'Ally Mukt' BJP? How PM Modi & Amit Shah's 5-Step Playbook Is a Disaster for NDA

Have PM Narendra Modi and Amit Shah failed to maintain allies or do they not want to have alliances in the long run?

With Nitish Kumar snapping ties with the BJP, the National Democratic Alliance has lost its biggest non-BJP constituent – the Janata Dal (United) which has 16 seats in the Lok Sabha.

BJP's biggest ally now is the Eknath Shinde faction of the Shiv Sena that claims the support of 12 MPs. If one sets aside the Shinde grouping – whose existence itself is sub-judice – the biggest BJP ally in terms of Lok Sabha strength is the Apna Dal, with 2 seats.

All the remaining NDA constituents have 0-1 seats in the Lok Sabha.

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power in 2014, about 19 parties have quit the NDA. To be fair, some have come back as well.

However, some of the most important allies are no longer with the BJP – the Telugu Desam Party left the NDA in 2018, at a time when it had 15 seats in the Lok Sabha. The BJP's oldest ally – Shiv Sena – left in 2019. Its second oldest ally – Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) – left in 2020. And now the Janata Dal (United).

In none of these cases did Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his second-in-command Amit Shah try to stop any of these parties from leaving.

So, what explains the BJP's inability to maintain allies?

The answer partly lies in the Modi-Shah playbook for managing alliances.

The Modi-Shah Alliance Playbook

PM Modi and Amit Shah have been adopting a clear playbook for alliances in various states, with minor variations. It broadly involves the following steps.

1. Ally with a dominant regional party in a state where the BJP isn't strong enough on its own

2. Use the alliance to expand BJP's influence in new areas or communities. Capture the regional party's entire base if possible.

3. If not, then dump or split the regional party

4. Ally with a smaller, more pliable regional player (or a faction of the above regional party).

5. Take a much larger share of tickets and power for the BJP.

To be fair, the first two steps have been the BJP's policy even before Modi and Shah. However, the third, fourth, and fifth steps are Modi-Shah's speciality.

This approach has particularly been successful in the Northeast, with Himanta Biswa Sarma also playing a role in this. Several 'allies' have met this fate:

• Bodoland People's Front was replaced by UPPL in Assam's Bodoland region

• Sikkim Democratic Front was replaced by Sikkim Kranti Morcha. Later all SDF MLAs except former CM Pawan Kumar Chamling joined the BJP.

• Naga People's Front was replaced by NDPP in Nagaland. Later 21 out of 25 MLAs joined BJP ally NDPP.

• Asom Gana Parishad surrendered much of its base even before reaching stage three.

Outside of the Northeast, this has happened with the Shiv Sena. The same method was tried on the Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal), the Telugu Desam Party but with limited success.

The case in Bihar is even more complex. Here the BJP is said to have used Chirag Paswan's Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) to weaken the Janata Dal (United) while still in alliance with the latter. The JD(U) did suffer some losses as a result in the 2020 Assembly elections. However later, the BJP backed Paswan's uncle Pashupati Paras and allegedly facilitated a split in the LJP itself, the party which helped weaken the JD(U).

Given these machinations, it becomes difficult for BJP allies to survive, unless they reduce themselves to a completely subservient position like an AGP or Apna Dal. Unfortunately for these parties, even quitting the NDA didn't help, as can be seen from the splits in the Shiv Sena and Telugu Desam Party.

The Backstory to the Modi-Shah Playbook

Through his career – from a Gujarat BJP functionary to the prime minister of India – Modi's has had different levels of engagement with non-Congress parties or regional parties.

As the BJP's incharge for Haryana and Himachal Pradesh in the mid 1990s, Modi played a key role in forging the BJP's alliance with the INLD. While based in Chandigarh as part of this responsibility, he also cultivated a rapport with SAD patriarch Parkash Singh Badal.

During his later years as Gujarat CM, Modi tried to cultivate good relations with several regional leaders as he presented himself as a champion of federalism against the UPA government at the Centre.

This included the then Tamil Nadu CM J Jayalalithaa, Nagaland CM Neiphu Rio, Punjab CM Parkash Singh Badal, West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee and Odisha CM Naveen Patnaik. However, Nitish Kumar never quite warmed up to him, despite being a BJP ally.

More than his stint as a BJP national office bearer or Gujarat CM, Modi's approach towards regional and non-Congress parties is shaped by his earlier experiences as a BJP organisational functionary in Gujarat.

As BJP's organisation secretary in Gujarat in the late 1980s and a key part of the Gujarat BJP's win in 1995, Modi developed a deep distrust of the Janata Dal, in particular its face in Gujarat – Chimanbhai Patel.

Unlike some of his party colleagues who saw Chimanbhai as a lesser evil compared to the Congress, Modi was firm in his belief that the BJP can come to power in Gujarat only if the Janata Dal is destroyed. This is what eventually happened in the state.

Unlike an Atal Bihari Vajpayee who didn't mind accommodating diverse parties and making ideological compromises on issues like Article 370 for the sake of political power, Modi and Shah are much more firm on establishing BJP's political and ideological hegemony.

So while a Vajpayee could accommodate a National Conference, DMK or Trinamool Congress, Modi-Shah didn't even spare the BJP's oldest and only Hindutva ally – Shiv Sena.

No doubt, this approach has given the BJP unprecedented political power and given it clout similar to what the Congress enjoyed at its peak.

However, it leaves the BJP without much of a buffer and excessively dependent on Modi and Shah's ability to consolidate Hindu votes across caste hierarchies and regional distinctions.

Such a consolidation isn't easy to sustain and can be maintained largely through emphasis on a communal or national security threat. In the run-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the absence of strong allies could add to the uncertainty for the BJP.