Muhammad Yunus' recent announcement that Bangladesh's interim government will seek former premier Sheikh Hasina's extradition has placed the Indian government between a rock and a hard place.
In a televised address to the nation on his first 100 days in office, the Nobel Peace Laureate and chief advisor to the Bangladesh government said on Sunday, 17 November, that Dhaka would try those responsible for the deaths of hundreds during the student-led protests in the country earlier this year – which ended with the toppling of the Hasina government and her decision to flee to New Delhi in August.
"We will seek the return of the fallen autocrat Sheikh Hasina from India," Yunus said, adding, "I have already discussed the issue with chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Karim Khan."
In this article, we aim to answer three questions:
Why does Yunus' announcement present India with a diplomatic conundrum?
What are the pros and cons for New Delhi if it decides to extradite the 76-year-old Awami League chief?
Is India legally bound to honour an official extradition request from Bangladesh?
Laying the Groundwork for a Fresh Start to India-Bangladesh Ties
Relations between India and Bangladesh have been tense since Hasina's departure from Dhaka. A number of thorns have marred the ties, including growing violence against Hindus across Bangladesh, Indian authorities' delay in processing the visas of Bangladeshi citizens, and safety concerns for Indian officials stationed in the country.
Moreover, the parties in power following Hasina's dismissal include the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) – both of which have viewed India through a sordid lens over the years as opposed to Hasina and her Awami League.
Hence, extraditing Hasina may seem like a logical decision for the Indian government as an attempt to extend an olive branch to the BNP and Jamaat, thus laying the groundwork for India-Bangladesh relations on a fresh and sure footing.
"If India were to extradite Hasina, its relationship with Bangladesh would be stabilised as this would be seen as a big boost to ties given how keen the interim government is to have Hasina back and for her to stand trial in the many cases she is charged in," Michael Kugelman, Director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington DC, said while speaking to The Quint.
Hasina's prolonged stay in India has also become a headache for the Narendra Modi government.
Following her arrival in India on 5 August, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had made a statement in Parliament saying that the deposed prime minister had sought approval to come to New Delhi "for the moment" – indicating that India was not to be her final destination.
While the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said that it was for Hasina to decide her future travel plans, it is no secret that the Indian government was hopeful of her departure from the country at the soonest so that matters between New Delhi and the Yunus-led government do not get complicated – which is exactly what ended up happening.
Over the last few months, there have been several calls from BNP and Jamaat leaders for India to extradite Hasina so that she may come back to "face the music". Moreover, Yunus' decision on 22 August to revoke Hasina's diplomatic passport has essentially tied the hands of both Hasina and India in terms of her attempts at seeking refuge elsewhere.
Infrastructure Projects
Yet another facet that India needs to be mindful of is the various infrastructure projects that are in the works between Indian and Bangladesh – many of which have been partially halted following a change of power.
At least three major joint infrastructure projects are currently under construction, according to the MEA. These include the Rooppur Nuclear Plant 1, Rooppur Nuclear Plant 2, and the Katihar-Parbatipur-Bornagar electricity transmission line. Apart from these, a number of Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs) have also been signed.
Further, talks have been underway between the two governments over the development of the multi-million-dollar Teesta River Project – scheduled to be built near the Siliguri Corridor, a highly strategic area for India as it serves as the only land link between northeastern states and the rest of the country.
The Teesta River Project is also contested by China, and the project going into the hands of Beijing would pose a major security threat to India. This is because it would lead to the stationing of Chinese officials close to India's northeastern states and could exert Chinese influence in the region – something that New Delhi cannot afford due to the Xi Jinping government's incessant claims of Arunachal Pradesh being a part of Chinese territory.
Thus, the success of the projects between India and Bangladesh will depend on how well New Delhi can work with the new parties in power.
India and Bangladesh are also part of several regional groupings – such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and Indian Ocean Rim Association – and have a significant stake in joint cooperation through these bodies.
"If Hasina continues to stay in India, it is sure to have an impact on the cooperation between India and Bangladesh in these groupings," said ORF Associate Fellow Soumya Bhowmick while speaking to The Quint. "The bargaining power of the region as a whole for favourable economic terms will be impacted at these multilateral forums if diplomatic relations are not on a sure footing."
