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The case of shots being fired in the Pangong Tso area on Monday night (7/8 September) is presenting itself as a Rashomon-like opera –– so, it may be a good idea to examine the issue from both the Indian and Chinese perspectives.
If what the Indian side is saying is correct – and this is more than likely – it means that the Chinese are not reconciled to the Indian occupation of the grey zone in the area, which means occupying heights like Helmet, Black Top, Mukpari, Rezang La and Reqin La, mirroring their own action in the north bank of the Pangong Tso. They are now trying their level best to push the Indians out of the area.
Clearly, the aim is not to mount some military operation against the Chinese forces who are quite well entrenched in the Spanggur Tso region, but to encourage them to restore status quo ante in the north bank of the Lake.
The commando anchors have already declared the Indian occupation of the peaks in the south bank of the Pangong Tso as some sort of a victory. Actually, having been caught napping in Depsang, Galwan and Pangong Tso, the Army didn’t want to let its guard down in this vital region as well.
The Indian action had two aims:
Two important roads lead out of the south bank—one north from Chushul to Tangtse, Durbuk and Leh, and the other south past the area of action, to the Loma Bend on the Indus river and thence up to Leh in the north, and down river to Demchok in the south. The south bank area was the area that saw the main thrust of the Chinese attack in November 1962, in an arc from Rezang La to the Yula area of the southern shore of Pangong Tso.
There have been reports that some shots had also been fired on the night of 29 August when Indian troops had occupied the heights. Further, there have been reports of the PLA trying to nudge the Indians out of their newly-occupied positions.
Essentially they confirm that the old Confidence Building Measures Regime inaugurated by the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 is dead. Already in the wake of the 15 June Galwan incident, India had reset the rules of engagement with Chinese troops.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had given the army “full freedom” to deal with China “while protecting Indian territory and the lives of army personnel.”
Second, it signals that India is determined not to let the situation freeze into a status quo. Even though at the highest levels it has taken an ambiguous stand, declaring that the Chinese were not occupying any Indian territory, the reality is that the Chinese have occupied some 1,000 sq kms of the grey zone in Depsang, Galwan, Gogra and Pangong Tso. The Indian strategy now is to push the Chinese to the point where they are willing to return to status quo ante as of April in these areas.
This is fraught strategy, and any of these incidents could escalate to a wider skirmish with consequences neither side may intend. In keeping with the way it handles these things, the Modi government is also seeking to ride the wave of patriotism roused by the commando anchors, so, there is also some media manipulation to overstate what is happening.
The government used the Special Frontier Force, manned by Tibetans, for the 29 August operation, and then made it known widely. This could not but have been seen as a provocative gesture by the Chinese. The presence of the BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav at the funeral of a Tibetan soldier of the force would be seen as an egregious slap on China’s face.
But if it fails, the situation could be more like Kargil where, having failed to prevent the incursions, India had to sacrifice the lives of more than 500 young men, even while claiming it to be a ‘great victory’.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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Published: 08 Sep 2020,10:11 PM IST