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Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with US President Barack Obama on Thursday, 22 October, in Washington, dwelt predictably on three contentious issues – namely Afghanistan, terrorism and the nuclear profile of the South Asian region.
Regarding the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan, the media summary released by the White House noted: “President (Obama) stressed the importance of avoiding any developments that might invite increased risk to nuclear safety, security, or strategic stability.” The context to this pithy observation is instructive.
The nuclear status of Pakistan received rare elucidation in the run-up to Nawaz Sharif’s visit to the US. On Tuesday, 20 October, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry confirmed what had been speculated for long – that Pakistan has tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. He added that the security establishment in Pakistan (read: The Army GHQ in Rawalpindi) was convinced that this was the only response they could rely on to counter what is being described as India’s Cold Start doctrine.
The possession of tactical nukes – or battle-field nuclear weapons – has been the unrelenting focus of many intelligence agencies that track the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. There is consensus that Rawalpindi has, indeed, stock-piled such low-yield warheads. This official admission is the equivalent of daring the US in its own den and defying the post-Hiroshima global norm about the non-use of such apocalyptic ordnance.
Foreign Secretary Chaudhry was briefing a small group of Pakistani correspondents in Washington DC. He made two statements whose strategic import may have been lost on India due to the din over the Bihar elections and deplorable domestic atrocities.
While the first statement was the admission-cum-confirmation that Pakistan does have tactical nukes, the second sought to lay to rest the intense conjecture in major US print media outlets (Washington Post and The New York Times) that the White House was planning to offer PM Sharif a nuclear deal. However, it was confirmed by Mr Chaudhry that Pakistan would not sign any deal on the nuclear issue with the US.
The chutzpah element of Chaudhry’s revelation can be better contextualised if it is recalled that the US has consistently identified nuclear and missile proliferation support to terrorism and the spread of radical ideologies as its major security challenge. President George Bush took the US to war against Iraq in 2003 for precisely these reasons.
While it was later conceded that the US had attacked the wrong country, the anxiety tripod remains the same. A regime that supports terrorism and nurtures jihadist Islamists as part of its national strategic policy, has engaged in rampant nuclear proliferation in a Walmart manner, and has used its nuclear weapons to pursue a revisionist agenda against its neighbours is a textbook case for reiterating US anxiety.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the US had identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ for being culpable of nurturing the nuclear/terror/non-state tripod and chose to turn a Nelson’s eye to Rawalpindi’s transgressions.
In the intervening years, the Musharraf make-believe over the AQ Khan nuclear Walmart was followed by the bin Laden-Abbotabad charade and the barmecidal (illusion) icing was the delayed announcement of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar . The legendary US indulgence of Rawalpindi’s perfidy going back to the Ronald Reagan Cold War years is now wearing thin, largely due to the many disclosures about the duplicity of the Pakistani security establishment that has resulted in the death of US troops in the Af-Pak region.
The US Congress is now more cognizant of the manner in which the Pakistan military has been a recipient of considerable fiscal and military aid for more than 50 years – and has been allowed to get away with all the transgressions associated with the Iraqi regime that led to the 2003 attack on Baghdad.
Aizaz Chaudhry’s revelation about tactical nuclear weapons is a case of raising the ante with the US in its own capital. It also signals a posture of defiance that Pakistan will not accept any monitoring or intrusion into its rapidly growing nuclear arsenal – which is now claimed to be ‘full-spectrum’.
The Obama-Sharif meeting would in all likelihood have witnessed some plain speaking by the current White House incumbent (who has admitted that Pakistan’s nukes give him sleepless nights) and for PM Sharif, this is a sense of déjà vu. In July 1999, Nawaz Sharif, as the beleaguered Prime Minister of Pakistan, sought an urgent meeting with the then-US President Bill Clinton to find a way out of the Kargil quagmire.
16 years later – the US interlocutor is different but the challenge for a civilian Prime Minister of Pakistan is the same – who controls the nuclear button? The Army Chief in Rawalpindi? This is a complex but not insurmountable challenge – if the US is able to get over its tenaciously nurtured Pakistan myopia.
(The writer is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies.)
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Published: 23 Oct 2015,08:19 PM IST