Two influential heads of government visiting each other’s countries in less than six months is a matter of unusual diplomatic interest and consequence. Narendra Modi’s setting aside of protocol to receive Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally at the airport during his current visit to India and the repeated use of words like ‘historic’, ‘path-breaking’ and ‘marriage made in heaven’ by the two leaders in the context of India-Israel relations indicate that it is of more than normal significance and has a long-term design embedded in it.
By all accounts, the latest engagement between India and Israel foretells a special purpose and energy in their relations not witnessed since the two states opened their full and formal diplomatic ties in 1992 during the tenure of Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao.
Will De-hyphenation Take India a Long Way?
- Cooperation in trade and investment, counter-terrorism, defence procurement, etc are the main drivers of current bonhomie
- Modi regime has accelerated de-hyphenation – simultaneously promoting good relations with adversarial states
- Such de-hyphenation has diversified access to new markets and technologies
- India’s dependence on the Arab world for energy needs may constrain Modi’s project to take India-Israel relations to the next level
- While pursuing its de-hyphenated policy, India should adapt a calibrated approach that aims at risk avoidance in expanding its intimacy with Israel
De-hyphenation in India’s Foreign Policy
Doubtless, no one is a loser in the expansion and deepening of the multidimensional cooperation between India and Israel in the areas of trade and investment, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, defence procurement, technology, agriculture and tourism, which are the main drivers of their current bonhomie.
Modi’s admirers cite India-Israel camaraderie as one of his foreign policy successes as he has shown courage to abandon the long-standing and hallowed tradition of hyphenation of India’s relations with the Arab countries and Israel.
The Modi regime has accelerated the much-desired de-hyphenation in India’s foreign policy in several regions, ie simultaneously promoting good relations with the two adversarial states and, at the same time, considering the relationship with one state independently of the relationship with the other state.
Such de-hyphenation has bolstered the scope for addressing India’s national interests effectively and diversified access to new markets and technologies. India has practiced such de-hyphenation in the case of China and Taiwan, China and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran etc. besides the Arab-Israel relationship.
Pragmatic Approach Towards Arab States and Israel
A hyphenated relationship in West Asia meant emphasising a slant towards the Arab states and demonstrating political neutrality towards Israel, while getting increasingly involved with it in the economic and technology sectors. Such hyphenation was a compulsion during the Cold War era, but it continued to underpin India’s approach even in the subsequent period, probably out of the fear of antagonising the Arab states as well as India’s Muslim population.
The Modi government’s de-hyphenated policy in West Asia means that India can be friendly with both Israel and the Arab states and Iran in order to reap benefits pragmatically. However, the key question is – whether the current momentum in India-Israel relations is sustainable and irreversible and whether the de-hyphenated policy in West Asia could withstand the reality of a zero-sum conflict between Israel and much of the Arab world.
Subdued Diplomatic Jargon on Palestine
India’s foreign policy makers have so far practiced a remarkably nuanced approach in West Asia. While cozying up to Israel, they have given no indications that India’s ties with other West Asian countries are under review or that it is shifting its pre-independence era commitment for an independent state of Palestine co-existing peacefully with the state of Israel.
Such de-hyphenated and balanced view was also evident at the last month’s vote at the United Nations General Assembly against America’s decision to set up its embassy in Jerusalem, which was an outcome of a flurry of diplomatic confabulations among representatives from India and the Arab countries. The only change one observes is in toning down of rhetoric on Palestine and in the frequency of affirmation of the same. That going-out-of-the-way kind of support India loudly proclaimed for Palestinians at the Non-Aligned Movement meetings or at the United Nations (UN) has given way to its minimum endorsement in subdued diplomatic jargon.
As the Arab-Israel relationship is mutually exclusive, ensuring de-hyphenation and delinking in India’s relations with both would prove increasingly challenging in future. Could India continue to advocate the cause of Palestinian homeland and, at the same time, expect Israel to move closer to it? Conversely, could India continue to be one of Israel’s best friends and, at the same time, expect Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iran to support its regional and global interests?
India’s Dependence on Arab States for Oil
In particular, India’s unconditional certification to Netanyahu could become a sore point for the Muslim world. Netanyahu is a far-right politician known for his hawkish foreign policy. He has refused to engage in negotiations on the Palestine issue even at credible international forums and defeated all possibility of the implementation of the UN resolutions on the subject. If the Israel-Palestine peace process stands derailed today, Netanyahu and the US President Donald Trump would take a large share of the blame for the same, and not just Hamas and other terrorist groups active in Palestine.
It is possible to argue that the Arab states themselves have in the recent past played down the Palestinian cause and are offering only a symbolic fight for its realisation. Also, the American dominance over most of the leading West Asian countries (except Iran and Syria) has neutralised detrimental anti-Israel actions from the Arab side. If the Arab states such as Jordan and Egypt could maintain their traditional ties with Palestine while building a positive relationship with Israel, there is no reason for India not to take a similar route for greater diplomatic manoeuvring, argue the advocates of the new India-Israel axis.
India’s dependence upon the Arab world for its energy security is likely to constrain Modi’s project to take India-Israel relations to the next higher level.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are among the top five trading partners of India, while the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) collectively constitute the largest trading block for India with a trade volume in excess of $150 billion. The 8-million strong Indian workforce in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait etc. would further limit the process of de-hyphenation of India’s policy towards Israel and the Arab states.
Calibrated Approach that Aims at Avoiding Risks
In its quest for a realistic pursuit of global influence and rapid economic and technological advance, India should not lose sight of the normative underpinnings of its historical stand on Palestine.
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, even in the pre-independence era, had decried the British-American strategy of artificially settling Jewish migrants on the Palestinian territory and reducing the original Arab inhabitants to a minority. Hence, even while pursuing its de-hyphenated policy framework in West Asia, India should fashion a calibrated approach that aims at risk avoidance and gradualism in expanding its intimacy with Israel.
De-hyphenation is not about abandoning equilibrium in sensitive theatres of conflict or about letting go the moral basis of one’s foreign policy. It is the moral and normative nuances of foreign policy that bring long-term legitimacy for a country’s external activities and credibility among the small or big actors in international politics.
(The writer is Professor, Department of Political Science, Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda. He can be reached @Amit_Dholakia . This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
(We Indians have much to talk about these days. But what would you tell India if you had the chance? Pick up the phone and write or record your Letter To India. Don’t be silent, tell her how you feel. Mail us your letter at lettertoindia@thequint.com. We’ll make sure India gets your message)
(At The Quint, we question everything. Play an active role in shaping our journalism by becoming a member today.)