Learning a Lesson From Libya: What Next After Headley’s Testimony?

Headley’s depositions provide India with the strategic edge it needs. But will that get lost in political noise?

David Headley (left), Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. (Photo: The Quint)

It is quite possible that David Headley’s revelations, being recorded in the Mumbai court of Special Judge GA Sanap, might get lost in the maze of political polemics in India. His opinion on the Ishrat Jehan “encounter” has resulted in a predictable war of words between political parties.

This is unfortunate since his evidence is important for shaping some higher strategic steps against Pakistan. It gives vivid details of how Pakistan’s official agencies had strategised, trained, equipped, exported and monitored terrorist activities against India, in blatant violation of UN conventions. UNSC Resolution No: 1373(2001) 2(a) and UNGA Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) Annexe II(1) binds member states “ from organasing, instigating, facilitating, participating in , financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities”. Pakistan, by signing these conventions, is also bound to take measures to ensure that its territories are not used for locating terrorism camps, training, or terrorist acts against other states.

Headley’s Testimony Shouldn’t Get Caught Up in Partisan Politics

If his testimony gets embroiled in partisan politics, it will be a sure victory for Pakistan. On the other hand, if we use it properly, it will set in motion a process which will finally compel Pakistan to abandon terrorism as a coercive foreign policy instrument against India.

Unfortunately, neither the present NDA government, nor the earlier UPA regimes have ever thought on these lines. For them, finalisation of criminal cases against terrorists, who are mere pawns, is an end in itself. They do not seem to have thought how we can take advantage of this judicial process to compel Pakistan to stop resorting to terrorism so blatantly.

When Gadaffi went Rogue

File photo of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. (Photo: Reuters)

Twenty six years ago, a maverick but defiant leader, who used terrorism as a foreign policy tool, was brought to his knees through determined UN actions. These were based on judicial processes in Scotland and France as we are witnessing now in India and earlier in USA involving Headley. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi who had declared his intention to “assassinate and set fire within the territory of United States” was least bothered by American unilateral actions, beginning with their 1978 sanctions banning military equipment sales.

In 1981, the US snapped diplomatic ties with Tripoli. In the same year, their military attaché in Paris was murdered by suspected Libyan agents. The US embargo on Libyan oil was met with Libya-sponsored terrorist strikes in Chad, Sudan, Rome, Red Sea and West Berlin between 1983 and 1986.

Reagan ordered air strikes on Libya on 5 April 1986. Gaddafi replied by bombing the Pan Am 103 Frankfurt-Detroit flight over Lockerbie (Scotland) on 21 December 1988, killing 256. A French airliner UTA 772 exploded over Niger on 19 September 1989, killing all the occupants in what was suspected to be a Libyan operation.

The UN and EU Intervene

These incidents set off tight European Union and UN sanctions. Libya capitulated in 1991 by offering to produce the terrorists. In 1992 UNSC rejected Libyan offer, imposing total air and arms embargo, restricting their diplomatic mission strength and enforcing travel sanctions. In 1993, the UN banned all Libyan petroleum exports and tightened further sanctions. In 1996, relatives of Pan Am 103 victims sued Libya in US courts taking advantage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 permitting suing foreign governments in US courts. In 1996, the UN warned Gaddafi that he would be prevented from flying to foreign countries. In the same year, Libya appealed to the UN that their sanctions were taking a heavy toll on its economy causing $19 billion loss and resulting in 21,000 deaths.

In 1997, Libya offered cash compensation to Pan Am 103 victims and offered to extradite terrorists. In 1998, the UN voted for lifting partial sanctions and in 1999, the suspects were delivered to the UN. The case ended in conviction in the Scottish court for one accused, while the other was acquitted. Gaddafi tried to come closer to the US by condemning the 9/11 attacks. In August 2003, the Libyan government and the victims’ families signed an agreement of $2.7 billion compensation. Tripoli also accepted responsibility for Pan Am 103 bombing. In September that year, the UN sanctions were lifted.

The Libyan Story: A Lesson for India

The Libyan story should be a model for us if we are interested in finding a lasting solution to our problem with Pakistan. This will be far more effective than the annual September verbal fusillade against Pakistan at the UN. Additionally, we should also lobby with the US Congress to include binding provisions of the lapsed Kerry-Lugar law in any aid bill to Pakistan. This is not going to be easy. It would test the negotiating skills of our leaders.

(The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and a member of the High Level Committee which enquired into the police performance during 26/11 Mumbai.)