We Should Thank Manmohan Singh for Not ‘Unleashing War’ Post 26/11

To assume Manmohan Singh was indecisive about retaliating post 26/11 attack is wrong. A war doesn’t help anyone.

Image of former PM Dr Manmohan Singh used for representational purposes.

(Photo: Kamran Akhter / The Quint)

Although we are quite used to politicians making unrealistic promises and wild accusations during electioneering, this time there is a new cat in town – called “national skooorty”.

The claims related to it include finger-pointing at past leaders, with the latest being, “the Indian Armed Forces were ready to retaliate after 26/11, but the government of the day kept mum”.

Busting Two Dangerous Myths

The problem with such a claim is that it postulates two dangerous myths:

• One that the Government of India is just one / two ‘decisive’ persons. In reality, it’s an entire system, comprising political leaders, military and intelligence chiefs, and apex-level civil services officers, with major governmental decisions being derived through a process and deep consultations. Hence, who kept mum? The so-called ‘Accidental Prime Minister’? Or, the entire Cabinet? Or, did the entire system disfavor a punitive strike? If ‘The Accidental Prime Minister’ ended up overriding the entire system, then he wasn’t as indecisive as made out to be. If the entire system had disfavored a military strike, perhaps there was collective wisdom at work.
• Second, the Government of India must allow the Armed Forces to conduct military strikes whenever they are “ready”. It is implausible that in the Cabinet meetings that followed 26/11, a range of military and covert options were not presented – and that the military and intelligence chiefs are mere “war-wagers”, expressed “readiness” – and did not opine on how each option may pan out and the strategic ramifications thereof.

History is full of war, predicted not to start at all.

Enoch Powell

The fact is that, in the aftermath of 26/11, major issues had militated against punitive strikes on the terror camps.

Military Strengths & Viability of India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine’

The Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), evolved after the 1999 Kargil conflict, and was enunciated around 2005. This envisioned the Indian Army mobilising, commencing strikes almost simultaneously, taking the Pakistan Army by surprise, and operating without crossing the ‘red lines’ which could trigger a nuclear response from Pakistan.

The CSD was critically examined by Pakistan’s military, who concluded that its armed forces were unprepared to fight in the CSD-generated environment. Thereafter, Pakistan initiated a three-step strategy to counter India’s CSD:

• Reduce reaction timings of its Army by (i) relocating select formations closer to the border; (ii) constructing additional critical infrastructure to facilitate troop movement; and (iii) revising its mobilisation regulations.
• A Force Development Strategy: The 1985 Pressler Amendment (invoked in October 1990) and the Commonwealth sanctions after General Musharraf’s coup in Oct 1999 had together ensured there was no supply of Western military equipment to Pakistan from 1990. Consequently, critical equipment deficiencies in the Pakistani Armed Forces were evident during the 1999 Kargil conflict. However, after 9/11, the US favoured Pakistan with MNNA (Major Non-NATO Ally) status, and began supplying military hardware. Pakistan also focused on acquisition on select “hi-tech” weapon platforms and force multipliers to improve its military’s strike and night-fighting capabilities, situational awareness, ISR, etc.
• ‘Lowering of Nuclear Threshold’: Conventional force development has a long timeline. Hence, to tide over the interim, Pakistan began to project that it had lowered its threshold for use of nuclear weapons.

How to Win a Contemporary War

In sum, we had to assume that matters may escalate – but by 2008, the Pakistani military was better prepared than 1999 and had also implemented some measures against the CSD. To conclusively win a contemporary war, one requires a technological edge over several orders and/or an overwhelming superiority in numbers (men, weapon systems) – and we forget that even the eminent superpower, US, has not been able to win the longest war in its history – against insurgents in Afghanistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a country with sizeable armed forces.

As far as our ‘readiness’ is concerned, after LeT terrorists struck Mumbai (26/11), the media and the public clamoured for retaliation. With the media also reporting the meetings of Indian leaders, Pakistan, apprehending an attack by India, had placed its Army and Air Force, particularly air defence, on high alert. Thus, from dusk 27 November 2008 onwards, an aerial attack into PoK was fraught with consequences.

