Manipur CMO's '900' Kuki Militants 'Input' Fiasco Exposes Blatant Abuse of Power

It is also an attempt to use national security and a contrived threat to the community—to which the CM belongs.

CM Biren Singh. 

(Photo: Kamran Akhter/The Quint)

In what could have possibly made pundits of game theory wink in amusement, Manipur seemed to have finally found a transient solution to the rather stubborn collective action problem, which has ‘allegedly’ eluded the Chief Minister’s Office (CMO) and the Unified Security Command headed by Kuldip Singh, its Security Advisor since the end of May last year when the Chief Minister (CM) was replaced as the head of the Command.

Notwithstanding his long-drawn grievance and concerted attempt to regain control of the unified security command in the state, CM Biren Singh seemed to have always wielded de facto final control in security-related matters which became apparent when in an unusual display of cooperation and coordination, Kuldip Singh briefed the press on 20 September, four days after the CM’s office sent him and two high ranking officials of the state an ‘immediate’ intelligence ‘input’ about an impending ‘national security’ threat posed by the infiltration of over ‘900 Kuki militants’ into Manipur from Myanmar.  

Although this input, signed by Ningthoujam Geoffrey, the Secretary to the Chief Minister, did not specify its source(s), it was unusually pointed and precise in its brief:

Over 900 Kuki militants, newly trained in the use of drone-based bombs, projectiles, missiles and jungle warfare have entered Manipur from Myanmar’. To amplify the emergent threat, this despatch averred that these Kuki militants ‘reportedly grouped in units of 30 members each…and (are) expected to launch multiple coordinated attacks on Meitei villages around 28 September 2024 (emphasis added).

What becomes evident from this is that either in his tearing hurry to please and do his master’s bidding or being arm-twisted, the Security Advisor did not bother to authenticate the credibility of the intelligence ‘input’ he received from the CM’s office on 16 September. The Security group meeting convened by the Security Advisor two days after receipt of this input which was attended by high-ranking military and police officials in Imphal was revealing in its content and intent.

Rather than adhering to a rule-bound and institutionalised practice of first scrutinising and establishing the credibility of the intelligence ‘input’ placed before them, these officials willingly reduced themselves to ignominy by readily sacrificing their agency and becoming willing partners of their political master. In doing so, the delicate balance of civil-military relations in democratic states where each is expected to remain ‘autonomous’ in their decision-making and actions are thrown to the winds. 

In game theory, overcoming the collective action problem and obtaining optimal outcomes in a zero-sum game requires players to cooperate and coordinate under a rule-based institutionalised framework where information inputs are credible, transparent, and not distorted. Established security protocols in that sense also demand that ‘immediate’ and ‘secret’ information of such kind are put under meticulous scrutiny and not shared with the public before credible and actionable strategies are chalked out and potential threats neutralised.  

Mindful of these rules and norms-based security protocols, the Spear Corps immediately tweeted demanding details and proper scrutiny of the intelligence ‘input’ notwithstanding the fact that the Security Advisor audaciously claimed in his press brief that he was ‘100 percent correct’ until proven otherwise.

That the Spear Corps could muster the spine to call out the bluff of the CM’s office and the Security Advisor was remarkable. Given that the powers-that-be have for long operated with full impunity under the shadow of a compromised institutional ecosystem and the fact that they expect pliable actors to fall in line, any contrarian position is neither accepted nor tolerated. This explains why the Spear Corps’ tweet was immediately taken down.  

What emerges from this is that howsoever much one may like to pitch the bogey of ‘national security’ to elicit public attention and secure a high TRP media rating, cooperation and coordination under a non-transparent, non-credible information system is unlikely to secure an optimal ‘national security’ outcome.

Absent this, the CM’s office ‘input’ not only exposes the blatant misuse of a constitutional office but also represents a calibrated attempt to use ‘national security’ and a contrived ‘threat’ to the community—to which the Chief Minister belongs—to leverage a biased and partisan ‘self-goal/interest’. Also evident is the sinister design to use this ‘input’ as a convenient scapegoat to malign and target tribal Kuki citizens as unwanted and troublesome second-class Indian citizens.  

Predictably, the CM’s office intelligence ‘input’ which explicitly castigated armed 'Kuki militants' as the source of ‘threat’ immediately feeds into a familiar pattern of a trumped-up misinformation campaign and a deeply problematic narrative that is conveniently used to whip up communal frenzy among the pliable section of Meitei society. The selective targeting and maligning of the Kuki militant ‘infiltrators’ not only as the gravest threat to Meitei society but also as a ‘national security threat’ could not have come out sharper as a result. 

