market for which he is not equipped with adequate skills or the necessary education.
The harsh reality is that they will most likely get a job as a low-paying security guard in the mushrooming private security industry. They are likely to find it difficult to adjust to a civilian atmosphere after having served in a disciplined environment like that of the defence forces. Even the alternative of giving preference to Agniveers in the Central Armed Police Forces, i.e., the BSF, the CRPF, the CISF, the ITBP, and the SSB, or even in the police, may not lead to absorption of all released Agniveers.
The lack of pension and other facilities like medical also are likely to adversely impact the Agniveers financially. The lump sum amount of Rs 12 lakh or so that they will receive isn’t adequate for them to start a proper business and simultaneously cater to the financial needs of their family.
The regular release of Agniveers, trained in handling weapons and other military aspects, especially if they are not able to find gainful employment, is also likely to adversely impact social harmony. We already have a large restive youth population facing unprecedented levels of unemployment, being exploited by fundamentalist organisations for hate crimes. The addition of trained but unemployed Agniveers in society could lead to its further militarisation.
An unintended impact of the scheme is on our relations with Nepal. The Gurkhas, who come mainly from Nepal and nearby regions, are fierce fighters and have been serving in the Indian Defence Forces for a couple of centuries. The Agnipath scheme has impacted the recruitment to the Gorkha Regiment with Nepal refusing to recruit Agniveers.
In view of what has been discussed above, reports of the government reviewing the scheme are welcome, albeit the reasons for review appear to be linked to the electoral performance of the ruling party. The government must have an open mind and it must consider all options — including scrapping the scheme. Any modification in the scheme, like enhancement of tenure or increasing the percentage of retention, will require in-depth analysis.
The modifications must first be restricted to a pilot scheme to see its efficacy in detail before any kind of implementation. The scheme also has to be made more attractive by adding some perks like a medical facility and a canteen facility.
It must be realised that even critics of the scheme have the best interests of our nation and armed forces in mind. The government must take a holistic view to make our defence forces more efficient. To quote a retired Lt General, the Agnipath scheme “merely addresses a subset, i.e., the HR policy at the bottom of the pyramid, and is unlikely to make an impactful difference financially.”
(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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