Twelve kilometres short of Malkangiri town, around 80 men, clutching bows and arrows crossed the narrow, metalled road, heading for the hillock ahead. Their temples glistening with perspiration, the men appeared cheerful and determined to make the most of the hunting trip they had set out for.
But unlike the tribal men in Odisha’s Malkangiri, their counterparts in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma did not step out of their emaciated villages to partake of the bounties of nature.
Sukma is in the grip of fear after the massacre of 26 CRPF jawans by Maoist guerrillas on 24 April. The attack sent shockwaves across three blocks – Sukma, Chhindgarh and Konta – of this “liberated zone” where the Maoists are said to enjoy control and influence.
Malkangiri’s “Different and Effective Technique”
It is not that Malkangiri has suddenly become an oasis of peace in this region, where security forces battle bands of Maoist rebels, often at the cost of heavy loss of life.
Senior district police officers, who requested anonymity, claim that of the seven “development blocks”, six remain affected by the Maoist menace, and relative peace prevails over two, Motu and Pariya. That is, until 27 April.
That night, two men from Suddhakanda hamlet in MV-79 village under Telrayi gram panchayat were shot dead by alleged Naxals, leaving the district administration stunned.
And yet, the police have reasons to believe that Malkangiri – once the Naxals’ strongest redoubt in a zone where the borders of four states are close enough to give the insurgents a strategic advantage – is better off than Sukma which has, over the past few years, been the epicentre of “red terror”.
The CRPF is the weakest link in the anti-Naxal operations, a Malkangiri district official said.
Although there is no dearth of political will, the weak link in anti-Naxal operations is the CRPF itself. The jawans do not have the adequate military training to take on the hardened guerrillas. They are often found to be lacking the wits and will to take the fight to the Maoists.
“Coupled with this dismal situation, development of and around Sukma is happening at a very slow pace. Besides, corruption and wilful neglect of development has not helped,” the official added.
Maoist influence and violence was contained to some extent in 2012, when the CRPF was withdrawn from counter-insurgency operations and replaced with the BSF. This gave shape to a “different and supposedly effective strategy” on the ground. The BSF adopted a more offensive tactic, reaching erstwhile inaccessible areas and setting up camps in an “area domination” method.
“The deployment of the BSF certainly helped,” G Srinivas Rao, a local social worker, told The Quint.
Strategic and tactical operations are limited but the BSF and the state police have managed to beat back the Maoists. This was reflected in the killing of about 30 rebels, including some leaders, near Chitrakonda dam in Malkangiri in October last year.G Srinivas Rao, Local social worker
Malkangiri is Better Managed than Sukma’s Castaways
Nestled in the foothills of the Mallikeshwar mountains, Malkangiri town is evidently “better managed” than Sukma, insofar as town administration is concerned. The adivasi-dominated villages have a network of narrow, but pucca roads. Government establishments provide sundry services and the area boasts stable mobile connectivity.
But in nearby Sukma, 26 km northwest of Malkangiri, there is no phone or internet connectivity. Beyond Sukma town, there are hardly any motorable roads. The adivasi villages and their inhabitants have, for years together, been treated as castaways by the district authorities. In tehsil after tehsil, there is no visible sign or presence of the police’s authority.
“The situation across Sukma is desperate. The void in terms of administrative neglect is appalling, giving the Maoists the opportunity to run a parallel administration,” Manish Kunjum, a Sukma-based CPI leader said. Srinivas Rao concurs. He said that the Maoists’ “praja courts”, for instance, deliver instance justice and the rebels often act to provide medical assistance to the “neglected” adivasis.
“Chhattisgarh has messed it all up in terms of delivery of government services, pushing the poor adivasis toward the Naxals. In contrast, Malkangiri, which too has its own sets of problems, has managed fairly well. The Maoists have been forced to retreat from Motu and Pariya blocks,” said a senior Malkangiri police officer.
Red Menace Fuelled by Corporate Interests
Much of the credit of having “pushed back” the Naxals, goes to Akhileshwar Singh, a former Superintendent of Police, who organised outreach programmes to win over the adivasis living in the fringe areas during his tenure.
However, even as the Odisha and Chhattisgarh governments deal with the “red menace” in their respective ways – with varying degrees of success and failure – sources in both state administrations do not mince words about the corporate interests in the region. Sources spoke of the often “shady” role played by corporates interests in a region that boasts untapped mineral wealth.
“There is absolutely no doubt that some of the corporates with deep interest in mining in these parts have a nexus with the Maoists. The two live off each other. In Malkangiri, for instance, a particular company’s multi-crore road-building project has not been stopped by the Naxals. Likewise, the rebels have been kind towards another company’s iron ore pipeline project,” Srinivas Rao said.
The “deal” between corporates and Maoists, if at all there is one, is allegedly paved with “dirty money” that the former dishes out – as pay-offs to the rebels so they can continue with their “business interests”.
And even as this alleged nexus is spoken of in hushed tones, the central government’s bluster – that it would avenge the 24 April Sukma attack – is being locally interpreted as “routine impotent rage” of little significance.
(At The Quint, we question everything. Play an active role in shaping our journalism by becoming a member today.)