Haryana Elections: The Lay of the Electoral Land

A few months after the completion of the 18th Lok Sabha elections, India enters another phase of electoral contest, this time in Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand. Though PM Modi has successfully returned to power by putting together a BJP-led NDA coalition government in June 2024, among political analysts, the broad consensus seems to be that his political clout has been circumscribed. Besides rejuvenating his popularity, PM Modi not only has to manage a coalition government in Delhi, but also has to reassert his leadership both within his party, as well as in the wider ambit of the Sangh Parivar.

To counter recent misgivings about PM Modi’s political influence, the top brass of the BJP continues to perpetuate his image as the all-powerful Hindu sovereign. Among other things, the usual “decisive” style of politics – a characteristic feature of all Modi governments from Gujarat to Delhi – is on display, for instance, in the recent proposal of ‘One Nation, One Election.’ These political embellishments aside, the results of these forthcoming state elections will closely shape the trajectory of the Modi-led NDA government in Delhi.

In this piece, I delimit myself to the state of Haryana. My key argument is that factors shaping Haryana’s election season carry resonance across India’s Hindi belt.

Stitching Together a Multi-caste Hindu Identity 

Like other north Indian states, Haryana has been very receptive to the BJP’s brand of politics. For instance, in both the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP won all 10 Parliament seats. In 2014, PM Modi became popular as the harbinger of socio-economic development (vikas), and then in 2019, he emerged as the protector of the nation, defending its border with the arch-rival Pakistan. Likewise, at level of the state, the BJP formed the government in Haryana in both 2014 and 2019. In other words, for a decade, Haryana has been ruled by the so-called “double-engine” government.

Recently, however, Haryana has emerged as a hotbed of anti-incumbency. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP won only five Parliament seats. And, if predictions of political pundits are anything to go by, then the BJP is heading towards a loss in the 2024 Haryana elections. How does one explain this transformation? 

After coming to power in 2014, PM Modi appointed Manohar Lal Khattar, a former RSS pracharak, as the Chief Minister of Haryana. Khattar’s appointment took many by surprise. Firstly, he was an obscure figure in Haryana’s electoral politics. Secondly, he did not belong to any of the historically dominant agricultural groups of Haryana like Jat, Gujar, and Ahir. Instead, Khattar represented the Punjabi community, a trading caste, whose members migrated to Haryana and its neighbouring regions after the Partition of British India in 1947.

Not surprisingly, Khattar’s promotion disappointed Haryana’s seasoned politicians, especially several Jat leaders who had flocked to the ascending BJP in 2014, aspiring to become Haryana’s next CM. Likewise, the BJP’s Jat voters, who were attracted to Modi’s developmentalist and pro-Hindu image, were frustrated. While conducting fieldwork in rural Haryana, I often heard Jat agriculturalists say, CM humara hota hai (“The CM’s post is ours”). For these reasons, many doubted Khattar’s political acumen to govern Haryana.    

The mainstream media celebrated Khattar’s promotion as BJP’s “masterstroke,” as political power was wrested from the hands of Jat politicians, represented by the Hooda and Chautala dynasts. This was the first move in the implementation of the policy of ‘social engineering,’ a term first popularised by KN Govindacharya, an ideologue of the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). It refers to the project of consolidating a broad multi-caste Hindu identity by including leaders representing upper, middle and lower castes in different levels of the BJP’s formal apparatus.

Indeed, by the end of 2014, BJP’s Haryana government served as a good example of social engineering. It included politicians representing not only the traditionally elite castes like the Brahmans, Banias, and Punjabis, but also had leaders from all agriculturalist groups, as well as the historically disadvantaged OBC and Dalit castes.  

In 2016 and 2017, the demand for reservations made by the Jats, arguably Haryana’s most dominant agriculturalist caste, consolidated BJP’s social engineering further. How? Haryana’s non-Jat castes, representing the upper, middle and lower echelons of local caste hierarchies, have long resented Jat political dominance at both local and state levels of government. Against the backdrop of Jat reservations demand, the political interests of all non-Jat groups aligned against the Jats, who had gained much notoriety for plunging Haryana into political violence and disorder in February 2016.

The prospect of sidelining towering Jat politicians like Bhupinder Hooda from formal structures of political power, and keeping the dominant Jats at bay from state resources accessible via the reservations policy, served as a glue for various BJP-backed non-Jat politicians. Since 2016, the resulting Jat and non-Jat caste divide has shaped Haryana’s politics profoundly. More recently, however, the BJP and its leading figures have started facing tremendous anti-incumbency. Among other things, it has compelled the BJP to remove Khattar from Haryana, and reposition him in PM Modi’s new cabinet in Delhi.

Anti-incumbency 

While it is widely recognised that the multi-caste Hindu identity put together by the BJP has incurred numerous fractures, it still remains to be seen if it has lost its potency significantly, or just marginally. One of the outcomes of a highly polarised socio-political milieu, which currently prevails in India’s Hindi belt, is that the political allegiances of pollsters start shaping their electoral understandings. This was most visible during the 18th Lok Sabha elections, when most exit polls conducted by corporate-led media houses predicted a massive landslide victory for the BJP. Something similar might be happening in Haryana too, but in the opposite direction.

