Dropout Rate in CRPF, BSF Increases & Bureaucracy Is To Blame

Our paramilitary forces need quicker promotions, better infrastructure facilities & more holidays to be retained.

Image used for representational purposes.

(Photo: Erum Gour/The Quint)

Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju informed Lok Sabha on 6 March 2018, that over the last three years, as many as 27,862 personnel and officers of the Central Armed Forces have quit service either by way of voluntary retirement or through resignation.

Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Armed Police Force (CRPF) – the two largest paramilitary forces – have witnessed maximum attrition, with 11,198 (almost 4.5 percent) and 10,620 (almost 4 percent) personnel quitting these two forces respectively between 2015 and January 2018.

Based on the reply of the minister, the press information bureau has released the following figures of attrition among these armed forces during the last three years and up to 31 January 2018.

(Source: Press Information Bureau / 2015 - 2018 / Till 31.01.2018)

Increase in Voluntary Retirement Points to Bigger Picture

The reasons stated by the minister for such heavy attrition are personal and domestic, including children or family issues, health or illness of the person or his family and social or family obligations.

He also stated that some personnel also sought voluntary retirement to enjoy a static life as well as pension benefits after completing 20 years of service. Interestingly, replies to similar questions asked almost every year for the last few years have also been along the same predictable lines.

On paper, the reasons cited cannot be disputed because the rules state that conditional resignation and voluntary retirement applications will not be accepted. However, interaction with personnel quitting brings out a totally different picture.

Moreover, an analysis of the data above brings out some facts which need to be considered seriously to retain such skilled talent that has been honed at heavy cost to the exchequer.

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It would be seen that the rate of voluntary retirement among the other ranks has jumped by almost four times in 2017 as compared to 2015. In case of the BSF and CRPF, the increase, at almost 12 and 6 times respectively, is even more alarming.

Similar trends can be seen in the figures pertaining to officers and subordinate officers. Such heavy increase in attrition during the times when jobs in open market are not easily available needs some serious analysis. The fact that so many officers, subordinate officers and other ranks opt to resign from a relatively better paid job after a short spell in service points towards a deeper malady.

Due Process Needs to be Followed for Maximum Efficiency

Service conditions of the paramilitary personnel are such that they are always deployed from one active area to another, unlike the Army, which alternately goes from field to peace and vice-versa.

The troops in BSF have actually internalised the situation and jokingly say that the periodic changeover exercise of units actually changes nothing but only the numbers on Border Pillars. Similar is the situation with other border guarding forces. CRPF units are continuously deployed in areas facing internal security threats, with no time for re-organising and refitting.

Even the training companies of these forces are never available as they are almost always deployed in aid to civil authority in maintaining law and order, or election duties or some other internal security duty.

This disrupts the well-conceived system of training, rest, relief and leave, and leaves both the commanders and other ranks tired and distressed.

The deployment for elections sometimes reaches ludicrous levels, with these forces being summoned to even ensure the smooth functioning of panchayat elections.

Policymakers need to take a call to streamline these in order to ensure that these forces are able to retain their efficiency. They also need to strictly implement the recommendation of the group of ministers (appointed after the Kargil war) of “one force one role” so that these forces acquire domain expertise and adopt a cohesive operational and training philosophy.

Infrastructure Development Lagging Behind, No Basics for the Forces

The infrastructure and amenities at the place of deployment even after so many years of existence of these forces are still not up-to required standard. The younger people joining the forces are well educated and exposed to modern technology and the modern way of life

Thus, they have aspirations which the forces are not able to cater to. The basic reasons for this can be categorised into two parts.

• First is the misplaced priorities of leaders of the force who appear to think that the officers institutes at the headquarters give them more visibility rather than the amenities at the border outposts (BOP).
• Second, is the unplanned expansion of these forces causing extra load on the existing infrastructure. Creation of additional infrastructure has not been able to keep pace with the expansion of these forces. There was recently a report which stated that out of the 66 BOPs in Barmer sector of BSF, only two had facilities for piped drinking water. The rest depended upon the water tanker.

Similar is the situation in Jaisalmer and Bikaner sectors. If we can’t provide even the basic necessities to troops, we cannot expect to retain them. It is said that a proposal to this effect is gathering dust in the corridors of power for the last four years. Policy makers urgently need to rectify the situation.

Home — a Distant Dream, Abysmal Promotions

The personnel have to stay away from their families with two months of earned leave and 15 days of casual leave available to them to visit their homes. A leave plan is religiously prepared at beginning of the year but can be rarely followed because of uncertainties of their duties. The scale of family accommodation available within the campuses is only 14 percent, and this too is curtailed by the fact that rapid expansion has compelled even the existing accommodation to be shared.

This adversely affects morale, especially if troops are unable to be with their families in times of need. This deprives them of a normal family life leading to stress which sometimes manifests in acts of indiscipline and even fratricide.

Moreover, there seems to be a lack of opportunities for career progression, specially, amongst the gazetted officers. A jawan in the BSF gets his first promotion not before 20 years. In other forces, the situation is a little better because of ongoing expansion. But this remains a major cause of attrition with no charm left, what with such delayed promotion.

In case of officers, the situation is even worse.

Some officers who joined BSF in the first decade would retire with just one promotion in their entire career. Efforts to rectify the situation through recently held (after a lapse of over 25 years) ‘cadre review’ has only succeeded in postponing stagnation. No wonder the young officers and subordinate officers are resigning in droves at the first available opportunity even if such opportunity is below the status and pay that they are in receipt of in these organisations.

Immediate Remedy Required

To add insult to injury, the higher level policy-making posts are not available to cadre officers who have deep insight of the work culture and ethos of the force. IPS leaders of these forces have neither any stake nor continuity to improve matters, as they come on deputation to avoid an uncomfortable situation in states or on the promise of a posting to New Delhi or their home town.

The reasons cited above generally cover the important reasons for high attrition. The government must look into these issues and take remedial measures. Any delay in remedying the situation will lead to a serious compromise in efficiency of these forces and consequently, national security.

Most importantly, the leadership of these forces must now be passed on to the cadre of officers of these forces so that their intricate knowledge of ethos of these forces can be utilised at policy making levels.

(The writer retired from the BSF as an additional director-general. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)