Masoud Pezeshkian's Victory Commences a New Era for the Reformists of Iran

But the president may face impediments in getting approval for reform in a Majles dominated by the Conservatives.

Masoud Pezeshkian.

(Photo: AP)

The reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian has defeated Saeed Jalili, a close associate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, to become the ninth president of Iran. The victory in the presidential election marks a significant comeback for the reformists, who had been out of the presidency since 2005 and have been largely marginalised in the political system.

Pezeshkian managed to garner 53.6 percent of the votes in the second round, the run-off, with Jalili finishing at 44.3 percent. The snap elections were triggered by the sudden death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash amid socio-political unrest, a faltering economy, and a volatile regional situation with the war in Gaza accompanied by simmering tensions between Israel and Iran’s ally Hezbollah.

The Guardian Council, Iran’s powerful vetting agency, approved six candidates to run for the presidency, with Pezeshkian the sole reformist candidate in the fray. As no candidate managed to gain a majority in the first round, the election went to a run-off round between the top two contenders, Pezeshkian and Jalili.

Even after securing the highest number of votes in the first round, Pezeshkian faced an uphill battle to win the election. While the first round ensured that the conservative vote was divided between as many as five candidates, the second round could feature a consolidated conservative vote.

Pezeshkian’s fortunes rested on increasing the abysmally low turnout in the first round and then transferring the disgruntled conservative vote. The turnout increased by almost 10 percent in the second round.

Why are the Results Significant?

This election marks a transformative phase in Iran, reflecting a growing schism between the people and the political establishment. The first round of the election witnessed the lowest-ever turnout, at 39.9 percent, since the revolution in 1979.

The turnout had been falling for some time now, as evident in the Majles elections concluded a few months back, but it fell to a historic low this time. Iran has been rocked by a series of protests in the last few years, most notably against the rise of fuel prices in 2018, and more recently, in the aftermath of the killing of Mahsa Amini by Iran’s morality police for flouting the Hijab law.

The regime initiated a brutal crackdown and showed extraordinary resilience to any kind of opposition. This has caused significant disaffection among the electorate, and the turnout fell sharpest in Sistan-Baluchistan and Kurdistan, the provinces that served as the epicentre of the Mahsa Amini protests. Discontent over the economy, marred with mismanagement and further strangulated by international sanctions, also contributed to voter apathy and cynicism.

In the first round, the establishment favourites, Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Ghalibaf, together couldn’t poll the votes that the late Raisi had won in the 2021 presidential elections. So, either a lot of the conservative base did not come out to vote out of disillusionment with the regime, or their votes went to Pezishkian or the other candidates.

Either, the writing is on the wall. The conservatives, or the principlists as they are known in Iran, have lost out on some of their traditional bases of support. The turnout surged in the second round, mostly to the favour of Pezeshkian, who outlined the dangers of a Jalili presidency, enticing many apathetic voters and some of the prominent anti-regime protesters towards his campaign.

A Short Profile of Pezeshkian

Pezeshkian, a man of humble origins, from West Azerbaijan province in the underdeveloped periphery of Iran, graduated as a surgeon. Apart from some participation in the student protests of the anti-Pahlavi movement, he had largely been away from politics.

His unexpected rise came with his appointment as the Deputy Health Minister under the reformist President Muhammad Khatami in 2000 and then served as the Health Minister from 2001 to 2005. He has been a member of the Parliament since 2008, representing Tabriz, Azarshah, and Oskou in the Majles and also served as the first Deputy Speaker of the Majles.

A vocal critic of the crackdown against the student demonstrations in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections and the detention of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, he also came out strongly against the compulsory enforcement of the Hijab law. As a result, Pezeshkian was disqualified from running for the presidency in 2021 by the Guardian Council, a 12-member vetting body that screens the fitness of running candidates in accordance with Islamic precepts of the regime.

The Council is notorious for favouring the conservatives and blocking reformist politicians out of the system. In this context, the approval of Pezeshkian to run for the presidency is seen as an attempt by the regime to increase the turnout and provide a semblance of legitimacy to the system.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

While the supreme leader has the final say on most critical matters, the presidency is the second most important political office in the Islamic republic. The president has the power to appoint members of the cabinet, send representatives to important policy-making councils, and propose a budget.

At the outset of his campaign, Pezeshkian, a pragmatist, acknowledged the constraints of the system he would be operating in and desisted from offering promises of a radical overhaul. He seeks to undertake whatever reform is possible within the scope of the system.

Pezeshkian highlighted mismanagement in governance and promised to bring in experts or technocrats instead of cronies and ideological companions to remedy the system. On the economic front, he flagged internal corruption and emphasised the need to adhere to international regulatory frameworks like the FATF (Financial Action Task Force).

In order to improve the economy, plagued by inflation, he seeks to bring sanction relief by engaging with the United States and other international stakeholders on nuclear weapons. His presidency could also herald limited socio-political liberalism, with an easing of internal restrictions on social media, dialling down of censorship, and some moderation in the enforcement of compulsory Hijab and dress codes for women. Further, his administration could see an increased presence of minorities and the extension of development programs to the undeveloped and peripheral regions, where they mostly reside.

While the overall foreign policy framework is set by the supreme leader and groups like the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), the president can provide a new direction to Iran’s external relations. Broadly, the incoming president stressed the need to end Iran's isolation and increase interactions with the world order.

The issue on top of the agenda would be nuclear weapons and sanctions. Pezeshkian, a votary of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action aka the Iran Nuclear Deal), could oversee a reopening of negotiations on the same. Mohammad Javaid Zarif, the former foreign minister who played an important role in the negotiations, campaigned extensively for Pezishkian and could play an important role in his administration.

Pezeshkian's presidency could also see an improvement in relations with neighbours and regional powers, and the process of re-engagement that began under Raisi could receive a fillip.

Forward but Measured Steps

The earlier victories of reformists and moderates like Mohammed Khatami and Hassan Rouhani on the planks of reform and liberalisation did not translate into the same. They were constantly in conflict with the conservative power centres and hardline groups in the system and ended up on the losing front more often than not. However, there were achievements as well, such as Khatami’s Dialogue Among Civilizations and the Rouhani administration’s success in striking a nuclear deal with the P5 + 1.

The reformist's victory offers better prospects for the Islamic republic, but the president may face impediments in getting the approval for his cabinet and legislative program in a Majles that is dominated by the Conservatives. In addition to this, Pezeshkian will have to grapple with the power of influential quarters like the IRGC and other interest groups that espouse a more hardline vision in domestic politics and foreign affairs. With few sympathisers in the regime, a Pezeshkian presidency could be as tumultuous as Khatami’s.

[Jappandeep Kour is a PhD candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She also holds a master’s degree in International Relations and Area Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her interests include State and Society in WANA, Political Economy, and Iranian Politics. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.]