Had the CMO's concern been a genuine one, the widely reported large-scale cross-over of proscribed Meitei armed organisations into the valley areas from Myanmar and their direct involvement in perpetuating this violence against the tribal Kuki-Zomi-Hmar would have drawn more serious attention and a coordinated response from the political and security establishment by now. By turning a blind eye to the widely reported involvement of armed groups like the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanba Lup (KYKL) in attacking the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages across the ‘buffer zones’ and who, for their crave for popular support, openly wear their badges and drape themselves in camouflage police uniforms, the Chief Minister and his office—and for that matter the Security Advisor—have completely lost their credibility, compromised their constitutional oath and commitments, and made their positions highly untenable. 

The large-scale collusion of proscribed Meitei armed groups with the Arambai Tenggol and the Manipur police which has been widely reported in the media since the beginning of this violence last year suggests that the ‘national security’ gain obtained in the aftermath of ‘Operation All Clear’ jointly launched by the security forces in 2004 to flush out proscribed Meitei armed organisations from Sajik Tampak and the valley areas have been neutralised under the nose of the current political dispensation. The reported use of improvised explosive devices (IED) by the UNLF, one of these proscribed armed militants, in what is now known as Pherzawl district way back in 2005-06 where many tribals were trapped and killed in IED explosions demonstrated the access that these militants have to sophisticated weapons and armoury within and across the Indo-Myanmar border.

This and the ease with which the People Liberation Army (PLA), another proscribed Meitei armed group, ambushed the military convoy of the Assam Rifles in November 2021 in Siahken, just a couple of kilometres away from the Indo-Myanmar border, and killed with impunity five of its personnel, including Colonel Viplav Tripathy, his wife and son, should still etch in our memory as a stark reminder that the unmistakable source of national security threat lies somewhere else across the Indo-Myanmar border. The recovery of a large cache of ‘arms and ammunition with war-like stores’ from the twelve KYKL cadres apprehended by the Spear Corps at Itham village in East Imphal district on 24 June 2023 demonstrated beyond doubt the unequal access that these militants have to sophisticated weapons and armoury. 

In ignoring the above and exclusively directing the optics on the ‘Kuki’ militants, the CM’s Office tried to tactically navigate a sensitive security terrain by misleading the Indian state and the public to up its ante against such a contrived large-scale ‘infiltration’ by masquerading it as ‘national security threat’, a language New Delhi understands best.

Clearly, this clever ploy to use ‘infiltration’ as a staple diet of political and national security discourse may temporarily help the CM in deflecting public attention from his direct role in perpetuating this violence to protect Meitei identity and dignity—a point that he allegedly emphasised in the leaked Manipur tapes reported by The Wire in a three-part series in the second half of August 2024. Given that the intelligence ‘input’ also sells easily among the deeply insecure and ill-informed public and naïve policy mandarins located in the state and in a distant New Delhi, this may also help him in building a larger-than-life image as the guarantor of ‘national security’ and Meitei identity and dignity. 

To reinforce this image, this ‘input’ has been sought to be conveniently used as an excuse to ‘pre-empt’ the ‘threat’ by launching a series of pre-meditated attacks on and perpetuate atrocities against the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar minority tribals groups in the name of ‘combing operations’—a point unambiguously alluded to by Kuldip Singh in his press brief. After this ‘input’ has caused much bad blood across the divide, and its intent was called out by various Kuki-Zomi-Hmar civil society groups, the office of the DGP and the CM finally accepted the intelligence bluster for lack of ‘substantive evidence on the ground’. 

Had it not been so, the high-pitch mobilisation among radicalised Meitei armed groups and civil society groups to upscale the ‘combing operations’ and launch a series of ‘pre-emptive strikes’ against the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar would have escalated the violence beyond redemption.  

Even as the well-oiled propaganda machine and misinformation campaign of the CM’s office appear fully naked in public view, it begs us the question: how and to what extent can a democratic and constitutional state like India allow and tolerate an authoritarian populist leader to subvert institutions and established protocols with full impunity and relentlessly wage ‘war’ on its own citizens in the guise of securing ‘national security’?

In the absence of a transparent and credible flow of information and an institutionalised system of decision-making, Manipur is not likely to overcome its collective action problem and may remain as what Mathew Arnold, the English poet, in a different context called: “…(a) darkling plain swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, where ignorant armies clash by night”—all in the name of ‘national security’. 

(Kham Khan Suan Hausing is a Professor and former Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow, Centre for Multilevel Federalism, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi. Views are personal. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)