Pakistan Should Know That India Has Run Out of Patience

How should India retaliate in light of Pakistan-based terrorist outfit JeM’s attack on Indian forces?

Image used for representational purposes. 

(Photo: Kamran Akhter / The Quint)

In the aftermath of the Pulwama attacks, the main theme of print and electronic media news has been “When will India respond?” For a change, the political spectrum has shown solidarity and offered their support to the government in whatever action it takes.

Pakistan has been following a well-calibrated, high-stakes, low-risk proxy war against India, mainly focused on Jammu and Kashmir, and, periodically, across the rest of a India. The suicide car bombing at Pulwama is a continuation of the same, and has the imprint of the ISI and its jihadi tool Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) written all over it, even though the actual suicide bomber was a local youth, who had joined the JEM as a low-level operative.

India Needs to Shake Off ‘Soft’ Tag

India’s restrained and mature response to earlier provocations has not had much success, and may have only emboldened the terrorists and their handlers further, also earning India the tag of a ‘soft’ state. The Pakistan Army (the de facto rulers of Pakistan) have shown no signs of shedding their deeply ingrained hostility towards India, emboldened by the emerging strategic environment in Afghanistan, where their chicanery seems to be paying off.

The time is, therefore, ripe for India to change track, and work on a comprehensive long term strategy to de-fang Pakistan, and make it accountable for its behaviour.

Despite the rising clamour, we must resist the temptation for a one-off counter action, unless it’s part of a larger strategic plan. The strikes, post-Uri, have given us a tactical high, but without much operational strategic pay-offs.

There are many like me, who strongly believe that the nation needs to speak through its actions, soft in decibel, but strong and effective in our actions. The Armed Forces certainly need to follow this dictum. The social media warriors may also want to tone-down their rhetoric.

India’s Two-Level Response

Our response has to be at two levels – internal and external. The first step is to enquire and evaluate, what went wrong in Pulwama. The government and the concerned organisations are already looking at this, and it must be done clinically and with despatch, so that we prevent any chance of recurrence.

The Valley has a very good intelligence grid, both technical and human. So how did such a big terrorist act, which would have entailed detailed planning and coordination, get through without arousing any suspicion? The Intelligence people have the most difficult task, they have to succeed every time – one failure and we pay a heavy price. We also need to look at our own SOPs and update them, as required.

All actions must be taken to reduce the vulnerability of the security forces, as such incidents affect the morale of the nation.

The state police and the central police forces must be provided with all the wherewithal that is necessary to be effective in such a challenging environment. Our strategy in Jammu and Kashmir should also be reviewed.

The actions of the Army and security forces need to be complimented by a well-thought out, political, socio-economic policy. Appoint a senior army officer, serving or retired, as the security adviser to the J&K governor. There should be greater focus on psychological operations on the youth in the Valley, to de-radicalise them and lure they away from the false propaganda being directed at them from across the border.

Legal Framework for Security Forces in Conflict Zones Should Be Strengthened

There should be proper crowd-control measures in place, including restrictions on social media, which is often exploited by terrorists and their handlers. False propaganda being spread through local media, including cable-operators, should be controlled. Hero-worship at the funerals of terrorists should be prevented, and funerals in undisclosed locations in the presence of immediate family members only, should be organised instead.

The legal-framework for security forces to operate in such disturbed areas, should be strengthened. The government, whilst pursuing politico-socio-economic policy, including dialogue with various groups, should not shy away from harsh measures.

The state governments should also ensure that Kashmiris, including students, are not harassed, for this is exactly what jihadis are aiming to do.

“Jus ad Bellum” – Latin for “right to war” – is a set of criteria that justifies taking counter-action – even war. As far as India is concerned, more than adequate justification exists for responding to Pakistan’s continuous provocations; we have a very strong case for taking appropriate response to convey our intent to defend ourselves, as also punish Pakistan.

