Did the US Make a Mistake by Relying on Zalmay Khalilzad for Afghanistan?

A retired Khalilzad will now watch from the sidelines as the new Taliban reality consolidates itself in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, left, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group’s top political leader shake hands. Image used for representational purposes. 

(Image: Modified by Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

On 19 October, Zalmay Khalilzad, the face of the United States’ Afghanistan policy over the past three years, resigned from his post as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation.

This was only appropriate for the approaches which he had advocated and had personally sought to implement ultimately ended in ignominious failure. Khalilzad’s superiors in Washington, including President Joe Biden, have strenuously attempted to project otherwise but the fact of the collapse of US policy to smoothly end the ‘forever’ war cannot be denied.

A large share of the blame for this outcome has to be shouldered by Khalilzad for it was he who led US negotiations with the Taliban which concluded in the US-Taliban agreement of February, 2020.

That agreement was nothing short of an instrument of surrender, the product of a desperate desire to exit Afghanistan. True, US strategic desperation gave Khalilzad very weak cards to play with but he could have nevertheless played a better hand for his adopted country which has given him so much. Why?

Rise of Zalmay Khalilzad in the US

Khalilzad was born in Afghanistan and spent his childhood and youth in the country’s capital Kabul. He belonged to a small group of Afghan young men who got US scholarships to study at the American University at Beirut. Among others in that group is former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. He maintained close contacts with his country of birth all through his life. All this should have equipped him well to negotiate with the Taliban. Obviously, it did not.

From Beirut, Khalilzad went to the US for higher education, became an academic, and also worked in government.

With the beginning of American opposition to the Soviet ingress into Afghanistan, Khalilzad began to be looked up for advice because of his Afghan background.

He worked in different capacities in different departments of US administrations and came through as conservative in orientation.

He was again brought in to work in senior official positions after the US decided to embark on armed action against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda after 9/11. His views were eagerly sought by the Bush administration after the Taliban were driven out of Afghanistan. He helped in bringing together a new political order in the country including as the US ambassador to Afghanistan in 2004-05. From Afghanistan Khalilzad was sent to Iraq as the US ambassador and thereafter became the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Clearly, Khalilzad went from success to success in the Bush administration.

American Faith in Khalilzad Betrayed

The Trump administration turned to Khalilzad in 2018 to negotiate the US exit from Afghanistan. He was brought in from the private sector where he spent more than a decade after leaving his post in New York.

Clearly, the US establishment, cutting across party lines, had faith in Khalilzad’s knowledge of Afghanistan and his skills as a negotiator. This is demonstrated by the fact that President Joe Biden continued with his services this year.

But Khalilzad failed Biden for he did not warn him sufficiently that the Afghan Republic would swiftly collapse as the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, began its advance in June this year. More than anyone else he has to bear the blame for not realising that the Afghan army that the US had raised and trained would ultimately give up without a fight and that Ghani would flee the country instead of inspiring his people and the army to resist the Taliban.

New Reality in Afghanistan

These Khalilzad failures would eclipse all his many achievements. He will be remembered by them. That is the cruel reality of life. Now 70, it is unlikely that Khalilzad will be given an opportunity to hold another official position. He will, therefore, have a lot of time to reflect on the how US Afghan policy unravelled in the summer of 2021, leading to the humiliation of a chaotic exit seen for weeks all over the world in real time.

Khalilzad will now watch from the side lines as the new Taliban reality consolidates itself in Afghanistan.

The new realities in Afghanistan are causing concern in the region and among the major powers. However, the causes for worries are different in different countries. The preferred option of some states is that the Taliban include non-Taliban leaders in government and adhere to universal standards on gender issues and the protection of minorities.

Other states are not so much concerned by the membership of the Afghan government as by modifying its approaches on gender issues. These states, too, are hesitating on giving the Taliban diplomatic recognition till they bring about the desired changes.

Stability in Afghanistan Suits Everyone

Certainly, no country wants civil war to break out in Afghanistan which would provide a fertile ground for international terrorist groups to consolidate themselves there. It would also lead to the movement of sections of Afghan people to foreign lands as refugees. Such movements may also occur because of the vast economic distress which has gripped the country.

Enormous humanitarian assistance is required by Afghanistan at this stage. The international community is willing to do so but through UN agencies. The Taliban have been willing to accept these conditions.

More than any other country it is Pakistan which wants the Taliban government to stabilise. It helped it win the war. Now it wants to win the peace but if that is not possible then Pakistan wants to blame the international community for the failure!

(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs. He can be reached @VivekKatju. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)