Do We Have the Intent or Capability for Covert Ops Across the LoC?

Lack of strike capability has prevented India from carrying out cross-border ops in PoK, writes Sharat Kalapa.

In the days following the latest attack by militants on the Army Brigade headquarters in Uri, the media has been awash with speculations of a “secret” cross-border strike on the training camps in the PoK. The existence of these training camps has been an open secret for decades now. Their exact locations and the fact that they are being run by the ISI for the express purpose of training the misguided (and in many cases, coerced) youth from both sides of the LoC to attack Indian interests is also a well-known fact.

So, why have successive governments not taken any action against what would appear to any impartial observer, grave provocations, if not outright acts of war against India? And what has changed now for us to believe that any direct action has been taken?

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Are We Capable of Carrying Out a Surgical Strike?

Actions of this nature are predicated upon two basic factors: One, do we have the capability to do it and two, do we have the intention and the resolve to do it?

The first question is more straightforward. And the short answer is no, we do not have the capability. To carry out what is widely referred to as a “surgical strike”, the crucial ingredient that we lack are the helicopters capable of evading radar and air defence weapon systems, specifically, man-portable air-defence systems. The Americans showed the world exactly what is needed in terms of helicopters and air support to carry out such an action when they struck in Abbottabad to capture Osama bin Laden.

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Is a Surgical Strike a Realistic Option?

• Presence of training camps and their exact location in PoK region is well-known; India has consciously chosen not to target them.
  
• India lacks both aerial as well as land-based strike capabilities needed to target the enemy by moving 20-30 Km across the LoC.
  
• Deployment of army for maintaining internal security in some parts of the country reduces their strength considerably.
  
• Launching a military offensive requires political will as well, with the leadership often remaining oblivious of the ground realities.
  

Lacking Aerial and Land-Based Strike Capabilities

While our special forces are capable of inflicting the necessary damage once they are delivered on target, we do not have the capability to aerially insert and extract the team needed to carry out such an operation. The other option of infiltrating a team by land to hit an objective 20 to 30 km deep, when the enemy is on a state of high alert, would be extremely difficult and exfiltrating successfully after the mission would be practically impossible. After all, the very purpose of a surgical strike is a quick, hard-hitting action which sends a clear message to the adversary without getting into a bloody slugging match.

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Question of Deploying the Army for Internal Security

The second question is a little more difficult to answer directly. As Clausewitz famously said, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. Which means that an action like this should be part of our foreign policy. When our country’s interests are hurt, we should respond suitably with all available means, including military if necessary. This is a fact that we as a nation need to understand and also accept, that this is where we have failed so far.

For far too long, as a country, we have used the army to do the jobs that the civil administration and the police have failed to do, which is to handle insurgency and militancy within our borders. Hence, we do not see the army in its true role as the final instrument of our foreign policy.

At the risk of stating the obvious here, we need to understand that if we need more police forces, we should recruit and train more police forces, not use the Army for extended periods of time on police (internal security) duties. After all, nobody would use a Formula One racing car to commute to office so why do we continue to use the Army (which is trained only to use lethal force) against the misguided citizens of our country for extended periods of time? The incapability of the armed police forces to deal with insurgency in any case is more to do with training and leadership rather than lack of numbers.

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Clarity in Political Objectives

It must be kept in mind, when we retaliate across the border (whether it is the International Border or LoC), it will be a political decision and we as a nation must be prepared for all the possible consequences of such an action. In the context of the Kargil War, it was President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan who, when asked during an interview if he had miscalculated the Indian reaction to the Kargil incursions, said in his usual brazen manner that he had not miscalculated, it was India which had “overreacted”. So how the enemy will react is best known only to the enemy, but we must be prepared for all possible options, else we will suffer the consequences.

Once such an action has been initiated, the political objectives must be clear to all stakeholders. This has unfortunately not been the case in any of our previous wars.

Fighting a war is a serious and professional business and needs a clear understanding of military matters by key decision makers in the government as well. Both our most resounding military victory in 1971 as well as our most humiliating defeat in 1962 saw the political leadership not in sync with military realities on the ground prior to both these wars.

The difference in the outcome in 1971 was largely due to the strength of character of the man who was then at the helm of the army. He did not buckle to political pressure and start the war without being fully prepared and at the time of his choosing.

Post-Uri Military Offensive Will Mark Shift in Policy

So coming back to the question: did we take any military action post the Uri incident? The facts in the public domain do not support the case, but if we did, then we should applaud the government for not turning the other cheek for a change and the army for successfully giving a befitting reply. More importantly, this would definitely mark a turning point in the way we as a country respond to any form of external aggression against us.

(The writer is a retired officer of the Indian Army who served as a Major in the Kashmir valley during the thick of insurgency from 1995 to 1998. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)

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