advertisement
The year 2024 has kicked off with the India-Maldives relationship witnessing an unusual strain. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep in early January triggered a diplomatic row between India and the Maldives, with three deputy ministers of the latter making racist remarks against PM Modi.
While the government suspended the three ministers and distanced themselves from the comments, President Mohamed Muizzu returning from his China visit, called India a 'bully' and assured to reduce over-reliance on India. He also gave a deadline for India to withdraw all its troops from the Maldives by March.
Muizzu's overt anti-India posturing is not a product of geopolitics or domestic politics alone. A successful 'India Out' campaign and its potential political benefits, and the use of Islam as a tool to appease Islamists and voters, Muizzu's pre-occupation with securing his tenure, his preference to work with China, along with Beijing’s assurances and guarantees, are contributing to this posturing.
Muizzu’s Progressive Alliance (PA), consisting of the Progressive Party of Maldives and the People’s National Congress, came to power through a nationalist 'India Out' campaign. There is no denying that elections in the Maldives have often revolved around the politicisation of India, but the PA’s ability to make this campaign a perennial issue rather than just an electoral one has significantly damaged India’s image.
Since 2020, the campaign has systematically targeted India and its role in the country, especially defense cooperation, and accused it of violating the country’s sovereignty. The alliance demanded that India withdraw its troops from the country and asked the then-ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) to publicise all the agreements and documents signed with India. The intention was to provoke nationalist sentiments by portraying India and the MDP as enemies of the country and reap electoral benefits.
Muizzu’s dependence on the Islamist and hardline elements like Jamiyyathul Salaf (JS) for political gains has further incentivised him and his party to promote anti-Indian sentiments or even turn a blind eye towards them. Since the 2004 tsunami and the country’s democratisation in 2008, Islamists have made gradual inroads in the country, promoting hardline interpretations of Islam at the expense of the country’s local practices and customs.
As a result, the ‘Ummah’ or Islamic brotherhood in the Maldives has gained more importance than in the past. The Yoga Day attack in 2022 and criticism of India’s solidarity with Israel on the recent Hamas terror attack are a mere indication of these complexities. This phenomenon has incentivised PA leaders and activists to target India by using domestic politics as a pretext. Given the incentive to woo both voters and the hardliners simultaneously, the PA is continuing to use this anti-India narrative.
Muizzu’s preoccupation with consolidating his hold over PPM-PNC (Progressive Party of Maldives-People's National Congress) and securing his five-year tenure is also fuelling this anti-India rhetoric. Being the last candidate to participate in the elections from the PPM-PNC, Muizzu has managed to sideline and eventually oust his prime threat, that is, former president Abdulla Yameen Gayoom.
Yet, to consolidate his power, he is promoting his inexperienced loyalists and activists to crucial portfolios. It is no coincidence that today, Muizzu’s administration has more than 200 deputy and state ministers, putting rational decision-making and administration in the backseat. The racist slurs by the deputy ministers and Muizzu’s hesitancy to take strict action against them fearing repercussions indicate that domestic politics are taking precedence over rational decisions in the country.
In addition, the PPM-PNC’s preference for China and China’s keen interest in making inroads in the Maldives are fuelling his policy. During his recent visit to China, Muizzu asked China to retain its status as a top tourist source for the country even as Indian tourists called for a boycott of the Maldives. Furthermore, Muizzu signed 20 MoUs and even agreed to expedite BRI projects and revive the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In return, China has offered scholarships to civil servants, a grant of 130 million USD, agreed to fund housing projects and infrastructure projects, and even consented to forgive the Maldives’ loan payment for the next five years.
This emboldened stance comes when New Delhi has shown signs of cooperation with the Maldives. India has not publicly complained of Muizzu’s maiden visit to Turkey over India, the non-renewal of the hydrographic agreement, and the government’s absence from the Colombo Security Conclave. Besides, India has also been exploring solutions with the Maldives to withdraw its troops stationed in the country.
But given that the government is keen to minimise engagements with India for domestic and geopolitical benefits, there is not much New Delhi can do. New Delhi should continue and effectively implement their community development and mega-infrastructure projects - for it will not be long before Muizzu realises that geography is an inalienable aspect of any foreign policy, and ignoring it will have severe political, economic, development and security costs.
(Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow, South Asia, at the Observer Research Foundation. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
(At The Quint, we question everything. Play an active role in shaping our journalism by becoming a member today.)
Published: undefined