Games Govts Play
- In the current international landscape, India does not figure very high in Russian priorities and vice versa.
- Russia may see its outreach to Pakistan as a useful lever to retain its share of the Indian defence market.
- Russian media has been pointing to other reasons why Moscow’s engagement with Islamabad has become necessary.
- Afghanistan is being cited as one such reason, besides ‘the Islamic crescent’ adjoining Russia’s Central Asian borders.
- There is now a strong driver bringing Russia and China together in confronting the West.
- India must avoid raising Pakistan to the level of an over-riding preoccupation.
- India must remain deeply engaged with Russia as the latter will remain a key source of sensitive technologies, hardware and energy.
India-Russia relations began to undergo a substantive change after the end of the Cold War. This was inevitable since the key drivers of the three-decade-long strategic partnership (1960-1990) began to lose relevance in a changed international landscape.
One, the new Russia no longer perceived China as a major security threat, certainly not to the extent that India did. However, a degree of anxiety about Chinese intentions in Russia’s Siberian Far East and Central Asia remained.
Two, even though Russia continued to be a significant partner for India in advanced defence technology and hardware, the end of the Cold War opened the doors for India to access these from the US and other Western countries.
Russia’s virtual monopoly in this regard diminished. The disruptions caused by the overthrow of the old Soviet command and control system also led to problems in accessing spares and components for Russian-made equipment and to unpredictable and sometimes extortionate pricing.
Moscow-Beijing Axis
At one time, in 2005, virtually 40 percent of India’s air assets were non-operational because of supply issues. The bitter dispute over refurbishing the Russian-made aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, for induction into the Indian Navy only strengthened the drive towards diversification of supplies. On the other hand, Russia began supplying sophisticated military hardware to China. This diminished the edge that India so far possessed, as the sole non-Warsaw Pact recipient of such hardware.
Three, the importance of the then Soviet market for a range of Indian exports such as tea, tobacco and leather goods among others under the rupee-rouble trade, virtually evaporated. This happened because Russia and India became increasingly globalised, market economies. India-Russia trade continues to be anaemic despite periodic and ambitious target-setting.
Erosion in Special Ties
Given this background, it was inevitable that India-Russia relations would tend to, over time, lose their special character. It was also unavoidable that each would respond to contemporary preoccupations rather than cling to sentimentalities of the past. One should acknowledge that in the current international landscape, India does not figure very high in Russian priorities, neither does Russia in Indian priorities.
If India continues to figure in Russian calculations, it is mostly as a continuing and lucrative market for defence hardware and nuclear power plants. In this context, Russia may see its outreach to Pakistan as a useful lever to retain its share of the Indian defence market.
Russia’s Tactical Calculations
The announcement of a slew of defence hardware supply agreements during the Modi-Putin meeting in Goa on the sidelines of the BRICS summit may well have reinforced Russian calculations in this regard. We may well see further Russian moves towards Pakistan in the coming days, driven by such tactical calculations.
The Russian media has been pointing to other reasons why Moscow’s engagement with Islamabad has become necessary. Afghanistan is being cited as one such reason but also ‘the Islamic crescent’ adjoining Russia’s Central Asian borders. Echoing the Chinese refrain, Russian analysts point to the critical role Pakistan will play in restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. They also talk of Pakistan’s help in preventing the radicalisation of the Muslim populations within and outside its southern borders.
Position on Terrorism
We must note, therefore, that the Russian position has gravitated closer to the Chinese position and that Pakistan is no longer being projected as the epicentre of terrorism as it once was by the Russians. Lately, mention is also being made of Pakistan’s role with respect to developments in Syria where Russia is heavily involved.
It is not clear what this Pakistani role could be. There are references to Pakistan enabling Russia to be accepted as an observer at the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) as a quid pro quo for supporting Pakistan’s entry to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
One could link several of these recent developments to the growing strategic congruence between China and Russia especially in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. The sense of anxiety and vulnerability that Russia has felt about China despite greatly improved relations in the post-Cold War period, has become muted in the wake of renewed hostility in relations with the West.
Confronting the West
There is now a strong driver bringing Russia and China together in confronting the West. Russia is more dependent on Chinese support as the US has put sanctions on Russia and targets it openly in Europe. The Chinese market has become progressively more significant for Russia, particularly as an importer for Russian energy resources, in an era of prolonged depression in oil prices.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia has started to align itself more with Chinese positions on a number of regional and international issues. The outreach to Pakistan may well reflect this trend. This is not different from what happened in 1971 when the US under Richard Nixon sought to uphold Pakistan’s interests, to curry favour with its new-found Chinese ally. India became collateral damage in the process.
India’s Response
What should India’s response be to these developments? First, we should avoid raising Pakistan to the level of an over-riding preoccupation, which substantively it is not. That’s because this also sets us up for both our friends and adversaries using Pakistan as leverage against India.
Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism against India is an admission of its own weakness, in real power terms, against India. If Pakistan is a threat, it is so as a sub-set of the larger Chinese threat, which really should be our preoccupation.
Secondly, there are enough reasons for India to remain deeply engaged with Russia. It will remain a key source of sensitive technologies and hardware, even as we diversify our sources of supply as we must in our own interest. It may well become a key energy partner as our own energy demand increases and Russia looks for markets outside Europe.
Biding for Time
Thirdly, Russia may be in a relatively vulnerable position at the moment. This compels it to mute its concerns over Chinese inroads into its Central Asian neighbourhood and the Chinese demographic challenge to its sparsely populated Far Eastern territories.
In the long run these concerns will resurface. Russia has always had a sense of itself as a great power. It is unlikely to accept as a permanent condition a junior status to an ascendant China. India should bide for that moment.
(The writer is a former foreign secretary and is currently chairman, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research. The views expressed above are his own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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