The search for a victimhood narrative as a means of self-definition has characterised many political and social groups in India, often for legitimate reasons of trying to unify their constituencies around perceived injustice. It is also a useful ploy to garner public sympathy and seek vindication for agitational politics.
Rarely, however, has a government in power needed to nurse constant victimhood as a statement of its political identity. The government of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Delhi, bereft of any substantive political vision, has found that presenting itself as an injured party can yield rich political dividends even if its performance as a government is poor.
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What Does AAP Hope to Achieve Through Regular Spats With L-G?
Not a day passes by when the AAP government does not raise injury claims against the Union government, the Lieutenant Governor (LG), Delhi Police, the DDA, the Municipal Corporations and now, even its own bureaucracy.
The latest is their ‘outcomes’ report on the performance of the L-G, Anil Baijal, on how he has thwarted significant welfare initiatives, resisted citizen-centred changes in policy, delayed crucial decisions, kept vacancies unfilled to ensure that no work gets done, and, in general, ensured that officers do not pay heed to the elected representatives and function entirely at his bidding.
As usual, the report has been ‘passed/endorsed’ by the Legislative Assembly and then made public. It has been accompanied by the AAP leaders vilifying the L-G with their characteristic belligerence and pugnaciousness — a manner they mistake for forthrightness and forcefulness.
It is difficult to understand what AAP hopes to achieve by continuing with their ugly spat with the L-G. Anil Baijal is not a politician, not a member of the BJP, and while he may have been chosen by the BJP government at the Centre, he is not formally affiliated to the BJP. In terms of optics, picking up a fight with him does not serve a political purpose.
The AAP government is in no position to get rid of him, and the L-G’s constitutional position will not undergo a change however much they may try to embarrass him. On factual grounds, the AAP case against Baijal is extremely weak as the latter’s meticulous point-by-point rebuttal to the charges of delayed decision-making establishes, even though his rebuttal has not received the same media traction as the charges against him may have.
A Powerless Delhi CM & a Flawed Power Structure
It is important to note that the AAP’s current standoff with Anil Baijal is a continuation of their war with Baijal’s predecessor Najib Jung. While in Baijal’s case they labour on his BJP links, this was surely not the case with Jung who was a UPA appointee and allegedly a Congress sympathiser.
It cannot be their argument that both L-Gs share the same antipathy to the elected government and both were/are politically motivated to serve the interests solely of the ruling establishment at the Centre. This constant defining of themselves with reference to a callous and insensitive ‘other’ (the L-G) is now beginning to get tedious because it shows an attempt to reduce a structural and institutional problem to one of a clash of individuals practising different brands of politics.
That there is a major structural flaw in the architecture of state power in Delhi is undeniable. Delhi is a Union Territory re-designated as the National Capital Territory and administered by the president through its administrator, namely, the Lieutenant Governor. He/she is not a nominal head like the governors of other states but the de-facto executive head of government.
There are matters which are within his/her exclusive jurisdiction in which he/she may or may not consult the chief minister, and there are matters in which his/her prior approval is necessary, by law. The chief secretary and the police commissioner are appointed by the Union Home Ministry and the chief minister plays no role in their appointments, except informally depending on his/her equation with the L-G and the Union government.
The home secretary and the secretary land and buildings are appointed by the L-G with the approval of the Home Ministry. All other senior-level postings and transfers have to be made with the approval of the L-G. The subjects of public order, police, and land are outside the purview of the Legislative Assembly and consequently the Delhi administration.
Delhi CM: A Puppet in Hands of L-G
As if this disempowered position was not enough, there are three other crucial institutions in which the CM plays little or no part — the DDA, which is responsible for master planning, infrastructure development, housing development and other associated urban development functions; the trifurcated Municipal Corporation of Delhi, and the New Delhi Municipal Committee. In the case of DDA and the three MCDs, the CM does not feature anywhere in the decision-making process.
Clearly, in terms of governance architecture, this is a nightmare. It makes Delhi one of the most difficult capital cities to govern anywhere in the world and it makes the position of an elected chief minister completely untenable if one was to go by a rigid interpretation of law.
While the constitutional morality of the relevant provisions is being debated in the Supreme Court and some clarity may eventually emerge about the role and jurisdiction of the CM and the Council of Ministers, the fact of the matter is that as things stand at present, the CM has a severely limited role to play within the constitutional schema and in any standoff with the LG his/her legal position is very weak.
All CMs of Delhi have had to function under these severe limitations. It is not a situation engineered to spite the AAP government. So for AAP to project this as a conspiracy directed against them is ingenuous. It unnecessarily pits the chief minister into an adversarial relationship with the LG and the Union Government, hardens political positions and further erodes the possibility of any harmonisation.
Lessons for AAP
In a situation so hormonally imbalanced and with one hand tied behind one’s back, a chief minister has to have extraordinary political and administrative skills as well as infinite patience to be able to meet popular expectations. There are three critical requirements to be able to do this.
- First, is to win over the bureaucracy and have them firmly by one’s side. In this, the Chief Secretary can play a significant role by acting as a bridge between the CM and the LG and the Union Government.
- The second is to keep the party political agenda aside and focus single-mindedly on governance.
- Third, is to communicate constantly with all the stakeholders by keeping them in the loop at all times — the bureaucracy, the LG and the Union Government, the media, and the public and to do so with humility, and also let everyone know the limitations within which the CM Delhi functions without showing petulance.
It is on all these three fronts that the previous chief ministers of Delhi —Madan Lal Khurana, Sahib Singh, and Sheila Dixit did well, particularly by keeping the bureaucracy on their side and relying on them to become advocates and champions of their plans and programmes. It is precisely on all these fronts that Arvind Kejriwal has failed miserably.
His own Chief Secretary having been humiliated and manhandled by his party MLAs in his presence has now become an adversary. The entire civil bureaucracy is up in arms and refuses to have any direct interaction with ministers.
AAP Needs to Build More Bridges
The police having been reviled as toadies of the Union Government do not give any consideration to the AAP Government. The LG and the Union Home Ministry having been publicly named as principal enemies, can hardly be expected to be sympathetic and helpful. Vast sections of those who voted for AAP are thoroughly disenchanted and are unlikely to ever vote for them again.
AAP still has two years to go, and it is bewildering how they expect to continue to function as a credible government by making everyone a detractor if not an enemy.
For some months after AAP’s poor performance in Punjab, one had seen a softer, quieter, and a more sober approach, and one had hoped that they would build on that. But by treating everyone who is not their cheerleader as the enemy, they have further weakened any possibility of rallying support for the fundamental structural reforms that are required to make Delhi governable. Alas!
(The author is a former IAS officer. The views expressed above are of the author’s alone and The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same)
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