India-China Disengagement | New Delhi's Patient Diplomacy Seems to Have Worked

But the agreement appears to be about “patrolling” and not “disengagement” or “de-escalation”, which may follow.

Modi and Xi.

(Photo: X/@narendramodi)

Wednesday’s meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia is their first formal one since Chennai in October 2019.

According to reports, Modi told Xi in his opening remarks that “maintaining peace and stability on the border should remain our priority. Mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual sensitivity should remain the basis of our relations.”

In response, the Chinese President said that the two sides needed to have “more communication and cooperation, handle our differences and disagreements, and [to] facilitate each other’s pursuit of development aspirations.”

Much has happened since the heady days of the Chennai meeting, primarily the clash in Galwan in eastern Ladakh on 15 June 2020 that took the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and reportedly twice that of the Chinese.

This was the result of a sudden set of blockades established by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to prevent Indian forces from patrolling six areas on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, which they had been doing as per agreement. Simultaneously, some 50,000 PLA troops were brought near the LAC without the prior notification required by the said agreement.

India was taken aback. But it responded quickly by deploying its forces opposite to the Chinese blockades and sending in additional troops to match the buildup. After that, apart from the successful military manoeuvre of occupying the Kailash Heights near Spanggur Tso, New Delhi has relied on patient diplomacy to persuade the Chinese to turn the clock back and restore the status quo in the area.

Its efforts now seem to have been rewarded.

Since 2020, the two countries’ foreign ministers and national security advisers met several times, and there were 17 official-level Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings, 21 rounds of talks at the higher military commanders’ level, and scores of conversations between local border commanders.

On Monday, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said at a news briefing that India and China had arrived at an agreement on “patrolling arrangements” with respect to their military standoff.

“Over the last several weeks, Indian and Chinese diplomatic negotiators have been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums, and as a result of these discussions, agreement has been arrived at on patrolling arrangements along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that has arisen in these areas in 2020.”

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri

The two sides would now take the “next steps” on this.

So far, there is no clarity on the nature of the agreement. It’s not clear whether the agreement represents a status quo ante as of April 2020 and whether the “buffer” or “no-patrol” zones created in four of the six areas through negotiations between 2020-2022 would be dismantled and normal patrolling there resumed. 2023 was a wasted year given how little was achieved. But a flurry of diplomacy and high-level meetings in July-September this year has led to this breakthrough.

Since 2020, India has set the benchmark, requiring the disengagement of armed forces at the blockade points and the de-induction of the additional forces both sides had brought into the region. But the language being used now is different, and the agreement is about “patrolling”.

As if to underscore this, Foreign Secretary Misri repeated this line thrice in his press briefing, “An agreement has been reached on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas.”

So, the agreement is about “patrolling” and not “disengagement” or “de-escalation”, which may follow.

Media reports suggest that the agreement is likely to be applied not just in eastern Ladakh but across the entire Line of Actual Control. Chinese blockades exist in two key areas — the Depsang Bulge in the northern part of the LAC and the Charding-Ninglung Nala near Demchok. On the other hand, India has blocked Chinese patrols in the east, especially in Tangtse, northeast of Tawang.

There is a hint, too, that the agreement may incorporate other measures to promote stability, such as coordinated patrolling, and to ensure that Indian and Chinese patrols do not run into each other while patrolling disputed areas, thereby avoiding face-offs and confrontations.

There was little clarification from the Chinese on the announcement of the deal on Tuesday. Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jan said in response to a question, “Over a recent period of time, China and India have kept close communication through diplomatic and military channels on issues relating to the China-India border. The two sides have reached resolutions on relevant matters, which China views favourably. Going forward, China will work with India to implement these resolutions.”

On Monday, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar too commented on the issue to say that with the agreement, “the disengagement process with China has been completed.” He added that there were areas where the Chinese had blocked us, “so we had blocked them… We have reached an agreement and understanding which will now allow the patrolling… Depsang, that is not the only place, there are other places also.”

Another important voice that weighed in on this on Tuesday was Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, who said that the bottom line of the agreement was the importance of restoring “trust” between the two armies. He asserted that it was important to go back to the status quo of April 2020. “Thereafter, we will be looking at disengagement, de-escalation and normal management of the Line of Actual Control.” He indicated that this would be done in several phases and over a period of time.

Till 2020, India and China maintained peace along the LAC, basing themselves on a series of agreements. In September 1993, they signed the first major agreement on “The Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.” Three years later, in 1996, they signed an agreement on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas.”

In 2005, they signed a protocol on the “Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.” Finally, in 2013, there was another military agreement between the two nations on “Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.

These agreements were quite unique and largely kept the peace along a border disputed in its entirety. It was because of these that the clash at Galwan in June 2020 was not with guns and grenades but with sticks and stones. Both sides had adhered to the prohibition of the use of guns and explosives on the LAC as part of the 1996 agreement.

But it was this very agreement that the Chinese violated when they failed to notify India about their troop movements close to the border in March-April 2020.

The cautious language and the measured steps that the two sides are now taking could mean that an entirely new set of confidence-building measures are in the works to ensure peace even as both armies patrol the LAC. This could include new buffer or no-patrol zones in certain areas, as well as surveillance measures to ensure there is no violation of the agreements.

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion article and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)