The Myanmar Coup, Three Years On

India's response has been that of a meaningless commitment to democracy and a continued engagement with the Junta.

The last three years have been a testimonial to international apathy, regional incompetence, and a people’s quest for democracy against despotism. 

(Photo: PTI)

It has been three years since the Min Aung Hlaing-led Sit-tat (Burmese military) toppled the National League of Democracy’s (NLD) democratically elected government and jailed its senior members including Aung San Suu Kyi.

The Sit-tat, however, underestimated the popular resistance to its coup.

The last three years have been a testimonial to international apathy and regional incompetence, but also to the people’s quest for democracy in the face of despotism.  

A Neglected Catastrophe  

Myanmar's ongoing turmoil, which has been overshadowed by global crises such as the Ukraine war and Israel’s bombarding of Gaza, represents a catastrophic yet overlooked struggle for democracy. Despite significant sanctions from the United States and the European Union, Myanmar’s plight remains in the shadows, absent from the lens of international scrutiny.

Since the military coup, approximately 4,500 civilians and pro-democracy activists have been killed, with the Junta detaining over 25,000 political prisoners and displacing over two million people. With the country now surpassing Afghanistan as the top producer of opioids, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, smuggling and trafficking activities in the Golden Triangle have intensified.

The non-binding arms embargo imposed through a 2021 United Nations General Assembly resolution has failed to stem the flow of weapons into the hands of the Sit-tat, with several countries continuing their supply and corporations financing the regime. The United Nations Security Council’s resolutions have been vetoed by Russia, which backs Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and serves as the Junta’s primary arms supplier. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) pursues a regional approach to conflict resolution and emphasises a ‘Myanmar-owned and led solution’, but the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC) has been undermined by internal limitations and lack of political will. 

The Cambodian chairmanship, soon after the agreement of the 5PC, was a major obstacle in making any progress, this trend is likely to repeat under the Laotian chairmanship. While the ASEAN may have barred the generals from attending the summit and taken away Myanmar’s turn to chair, they have primarily engaged with the Junta as the representative of the Burmese people. 

The recently announced ASEAN-backed Thai plan for a humanitarian corridor to assist refugees from Myanmar has emerged as a glimmer of hope, but its implementation is uncertain and also comes with the added risk of further legitimising the Junta and allowing it to weaponise aid. Through either ignorance or their support of the Junta, the international community has failed the Burmese people. Yet, they have held their ground against all odds.  

People's Power

Notwithstanding the lack of international support, the Burmese people’s resilience has given rise to a multipronged resistance movement. Civil disobedience spontaneously emerged, led by doctors and teachers, and spread across the country after the coup. The NLD along with other political actors have formed a shadow government – the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG also supported the formation of People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) for engaging in an armed struggle against the Sit-tat. One of the greatest achievements of the NUG has been its inclusivity and bringing Rohingya leadership into the fold. 

Most importantly, several influential Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have aligned with the NUG, helped in training the PDFs, and driven the Junta out of key border areas. The Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027, a coalition of EAOs, has captured significant territory from Burmese troops, inspiring other EAOs to launch similar offensives. These offensives are in line with the NUG’s broader call of ‘All Roads Lead to Naypyidaw’. The resistance, the NUG, and the EAOs control nearly two-thirds of Myanmar's territory, with the Junta's grip limited to less than a fifth.

The skepticism that the revolution might be the undoing of Myanmar is overstated and fuels the historical justification that the Sit-tat has given for centralising power in its hands.

The democratic transition during Suu Kyi’s leadership was incomplete due to the structural power and veto that were constitutionally given to the military. The widespread support among the military’s traditional support base, the Bamar majority, distinguishes this resistance from previous uprisings, offering the prospect of a federal and secular polity once the military is eventually stripped of its power. 

India's Myopia

India's response to the crisis has been that of a meaningless commitment to democracy, hiding behind ASEAN’s 5PC, and a continued engagement with the Junta. The scapegoating of Burmese refugees for the violence in Manipur is the only instance where the Modi government has sought to make the Myanmar crisis a public issue.  

The recent success of the Arakan Army in taking control of Paletwa village in Rakhine state, along the Indo-Myanmar border, has further alerted New Delhi. The suspension and scrapping of the Free Movement Regime reflects persisting ontological insecurity even in a post-colonial state's political psychology. This securitisation of refugees and ignoring the long-standing kinship ties across the border highlights the dissonance between the local sentiment and New Delhi's decision-making processes.

The local leaders, including the Chief Minister of Nagaland, and the people have come out to criticise the unilateral decision of the Modi government to fence the border without consultations with the local stakeholders.

The erosion of normative commitment to democracy in Myanmar is not a policy unique to the incumbent government. From being one of the most prominent supporters of the 8888 revolution, India gradually warmed up to cooperation with the military rulers. This policy shift is often justified in the name of pragmatism and national interests. Since the coup, India has sought to appease the Junta, even supplying arms after the coup. It’s easy to see today that India put its eggs in the wrong basket and, like the Junta, has gravely underestimated people’s determination for democracy. 

India’s faltering in Myanmar is another black mark in its Neighbourhood First policy. Myanmar was supposed to be India’s bridge to Southeast Asia under the Look/Act East policy which also forms the base for New Delhi’s broader approach to the Indo-Pacific. However, the evidence shows, especially in the case of Myanmar, that its decision-making suffers from myopia and adhocism.

The struggle in Myanmar is a neglected catastrophe, one that speaks volumes about the varying value of human lives in international politics and the enduring spirit of a people's desire for democratic governance. The situation demands a recalibrated global response that aligns with the aspirations of Myanmar's citizens. It is a sobering reminder that even in the face of political myopia and international neglect, the quest for freedom and justice cannot be quelled.

The path ahead for Myanmar is fraught with uncertainty, but the trajectory of the struggle promises that the question of resistance’s victory is of when and not if.  

[Chetan Rana is a doctoral candidate (Diplomacy and Disarmament) at Jawaharlal Nehru University and an Associate Editor at 9DASHLINE. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.]