India’s response should be calibrated, and in diplomatic, economic, informational and military domains, using varied capabilities at our disposal. The basic aim of our response should be to convey our resolve to defend ourselves and punish Pakistan, including their non-state actors for their terrorist and other violent actions against India. Pakistan must be made to understand that their terrorism against India shall no longer remain a “cost-free option”.

Mounting a Sustained Campaign With World Powers Against Pakistan

All elements of national power should be included to work out varied response options on the escalatory ladder. The control of the escalatory ladder should rest with India, with the onus of escalation resting on Pakistan. It also needs to be appreciated that to change Pakistan’s behaviour and cut it to size will also require a well-planned and sustained campaign on many fronts, and not just short-term responses.

India cannot allow the status-quo any longer, and let a weak state like Pakistan impede its rise in the 21st century. A diplomatic response in varying degrees, including recalling of the High Commissioner and reducing the Pakistan mission to the bare minimum, should be taken into account.

In addition, we should mount a concerted and sustained campaign to convince the world powers of Pakistan’s dangerous gambles and the need to take it to task. Our focus should be on the US, China and Saudi Arabia, who have a major influence on Pakistan.

An economic squeeze on Pakistan will certainly hurt it. The government has already withdrawn the MFN status and imposed a 200 percent import duty. We should also approach the IMF and other donors not to bail out Pakistan, unless it conforms to international behaviour norms, and stops patronising terrorists and jihadis of all kinds.

Being an upper-riparian state, we retain control of river waters flowing into Pakistan. Notwithstanding international treaty obligations, this is a powerful tool, and in extreme cases can be used as a threat. This is bound to hurt Pakistan.

Low-End Options to Hurt Pakistan

These relate to both overt and covert capabilities and include a range of war-gamed options on the escalatory matrix. The armed forces plan for a lot of contingencies, from the low-end to a limited war, to the option of an all-out war and that too, against a nuclear backdrop. War is serious business and cannot be talked of lightly. It is the last resort of a nation, to be taken when all else has failed.

However, there are a number of low-end options that are available to hurt Pakistan and make it realise that its actions will not be cost-free:

• Covert operations to neutralise terrorist leaders, like the JEM Chief. The USA, Russia and Israel are masters at this game. Collaboration may be useful.
• We also have underutilized capabilities with our special forces; we may like to induct such officers into agencies like the RAW, to make them more effective.
• Abrogation of ceasefire and hotting up the line of control (LoC).
• A targeted response on a specific terrorist or military objective.
• Intense fire assaults to destroy specific targets.

Need To Take Collateral Damage Into Consideration

In addition, medium-intensity operations may also be undertaken to destroy targets in depth, using missiles, armed UAVs and even air, flying on our side of the border and using smart, long-range, precision ammunition. Of course, while choosing, we have to take into account the adversary’s reaction and be prepared for it. Collateral damage is another consideration, that may restrict the use of some options.

For obvious reasons, the high-end options, including the nuclear backdrop, are not being discussed here. Suffice to say that requisite space exists for conventional and sub-conventional responses, despite Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons.

If we are to secure long-term strategic objectives, particularly in the responses short of war successfully, we have to blur the distinctions between various domains, and utilise the immense expertise and intellect available with the uniformed fraternity, both in service and those retired. This is an area we lack in severely.

India’s Patience Has Been Tested to Its Limit

We may also like to seriously consider whether our defence allocations, over the years, are adequate to address the grave challenges and monumental adversities in our security environment. It is also for our collective consideration, that, while defence must certainly not burden the country, it can be nobody’s case that capacity-building in national security be premised only on economic considerations, disregarding geopolitical realities – the pure economist’s scalpel that is applied to budgetary allocations for defence, year after year, is a matter of intellectual and strategic concern.

There is a limit to India’s patience, and the time has come to bring Pakistan to book. This needs to be done through a comprehensive strategy, using all the resources and instruments available to India. And finally, India should not hesitate to use the might of the Indian Armed forces to inflict punishment and bring Pakistan to book.

(Lt Gen A K Singh(Retd), is former Army Commander and Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar and Puducherry. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)