The Cost of Extraditing Hasina
While the benefits of extraditing Hasina are many for India, on the flipside doing so would lead to reputational damage as New Delhi could be painted as an "opportunist" for abandoning its closest ally in the region, according to experts.
Ever since her first term in 1996, Hasina has forged close ties with India and has consistently maintained her stance over the years. The Awami League has also time and again acted against ethnic insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh to harm the interests of India's northeastern states. As opposed to the BNP, which has been accused of nurturing hardline Islamists which are critical of many of India's policies and accuse the Modi government of acting against the interests of Muslims.
"For India, I feel the cons of extraditing Hasina outweigh the costs," says Kugelman. "If India sends her back, it would be a case of India turning its back on its closest friends, which goes against a promise made by India, though indirectly, that it does not abandon its allies."
Moreover, India is still not sure whether it can trust the interim government in Bangladesh. On coming to power, one of the first decisions the government took was to lift the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami. India fears that the BNP and Jamaat could create a safe harbour for hardliners and separatist forces like the United Liberation Front of Asom, as it happened when the coalition assumed power between 2001 and 2006.
Further, India has always had tense relations with the Khaleda Zia-led BNP, which has time and again accused New Delhi of bias towards Hasina and her Awami League, and has prioritised China as a regional hegemon over India.
Yet another factor that India must be mindful of if it decides not to extradite Hasina is that it might invite allegations of "double standards".
In the backdrop of the ongoing tense face-off between the Indian and Canadian governments, New Delhi has consistently attacked Ottawa over its refusal to accept extradition requests from India for Khalistani extremists residing in the country – many of whom have been labelled "terrorists" by the Indian government and charged under stringent laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the National Security Act.
Critics are sure to attack India if it refuses to extradite Hasina to Dhaka, as she herself has been charged with serious crimes in the country, including "massacres, killings, and crimes against humanity".
However, experts suggest that India could point to a difference in perception between the two situations.
"From New Delhi's perspective the argument will be very simple. The individuals that India desires to be extradited are extremists, terrorists, and violent actors, whereas Sheikh Hasina is not any of those things. She's someone who held extremists at bay, strengthened Bangladesh's economy and was a very strong and effective leader. According to India, Hasina does not fit the bill of an extremist or criminal in any way."Michael Kugelman
Is India Legally Bound to Accept Bangladesh's Extradition Request?
Putting aside all the pros and cons for the moment, an official extradition request from Bangladesh will have to be answered by India in accordance with the stringent provisions of the law – whether New Delhi likes it or not. However, this does not mean that the Modi government cannot make use of certain supposed loopholes in the law in its, and Hasina's, favour.
India and Bangladesh signed an extradition treaty in 2013 to keep a check on insurgent activities along the 4,096 km-long border between the two countries. According to the treaty, the two countries aim to streamline the extradition of fugitives on either side who pose a threat to the other's national security.
The treaty requires both countries to extradite people charged with crimes that entail at least one year's imprisonment. The crime in question must be considered a punishable offence in both the countries.
However, Article 6 of the treaty makes an exception for political offences. In other words, either country can refuse an extradition request if the offence for which extradition is being demanded is of a political nature.
Even in this regard, several exceptions have been made. For instance, serious offences like murder, terrorism, kidnapping, manslaughter, et al must be considered outside the scope of a political offence.
While Hasina has been charged with several serious crimes in Bangladesh, including murder and crimes against humanity, India might try and find a way to waive the extradition request citing the provision of political offences.
Yet another article in the treaty may be used by the Indian government to deny extradition. This is Article 8, according to which extradition requests not made under good faith or not in the interests of justice can be turned down.
Hence, India may say that since the people who have accused Hasina of crimes are her age-old rivals (Yunus, BNP, Jamaat et al), the accusations are not credible as they come from quarters with prima facie vested interests.
"If it seems that a third country is not willing to take Hasina in, India will look more closely at the stipulation of the extradition treaty," Kugelman told The Quint.
"While the interim government will point to Hasina's activities in her last weeks and days in power when she permitted Bangladeshi forces to use violent force against protesters, India will try to bring focus to the fact that the people demanding her extradition are critics who have been sparring with her for many years."
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