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Within a fortnight of taking charge as Pakistan’s army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa reshuffled some senior commanders and principal staff officers. Among the important changes is the appointment of Lt Gen Naveed Mukhtar as the new Director General (DG) of the ISI. Till recently, the corps commander at Karachi, Lt Gen Mukhtar earlier headed the ISI’s counter-terrorism wing and is perceived to hold hawkish views on India.
Lt Gen Bilal Akbar, who was DG, Pakistan Rangers, at Karachi and has been dealing with internal security, has been appointed Chief of General Staff (CGS). Together, these two appointments are indicative of General Bajwa’s emphasis on internal security to defeat the demons within.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse the abiding institutional make-up of the Pakistan army’s leadership.
The Pakistan army thinks of itself as the guarantor of the idea of Pakistan. India is perceived to be the arch-enemy that must be punished in order to avenge the vivisection of Pakistan in 1971. Jammu and Kashmir is seen as the prize that must be snatched from India. In order to justify its strength of half-a-million soldiers and a defence budget that consumes over 20 percent of the total government expenditure, the army cites the bogey of an existential threat from India.
Despite having handed over power to a duly-elected civilian government that enjoys majority support in the National Assembly, the Pakistan army’s shadow looms large over the country’s polity. The army continues to play a ‘guiding’ role in the formulation and execution of the country’s foreign and security policies, especially those related to India and Afghanistan.
The army has full control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and, in conjunction with the ISI, continues to sponsor terrorist attacks in both India and Afghanistan.
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As reported by Cyril Almeida in Dawn on 6 October, India’s surgical strikes across the LoC emboldened PM Nawaz Sharif and his cabinet colleagues to ask the army and the ISI to put an end to their sponsorship of terrorism to avoid international isolation. However, General Raheel Sharif prevailed on the prime minister to deny that any such instructions had been issued.
While the Pakistan army will for some more time remain preoccupied with fighting the scourge of fundamentalist terrorism within Pakistan, India can ill-afford to let its guard slacken.
In keeping with its tradition of launching grand strategic initiatives like Operation Gibraltar of 1965 and the Kargil incursions of 1999 – both monumental blunders, without due thought being given to the consequences – the Pakistan army, aided by the ISI, may attempt to get its mercenary marauders to ‘seize’ a small town in Kashmir and proclaim that it has been liberated by the mujahideen. Such attempts need to be guarded against through effective intelligence networks and vigorous counter-infiltration operations by the army.
The real problem between India and Pakistan is the latter’s army and its abnormal influence in that country’s affairs, and not the Kashmir dispute or any other challenge. Till the Pakistan army’s role in the country’s affairs is reduced and genuine democracy takes root in Pakistan, India-Pakistan problems will remain intractable.
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Concerted international efforts must be made in the long-term interest of democracy and Pakistan’s regional stability. This should ensure that the Pakistan army is not allowed to rule unhindered from behind the scenes and meddle in the internal affairs of its neighbours by using jihadi extremists. India must leverage its influence with Western democracies to prevail on them to refrain from conducting business as usual with the Pakistan army, particularly from providing military aid.
It is necessary to continue to engage the elected civilian leadership of Pakistan since it will gradually reduce the salience of the army in the country’s polity. It would also be counter-productive to pin hopes on early resolution of the complex issues that have plagued the relationship for almost 70 years.
(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), and former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. He can be reached @gurmeetkanwal. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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