Is it even possible to talk about India and Pakistan having neighbourly relations without talking about China?
A panel of national security and international relations experts sat down on 7 December to discuss the topic of whether India and Pakistan – the only two nuclear powers to have fought a war with each other – can ever have friendly relations. It included heavy-hitters like ex-foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal, General Deepak Kapoor, ex-high commissioners to Pakistan TCA Raghavan and Sharat Sabharwal, journalist Saeed Naqvi, and Congress MP Gaurav Gogoi, with career diplomat Surendra Kumar moderating.
Saeed Naqvi passionately argued that the Hindu-Muslim divide within India was adding to the intractability of the problem, highlighting the acceleration of communalism over the last three and a half years. He found some agreement on this with Sharat Sabharwal, who said that this kind of polarising domestic rhetoric limits the space in which foreign policy can be formulated and implemented.
And if domestic politics was constraining Indian foreign policy, it was the Pakistan Army's influence on policymaking that was constraining Pakistan's. The participants spent considerable time weighing the merits of increased dialogue, or dialogue including both countries' militaries, or the stoppage of dialogue altogether. Gaurav Gogoi's prescription for chipping away at the Army's influence over the Pakistani public was for India to engage with Pakistani society, enable people-to-people links, and sell India's economic vision over a communal one.
But all of these well-meaning suggestions come up against a concrete fact:
So long as China and India have antagonistic relations, our increasingly belligerent Eastern neighbour is not about to let its ‘all-weather friend’ and its main regional adversary cosy up with each other.
Kanwal Sibal emphasised the role of China, saying "the China factor will be a huge impediment" to growing ties between Pakistan and India – and China would use the chasm between Pakistan's civilian and military establishments to scuttle warming ties.
With China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 11 December saying in a speech that it was China's "restraint" and diplomacy that ultimately led to India "withdrawing" from Doklam – against MEA Sushma Swaraj maintaining that it was a mutual withdrawal – and with recent allegations of China diverting Brahmaputra waters before they reach India, it's clear that China is in no mood to let sleeping dogs lie.
Christine Fair, defence and Pakistan expert, indicated that in response to India getting tough on the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan – which have seen stalled negotiations in September on the building of two dams in J&K – China may turn the heat up on the Brahmaputra.
All this goes to show that India's policies on its Eastern and Western borders may have become inextricably intertwined.
Pakistan, the Jewel in the Crown
The China-Pakistan friendship has delivered tangible and satisfying benefits to both sides. From undercutting India's bid to be included in the Nuclear Suppliers Group – where China erected roadblocks in the form of tying India's legitimacy to Pakistan's – to scuttling the designation of Pathankot mastermind Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, to building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to pass through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in spite of India's claim of sovereignty, it’s been smooth sailing on this front.
Pakistan is the keystone in China's vaunted One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative – comprising two routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, giving it access to Europe through Central Asia, South Asia and Africa over land and sea – of which the $46 billion CPEC is an important part. China's closeness to Pakistan has allowed it an avenue into Central Asia and beyond, bringing it a larger swathe of operational space. This is integral to the ambitions of an expansionist China. And with the rift opening between Pakistan and the US, this new benefactor is welcome indeed for Pakistan.
So while it may be conceivable, at some later stage, for Pakistan's civilian establishment to become bold enough to hold its own against the army and move towards normal relations with India, and while it may be possible, at some later stage, for us to shift our own national conversation away from minorities, it may not be realistic to expect the world's second-largest economy and aspiring regional hegemon to sit and watch all of this quietly – there's just too much to be gained from India and Pakistan being at each others' throats.
Trouble in Paradise?
The China-Pakistan friendship has seen a massive upswing recently, but this is not to say that there aren't tensions and trouble-spots. Pakistan, like other countries China has courted, may be coming to the realisation that the terms of business are tilted too far in favour of its giant partner.
The Express Tribune, for example, reported that Pakistan withdrew its request to include the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam in CPEC in early December – a move that came two days after Nepal did the same with its own hydropower project.
Nepal's Deputy PM Kamal Thapa tweeted:
The government has decided to scrap the agreement signed with the Chinese company, Gezhouba Group, for the construction of Budhigandaki Hydropower project. [...] The agreement signed recklessly and shadily with the Chinese group was scrapped following the directives of various parliamentary committees.Kamal Thapa, Deputy Prime Minister, Nepal
Nepal had cited financial concerns with its Chinese partner company for scrapping its $2.5 billion contract for its hydropower project.
Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority Chairman, Muzammil Hussain, said much the same thing, according to the Express Tribune. "Chinese conditions for financing the Diamer-Bhasha Dam are not doable and are against our interests."
In mid-November, Myanmar had said it was no longer interested in hydroelectric projects, 3 years after stalling a $3.6 billion project with the Chinese. It seems that after Sri Lanka's experience with exploitation at the hands of the Chinese at its Hambantota port – which the Chinese have now all but taken over with the signing of a 99-year lease – smaller regional players are growing wary.
And there's another pebble in the shoe – on Friday, 8 December, China's embassy in Islamabad sent out an unusual alert to its citizens in the country.
"The embassy alerts all Chinese organisations and citizens in Pakistan to stay vigilant, safeguard personal security, reduce time spent outside and avoid going to crowded places as much as possible," it cautioned.
The security of its citizens in Pakistan has always been a concern for China, not helped by the the incident in which the Islamic State claimed to have killed two Chinese nationals in June 2017 in Quetta, in the restive Balochistan region.
China also fears that Uighur militants from within its borders could receive terror training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, only to return to China and wreak havoc.
No Known Cure
These hiccups, though, do not constitute a threat to the fundamental calculus underlying the relationship – that is, a common interest in keeping India down. There are definite things that India could do to change China’s approach to it – be more deferential to greater Chinese influence in the region and give up trying to form alliances to contain China’s rise. But that ship has already sailed, especially with the India-Japan-US-Australia Quadrilateral now slowly taking off after fits and starts over the last decade, and with a meeting of the India-Japan-Australia trilateral held on 13 December.
So what can India do? Gogoi outlined his vision for foreign policy vis a vis Pakistan: Less dovish, less hyperbolic and less noise.
Less dovish, yes – dialogue appears to stall repeatedly in the face of attacks and Pakistan still feels that its interests are best served through continued adventurism across the border. Imposing tangible and quickly administered costs to acts of hostility could change Pakistan's cost-benefit calculations.
Less hyperbole? Of course – hyping up the smallest of reactions will lead to lost credibility and fanning the flames of animosity is unlikely to result in normalisation of the relationship.
But less noise? Perhaps not.
For its adventurism across the border, Pakistan must feel the bite, not only of punitive military operations, but also of a dented image both globally and domestically. A balance must of course be struck between retaliation and avoiding escalation. But there's little use in quietly-quietly giving it back, allowing the aggressor to save face. After the surgical strikes and the Doklam standoff, one thing is clear:
Decisive, measured and swift action, communicated promptly, cements the impression of India as a no-nonsense player, a grown-up, and takes a heavy toll in public perception on the other side.
So while it may be unrealistic to expect India and Pakistan to have friendly relations while China hovers near, India can manage the conflict to reduce symptoms (adventurism on Pakistan's part) while keeping the treatment (dialogue and the possibility of a long-term normalisation) going. Some conditions can only be managed, not cured. Yet.
(With inputs from Reuters, South China Morning Post, Express Tribune)
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