UP Madarsa Act: How SC Corrected Allahabad HC's Overreach

In question were the rights of minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions under Art 30.

Advocates react after the Supreme Court's verdict on UP Madarsa Education Act.

(Photo: PTI)

On 5 November, in Anjum Kadari & Anr v Union of India, a Supreme Court (SC) bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachu (one of his last cases) and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, set aside a judgment of the Allahabad High Court (HC) around the constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act 2004.

The HC had ruled that the Madarsa Act violated the principles of secularism and Articles 14, 21, and 21 A of the Constitution.

The SC, however, observed that the former had erred and that a statute can be struck down only if violates fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution or violates provisions regarding legislative competence.  

"The Constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. In a challenge to the statute for the violation of the principles of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism. The High Court erred in holding that the statute is bound to be struck down if it is violative of the basic structure," the SC held. 

The court, however, added that the Act, to the extent that it regulates higher education to award higher degrees 'Fazil' and 'Kamil', is in conflict with the UGC Act, and to that extent, it was unconstitutional.  

In my last piece, I argued that the SC would likely set aside the judgment as it was clear from the first day that the Allahabad HC had misconstrued the provisions of the Act.

Here’s a brief overview of the four conclusions from the judgment:

• The Act regulates the standards of education in Madarsas

• The Act ensures that students attain a level of competency that allows them to be a part of the mainstream society

• Article 21A (Right to Education) and the Right to Education Act must be interpreted in a way that respects the rights of religious and linguistic minorities

• Fazil and Kamil are unconstitutional because they are in conflict with the UGC Act, a law under Entry 66 of the Union List

The Allahabad HC's Argument

The Allahabad High Court argued that the state's involvement in religious instruction contradicted the equal treatment of all religions mandated by the Constitution, and therefore, the Act violated secularism.

Additionally, the Act, as per the court, was found to infringe upon Article 21 A (which guarantees children the right to free and compulsory education) by effectively segregating students in Madarsas from mainstream, secular education. 

While declaring the law as ultra vires, the division comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Subhash Vidyarthi also directed the UP government to frame a scheme within which students presently studying in Madarsas can be accommodated in the formal education system, i.e., under the state's primary and secondary education boards.

This directly impacts the rights of minorities to establish and administer their own educational institutions under Article 30. The case before the Supreme Court was to determine the balance between the state's duty to ensure secular education and the constitutional rights of minorities to preserve their religious and educational practices. 

The SC's Judgment

In para 85 of the judgment, the SC emphasised that the Madarsa Act seeks to regulate educational institutions run by religious minorities and the distinction between "religious instruction" and "religious education" is crucial.

Madarsas do provide religious instruction, but their primary aim is education. The legislation (Madarsa Act) that regulates these institutions does not overstep the state's legislative competence simply because some religious instruction is part of the curriculum. The state's interest in ensuring the quality of education is not limited by the presence of religious teachings. 

The court added that even though Madarsas impart religious education, they are still fundamentally educational institutions, and the inclusion of religious instruction does not strip them of this identity. The legislative competence of the state in regulating such institutions is upheld, ensuring that minority institutions comply with educational standards while still respecting their religious character. 

The court held that when granting aid or recognition to minority institutions, the state may impose regulations. However, these regulations must meet three conditions: they must be reasonable, they should help the institution serve as an effective vehicle for education, and they must aim at maintaining high educational standards and efficient administration.

Referring to its earlier decisions, (State of Kerala v Very Rev Mother Provincial) the court reiterated that the right of minorities to administer educational institutions includes the right to manage the affairs of the institution in accordance with the ideas and interests of the community in general and the institution in particular.

"However, the right to administer minority educational institutions is not absolute. The right to administer educational institutions implies an obligation and duty of minority institutions to provide a standard of education to the students.70 The right to administer is, it is trite law, not the right to maladminister."

Supreme Court

Further, in para 55 of the judgment, the SC determined whether a statute can be struck down for being violative of the basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala). The court concluded that a statute can be struck down only for the violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or for being without legislative competence.  

The Court observed that the constitutional validity of "statute can be struck down only for the violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or for being without legislative competence."

"Allowing courts to strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will introduce an element of uncertainty in our constitutional adjudication. Recently, this Court has accepted that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute for violation of the basic structure is a technical aspect because the infraction has to be traced to the express provisions of the Constitution. Hence, in a challenge to the validity of a statute for violation of the principle of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism."

Supreme Court

The SC's decision is a welcome move that rightly restores balance in the regulation of minority educational institutions, particularly Madarsas, and ensures that the education of the Muslim community is protected within constitutional boundaries (Article 30).

By setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of religious minorities to manage their institutions while allowing necessary regulations to enhance educational standards. 

(Areeb Uddin Ahmed is an advocate practicing at the Allahabad High Court. He writes on various legal developments. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)