Why did the dog not bark?
– Sherlock Holmes in ‘The Hounds of the Baskervilles’
For 2nd Battalion, The Rajputana Rifles (2 RAJRIF) the Kargil War started when we received a Warning Order at Kupwara on May 25, 1999, to be prepared to move to Sonamarg.
We knew something was amiss in the Kargil sector.
We assumed that militants were holding heights near Zozila and army units were struggling to dislodge them besides suffering heavy casualties.
On May 29, we received orders to move. On my way to Sonamarg I tried to gather maps and information. I managed to get two sets of maps and the information I gathered left me less wise and more confused. On reaching the transit camp in Sonamarg one realised what the fog of war is all about.
There was hardly any officer around with first-hand information, many more speculations, even greater ‘no opinions’ on what ought to be done and rumours were flowing thick and fast. I took the precautionary measure to isolate my battalion and moved away from the transit camp on the road into a camp a considerable distance away and started preparing for the worst: “Attack along enemy held ridge line.”
Moved to Drass
Inducted in to the Drass sector on June 1, my battalion was tasked on June 3 to capture Tololing. What little information we could gather was patchy and contradictory. The first job was to get all the required information for executing our task, which we accomplished by some close reconnaissance and talking to troops in contact with the enemy, and firmed up our plan.
The success of the plan hinged on our ability to move 15 tons of ammunition close to the enemy, then build up the assaulting troops surreptitiously and launch a ferocious and determined attack on an enemy holding strategic high ground. In doing so, I was witness to awe-inspiring capability to suffer great privation, face adverse physical and professional challenges and willingness to risk men, junior leaders and officers of 2 RAJRIF.
A night-blind carpenter Uttam Singh lugged ammunition, trekking every night for eight hours, catching the coat tail of the soldier in front of him. Such was the level of motivation and professionalism of this battalion.
Attack Launched
The attack commenced at 9 pm on June 12 to the boom of 100 artillery gun support. After a night-long operation, 2 RAJRIF was able to wrest Tololing Top from the enemy with 11 dead besides 92 injured. This was a great morale booster for the army which never looked back. The Chief of Army Staff, General V P Malik, personally congratulated the battalion. He said “You (battalion) have done the army proud, the nation proud,” and later termed this the “turning point’ of the Kargil war.
This battalion launched another ferocious and successful attack on June 29 on Three Pimples with heavy losses. Three officers and six soldiers died. Gen Malik, impressed by the tremendous success and the determination and courage that went into it, announced the Indian Army’s first suo moto “Army Chief’s Unit Citation”.
The nation bestowed four Mahavir Chakras MVC, seven Vir Chakras, nine SM and two MinD for display of individual valour, two battle honours for ‘Tololing’ and ‘Drass’ and a theatre honour ‘Kargil’ for collective achievements. We in the battalion felt we deserved at least one Param Veer Chakra, the highest gallantry award.
In this war 2 RAJRIF and several other battalions essentially restored an adverse situation in our favour at an enormous cost in human life.
Monumental Intelligence Failure
The question that cries out for an answer is why did we get into such a situation in the first place? In my opinion the war was the result of a monumental intelligence failure.
Border security has many layers of protection. The troops physically guarding it are the penultimate layer, the force that restored the status quo ante, such as my battalion, is the ultimate layer.
There are many more layers starting with the Research and Analysis Wing assets, the Air Force, the army’s air surveillance assets and ground intelligence assets of the army and the Intelligence Bureau.
If Pakistan Air Force, which was kept out of the loop by Pakistan Army, could detect the intrusion, why couldn’t our security agencies?
Had the dog barked the story would have been different.
The Question
The nation has not been informed how the armed forces and the security agencies collectively failed, and what systemic changes should be made to ensure this does not happen in the future. And how in the future we need not sacrifice troops to perform a task that could have been undertaken at a much lower cost.
Have we learnt our lessons?
(A former Commanding Officer, 2 Rajputana Rifles, the writer fought in Tololing and Drass in the summer of 1999.)
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