Pathankot Attack: Intelligence and the Keystone Syndrome

The Pathankot operations may have been successful, but it exposed glaring gaps in security protocol.

The Pathankot attack is over but was it a success for the Indian Air force? (Photo: The Quint)

• The Pathankot counter-terror operation has been successful as damage to material assets and human life has been contained.
  
• Based on information in the public domain, it is clear that Indian security forces could have done better in the intelligence domain.
  
• The attack on the Pathankot airbase isn’t the first time that intel from local sources has been ignored.
  
• Gurdaspur SP Salwinder Singh’s abduction and eventual release is decidedly fishy.
  
• The NIA ought to look into the links between drug cartels and terrorism, especially in Punjab.
  

Pathankot Operation Successful, but the Attack Exposed Gaps in Security Protocols

The Pathankot terror attack is finally over and the counter-terror operation can be termed a success – to the extent that the primary objective of the perpetrators was denied – namely, damage to material assets in the airbase and a greater loss of human lives.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited the base on Tuesday (January 5) and provided a spirited rationale for the manner in which the entire operation was conducted. A more detailed investigation by the different agencies involved will shed more light on an operation that is still opaque by way of chronology and tactical detail – but Mr Parrikar admitted that there were some gaps in the local security protocols. Hopefully appropriate lessons will be learnt and policy correctives swiftly applied.

Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar addresses the media at the Indian air force base in Pathankot, Tuesday, January 5, 2016. (Photo: AP)

India’s Keystone Cops: Intel Must be Put to Better Use

Based on the information now available in the public domain, it is evident that the one area where the Indian security establishment could have done better is in the intelligence (or intel) domain.

The term ‘Keystone cops’ taken from the silent films era refers to a bunch of bungling police officials and their comic characteristic is that slapstick mistakes recur after expending vast energy, time and resources and the visible lack of coordination.

The word Keystone comes to mind when reviewing the intel handling over the Pathankot operation – the big difference being that this had a tragic ending by way of the loss of precious Indian lives. Even while conceding that not all available intelligence inputs can ever be disclosed in the public domain in a counter-terrorism operation – some strands are instructive.

Security beefed-up outside Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Pathankot. (Photo: IANS)

Enough Intel was Available to Justify that Special Forces be Moved into the Area

It is understood that the first alerts were made available to Delhi by a ‘third country’ around Christmas Day – which incidentally was when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his surprise visit to Lahore. Subsequently, it transpires, the local Punjab police had also picked up some ‘clutter’ to suggest that military bases in Punjab would be targeted by terrorist around New Year’s eve.

The terror attack took place in the early hours of Saturday (January 2) and the intel inputs are further strengthened by information ostensibly provided by a Punjab police SP – Salwinder Singh – who was apparently abducted by the terrorists the previous night – and curiously – released.

This is the broad contour of the intel inputs and one presumes that the quality was deemed credible enough for special forces to be moved into the area.

Army personnel take positions on a rooftop of a building outside the airbase in Pathankot, Saturday, January 2, 2016. (Photo: AP)

Pathankot Isn’t the First Time Early Inputs Were Ignored

The operation then moved into what may be called the 24/7 cycle of TV news channels and it then became a ball-by-ball account till the combing operations had concluded – and the Defence Minister Parrikar was able to visit the airbase.

The ‘gaps’ that have been acknowledged point to the inability of the existing intelligence grid in Punjab to manage such inputs and translate them into what is termed as ‘actionable intel’ inputs. A predictable blame-game has already begun with the local Punjab police claiming that they had done their bit and that it was the next level (the centre?) that had not acted promptly.

While the veracity of these claims needs to be objectively reviewed in the weeks ahead – what stands out now is the eerie similarity with what happened during Kargil in May 1999 and the 2008 Mumbai terror attack. In both exigencies, early inputs received from local sources were either ignored or not treated with the rigour that was warranted by the existing national security lattice. Individual ministries and services/departments remained in their silos and turf was protected in an insular manner.

The Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai November 27, 2008. (Photo: Reuters)

Vajpayee’s Intel Reforms Remain Still-Born

Then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee constituted a holistic post-Kargil review and intel reforms was a major recommendation. However it remained still-born. The same experience was repeated in Mumbai in 2008 when the first alerts about a potential attack from the maritime domain was ignored. And now Pathankot exudes a familiar pattern – the lack of apex capacity and institutional harmonisation across various security related agencies and ministries.

The most curious element in the Pathankot story is that of SP Salwinder Singh and the manner in which he was ostensibly abducted in his official car. Glaring inconsistencies have been brought into the public domain and his personal profile includes a gender harassment charge.

SP Salwinder Singh faces sexual harassment charges. (Photo: ANI screengrab/Altered by The Quint)

Explore the Drug Cartel/Terror Link

Given the narcotics footprint that has enveloped many parts of Punjab and the manner in which state machinery and certain officials have been compromised, many questions remain to be answered. The most glaring is why a group of ruthless terrorists would first abduct and then release a police official even as they moved towards their designated target area – an airbase. This is the Keystone redux!

The drug-cartel/terror linkage is well established internationally and one presumes that the NIA, which has been brought into the investigative loop, will follow all of these leads determinedly – however politically prickly. The even more intriguing aspect of the Pathankot-intel narrative is that Salwinder Singh was given considerable media space to buttress his story.

The ambiguous centre-state command and control over internal security management could not have been more ‘Keystonish’. Hopefully the Pathankot investigation and policy review will not end in the Kargil-Mumbai cul-de-sac.

(The writer is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies.)