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The usual “kari ninda” has been done on Amarnath Yatra terror attack and militants warned in no uncertain terms that they will not be spared. The army chief and scores of sundry ministers are reviewing the security situation. The Prime Minister has also expressed concern about the death of innocents.
In midst of this din, no one seems to discuss the important issue of how the incident happened despite intelligence inputs and high level of security. It was only a couple of days prior to the yatra when the public was informed that drones were keeping an eye, round the clock, on the entire route.
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It is learnt that the pilgrims had, in fact, completed their visit to the shrine a day or two earlier, and had been staying somewhere in Srinagar to visit other places of interest after the pilgrimage. That is why their plan was not known to the Amarnath Shrine Board.
The bus was not even travelling on the yatra route when ambushed. They were in fact returning to Jammu when attacked at about 20.20 hrs in the evening.
If the bus was registered, the passengers would have gotten a cover from a convoy during day time after the deployment of the Road Opening Party (ROP) that clears all suspected places enroute and secure the dominating and vulnerable points/features.
The other question is how this lone bus was allowed to leave Srinagar so late in the day, a time which is not considered safe for travel in the valley? Even the security force vehicles, except when conducting an operation, do not move at night so how was this bus allowed to go unchecked?
Normally, there should have been a police/security force check-post close to the entry/exit point of Srinagar. If the check-post was there, why didn’t anyone stop the vehicle from going any further? The personnel deployed on the check-post need to answer for this grave lapse.
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Conversely, if the check-post was missing, then it portrays faulty planning on part of the police and the security personnel responsible for the area. A thorough probe will be able to fix responsibility on these accounts.
A total of ten incidents of ambush on security forces have been carried out, by militants in this area, since August 2014, leading to a large number of causalities. In fact five incidents have occurred in the last six months since December 2016!
The security apparatus should have analysed the spurt in these incidents in recent past and adequate measures should have taken place before that could’ve prevented civilian movement at odd hours and thus being converted into soft targets.
The rise in terror incidents is also an indicator of the fact that the domination by security forces in this area is comparatively less. In fact, if an analysis of incidents and deployment pattern is done, it will be evident that the troop concentration is towards north Kashmir.
Further the domination is restricted in the form of “ROP” on the highway, with almost nil presence in the interior rural areas.
The presence of security personnel is, thus, not adequate. This situation has come about in last couple of years after the present government in the state came to power. One wonders whether the force levels and deployment patterns have been decided after consulting security experts or not.
Further, if the pattern of operations of these forces is analysed, it will be found that hardly any proactive operations are carried out by them. The troops after ROP operation during the day, also go back to their permanent camps and no night domination is carried out.
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With foreign trained militants finding it extremely difficult to cross the LoC, the leadership has passed on to home grown militants, who find it easy to operate due to the security void.
During the mid-nineties, BSF personnel were deployed in this area. They used to carry out extensive operations in interior areas successfully. The same needs to start once again.
Lessons must be learnt from Punjab’s experience. The militants in Punjab could be controlled only when night domination started. That restricted the movement of militants. The rural area especially needs to be dominated on a regular basis during the daytime as well as night.
Incidents like the recent attack on Amarnath yatris can be averted only when real time actionable information is disseminated to the troops on the ground. The agencies involved have to forego competitive urge of taking credit and putting national interest above anything else.
We must also draw lessons from such setbacks and take corrective actions. If we don’t prepare ourselves for contingencies, we will continue to repent at such tragedies.
(The writer retired from the BSF as an additional director-general. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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