Several political analysts appearing on various media channels (both TV and YouTube) are predicting that the BJP will receive a serious drubbing at the hands of the Congress. My unsolicited advice would be to not underestimate the BJP’s electoral strength.  

The 2020-21 farmers’ protests made the first serious dent in the meticulously crafted multi-caste Hindu identity. While it is indeed accurate that most farmers who protested against the three ‘farm bills’ along the borders of Delhi belonged to the Jat caste (i.e., Sikh Jats from Punjab and Hindu Jats from Haryana and western UP), it does not imply that farmers from other agriculturalist castes like Ahir, Gujar, Rajput, Saini, Ror, did not participate and were thus indifferent to the farmers’ protests.

Before advancing such facile arguments, one must remember that all agricultural castes of this region are bound by centuries-old ties of socio-political cooperation and affinity. They are best captured through the regional idiom of bhaichara (brotherhood). All political stratagems to drive a wedge between these groups, for example, through the Jat and non-Jat divide, can only offer limited electoral purchase. 

Consider the case of Raj Kumar Saini, a former BJP MP from Kurukshetra, Haryana, who once enjoyed widespread popularity among Saini agriculturalists. He played the leading role in crystallising the Jat and non-Jat caste divide in Haryana by spewing anti-Jat vitriol during the Jat reservations movement in 2016-17, but has now parted ways with the BJP and contests elections against its candidates.

Likewise, Rao Inderjit Singh, a widely popular Ahir politician, and the current BJP MP from Gurgaon, has expressed interest in becoming Haryana’s next CM. His displeasure with the promotion of Nayab Singh Saini, a much junior politician, as the new BJP CM of Haryana in March 2024 is reported by many. These two examples (and there are several like this) underscore that the model of social engineering adopted by the BJP, popularly known as the Jat and non-Jat divide, is an artificial one, and goes against historical ties of bhaichara prevailing among various farming castes of Haryana, and by extension, of north India. 

The second factor influencing Haryana’s electoral politics is widespread unemployment. As Haryana’s youth seek non-farm jobs (to not only fulfil their forward-looking aspirations, but to also escape downward mobility precipitated by the abysmal state of India’s farming economy), a very small number of salaried positions are available in both state and private economy. A recent promotional video released by Rahul Gandhi’s team has catapulted the dangerous trend of the ‘donkey route,’ or illegal immigration, into the public domain. Despite gaining immediate popularity in Haryana and beyond, the so-called dunki problem captures the unemployment issue only partially.

It is widely known that illegal immigration to the US, Canada, or elsewhere, is pursued largely by the youth from farming families, as only they have farming land to sell to finance the dangerous mission. The issue of unemployment confronted by the youth from landless castes remains untouched by all political parties. No wonder, the problem of drug addiction, popularly known as chitta, which was until recently limited to Punjab, is now making inroads in rural Haryana. Such widespread economic dissatisfaction against the current government will only aid the opposition.  

These recent developments, along with others like the Agniveer army recruitment scheme, have brought to the fore certain fractures in the multi-caste Hindu identity. The BJP’s performance in this election will depend on whether those fractures are shallow or deep. 

The Opposition

The Congress too has cobbled together a wide spectrum of multi-caste politicians in its fold, for example, Bhupinder Singh Hooda, Selja Kumari, and Rao Dan Singh, among others. Add to the list Haryana's Meo leaders as well, who are siding with the Congress to resist the aggressive BJP. But, having gained a reputation for not being able to manage internal factionalism, a weakness repeatedly exploited by the BJP, the biggest challenge confronting the Congress would be to keep its team together to cross the finish line.

For that, the Congress has hired a team of electoral strategists like Sunil Kanugolu, who has previously helped them win Karnataka and Telangana state elections. The swelling crowds attending Rahul Gandhi’s rallies, as well as his ongoing yatra through Haryana, suggest the Congress may form the next government.  

Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Admi Party (AAP) is the new entrant in Haryana’s electoral fray. Belonging to Haryana’s Bania community, Kejriwal will target the traditional vote-bank of the BJP, i.e., the Brahman, Bania and Punjabi groups of Haryana. Further, if his electoral successes in Delhi and Punjab are anything to go by, then he may also make inroads among other communities of Haryana.

Two Dalit leaders from the UP, namely, Kumari Mayawati from Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Chandra Shekhar Azad from Aazad Samaj Party (ASP), have entered into an alliance with two separate patrilines of the famous Chautala lineage, whose ancestors like Devi Lal and OP Chautala once ruled the state. Their prospects in this election, however, do not seem very promising.   

If the BJP loses Haryana, it is bound to impact state elections in Maharashtra and Jharkhand later this year. This is because issues like the declining farm economy and growing rates of unemployment are not limited to Haryana but have recently emerged as national-level concerns. The results of these state elections may further circumscribe the BJP’s political clout, and fuel murmurs of a leadership change under the aegis of the RSS. 

(Vineet Rathee has a PhD in Anthropology from McGill University, where he currently works as a course lecturer. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)