What About the ‘Mushroom Cloud’?

But what about the rapid escalation of tensions to nuclear levels? Many Indian “analysts” espouse that there is space for punitive strikes and “limited war” beneath the “nuclear threshold”. The reality is that Indian attempts to keep a punitive strike or a conflict ‘limited’, may not succeed.

The cycle of Indian strike-Pakistan retaliation-Indian counter-response holds the potential to progressively escalate to the threat of imminent nuclear war, which compels the international community to intervene. Nevertheless, let us assume that there is no chance of a punitive attack spinning off into a broader conflict. If so, why did we not ‘retaliate’ after one of our aircraft was shot-down recently?

What US Wants in the Region

To sustain military operations in land-locked Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US had deployed on major air bases in Pakistan, carved exclusive air corridors in Pakistani airspace, and begun using two logistic routes (Karachi/Gwadar-Chaman-Kandahar; Karachi/Gwadar-Khyber-Kabul) into Afghanistan. After the 13 December 2001 attack on our Parliament, the Armed Forces were mobilised (Operation Parakaram) – but the US, heavily dependent on Pakistan, did not want India to disrupt US operations in Afghanistan by attacking Pakistan.

India was presented with a similar, aggravated dynamic after 26/11. In 2008, the US, facing setbacks in Afghanistan, had decided to surge additional troops there.

Simultaneously, the US was pressurising Pakistan to seal the Afghan-Pak border in order to thwart the Taliban from conducting attacks in Afghanistan, and then retreating to safe havens in Pakistan for rest-recoup-refit. Consequently, Pakistan had deployed in its tribal areas (FATA-KPP) on the Pak-Afghan border. The overall Pak Army posture was:

United States – The Elephant in a Dark Room

Thus, post-26/11, the Indian Army and the IAF could have not only carried out a series of punitive strikes into PoK, but if things had expectedly escalated, could have gone through this marginal deployment of 25 Pakistan Army infantry brigades in the IB sector, like a hot knife through butter. The latter situation however, coupled with Pakistan’s limited strategic depth, its fear of being quickly overwhelmed and then facing an existential threat, would have led Pakistan to quickly move higher on the escalatory spiral towards nuclear weapons.

And it is certain that Pakistan played the US at this juncture – and ostensibly informed the US that it would (i) respond in kind to any punitive strike by India; and (ii) withdraw its forces supporting US objectives on the Pak-Afghan border in order to meet the Indian threat.

In turn, the US, not willing to jeopardise its strategic objectives in Afghanistan, asked India to refrain, promising to pressurise Pakistan on terrorism. It is common knowledge that post-Balakot airstrikes, ingress by the Pakistani Air Force and the downing of combat aircraft on both sides, the US administration had similarly told India and Pakistan to cool it. In sum, the US is the huge elephant in a dark room. We claim we will not accept anyone’s mediation – but in reality, most nations tend to amble into a corner when this elephant shuffles. The difference between 2008 and 2019 also is that now, the US has supported our right to strike Balakot.

The Need for Precise Intelligence

As is evident from the raging controversy over the Balakot attack casualties, one of the most crucial elements of a strike on a terrorist training camp is last-minute-pre-strike intelligence. Terrorist training camps are just that – camps – which are moved by Pakistani handlers.

A decade ago, had the IAF struck a wrong target on account of imprecise intelligence and instead hit unassociated men, women and children, we would have played right into the hands of Pakistan.

It may be appropriate to end with a quote from Field Marshal Slim, “Nothing is so good for the morale of the troops as occasionally to see a dead General.”

Troops find this nice – they face the brunt of a bloody war even as the Generals sit in rear areas in comparative safety. Apex political leaders are far more protected and safer.

Hence, to assume that such-and-such political leader was a coward/indecisive is wrong – he/she could have unleashed a war and seen it through without losing a hair from their or their families’ heads. It’s a separate matter that the country, its economy, its infrastructure and the families of soldiers may have suffered some of the ravages of a war.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)