Electoral Compulsions Force Even the Most Obdurate Netas to Take Policy U-turns

Still, the BJP cannot avoid adherence to its core agenda while making select compromises.

What do Modi’s U-turns on the Waqf Bill (that went to a joint parliamentary committee), the budget proposals on capital gains, the draft Broadcast Bill, and then the lateral entry scheme to civil services, indicate?

Electoral compulsions force even the most adamant politicians to rethink their policies and programmes, with Narendra Modi not being an exception. Bowing to the fear of possible political and electoral implications, the Modi government withdrew the much-controversial farm laws and the prime minister personally apologised to the peasantry. But, this was not before a massive agitation over a year.

The hasty retreat on the farm laws on the eve of assembly elections in early 2022 after their unilateral enacting in Parliament, continues to hurt the BJP in several states, especially Uttar Pradesh and Haryana.

Despite forcefully adhering to the Agnipath scheme, the Modi regime displayed signs of vulnerability as the Nitish Kumar-led JD (U) publicly aired its displeasure. The statements from official circles indicate possible changes in the scheme to accommodate the concerns of critics, especially of the NDA allies. But, such policy obduracy has also cost the BJP in the above-mentioned states.

Now in his third term, why does Modi continue to take such controversial measures despite his party's reduced electoral strength?

The BJP, especially in the current phase of its evolution under the leadership of the Modi –Shah duo is known for its expansionist approach to politics, notwithstanding such an approach hurting its allies. This is precisely the reason why the BJP could also grow in areas that are not its traditional terrain. But such a risk appetite can have its flip-flops too.

The BJP’s refusal to yield ground to the PDP in Jammu and Kashmir, its encroachment of political space occupied for decades by the Shiv Sena (UBT) in Maharashtra, and its attempts to grow at the cost of its ally AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, reveal how the saffron party accommodates the concerns of its allies only when it is rather inevitable.

But, it repeatedly attempts to push forward its own agenda despite knowing fully well that such an agenda may not be palatable to the allies. This is quite contrary to the Vajpayee era approach where the BJP kept its controversial agenda out of the NDA.

Such a change in the BJP's style of running coalition politics was a result of its increased strength and the political asymmetry within the NDA contributes to its audacity. But, the political reality has changed after 4 June, even though the allies have neither the electoral muscle to put the BJP on the mat nor any ideological integrity to de facto separate from it. Modi knows this well.

The pusillanimity of the BJP's allies is evident when the LJP leader Chirag Paswan while expressing his opposition to the lateral entry scheme devoid of reservation, expressed his full confidence in Narendra Modi’s commitment to social justice.

Nitish Kumar has been making noise on issues like the Agnipath scheme while not forgetting to heap praise on Modi’s leadership. Similarly, TDP supremo N Chandrababu Naidu, on every occasion, praises Modi despite heartburn on the denial of special category status to Andhra Pradesh and over the BJP’s relentless humiliation of minorities.

The Modi government has backed out of the lateral entry scheme not just because Chirag Paswan opposed it. He is aware of the fact that the social justice discourse helped parties like the Congress and the SP make deep inroads into saffron-dominated Uttar Pradesh.

The BJP has clarity that it cannot depend upon its allies to remain in power in the centre. It has a disdain for coalition politics but is forced to reconcile only because of the political reality. Unlike its allies (their goal is to remain perpetually in power), the BJP is wedded to its ideology and cannot compromise on its ideological stances beyond the necessities of contemporary politics.

Meanwhile, regional parties across India have time and again demonstrated their politics of compromise. The social justice parties like the JD(U), the LJP, and the Republican party, continue to remain in the BJP-led NDA, though the mandal and kamandal agenda cannot coexist. The BJP’s inclusive Hindutva is more of a practical adjustment than an ideological compromise.

The social justice parties are aware of this, but still ally with the BJP for their own parochial political and electoral interests. Thus, these parties continuously demonstrate transactional political relationships with the BJP, either of them at times yielding.

Despite the limits of Hindutva politics and the impact of counter-political currents, the BJP cannot avoid adherence to its core agenda, while making select compromises. The rephrasing of the civil code discourse by Narendra Modi illustrates how the party is traversing the tricky trajectory of coalition politics.

Additionally, defeat in the series of assembly elections will make the Modi regime further vulnerable to the pulls and pressures of coalition politics. How the BJP’s electoral fortunes will fluctuate across the nation will define the bargaining power of the NDA allies.

Thus, the NDA cannot be static. It will evolve dynamically depending on the changing electoral configuration. Who wins and who loses depends on the political dexterity of each player.

(Prof K Nageshwar is a senior political analyst, faculty member of Osmania University, and a former MLC. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)