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What will happen in the Delhi polls in February 2020?
Despite his shrinking political base (in particular, disillusionment of the urban middle class), if Arvind Kejriwal wins again (even if only marginally), it will be in large part due to the hapless state unit of Delhi BJP which, riven with internecine turf wars between ineffective political leaders, seems destined not to win on its own (unless rescued by Modi and Shah).
This pitiable state of affairs of Delhi BJP is all the more appalling as Delhi was once the nucleus of the erstwhile Jan Sangh, and subsequently BJP. To fully understand the present situation, let us, briefly step back into history.
It was in Delhi where the actual structure of Jan Sangh was born and took shape post its formation in 1951.
India’s partition was a dastardly affair orchestrated by the departing British colonial powers. The worst affected was undivided Punjab where the enormity of what occurred is beyond conjecture—an almost wholesale transfer of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab to India and Muslims from present day Punjab to Lahore and beyond.
Two characteristics defined these refugees. First, universal opprobrium and scorn towards Congress for having separated them from their homes and hearth. Second, an indefatigable spirit and unbounded pragmatism - they were determined to make good as soon as possible and ensure that they were better off than before.
These refugees soon dominated and wrested control of Delhi’s sizeable mercantile and trade industry which was earlier the suzerain of Banias - the Vedantic trader class and traditional Congress voters. Punjabi refugees, enjoying the newly-found incense of prosperity and dominance, craved for political power and found the suitable option in Jan Sangh.
Nurtured by redoubtable refugee leaders like Balraj Madhok; VK Malhotra (former CEC of Delhi), Kidar Nath Sahani (former Mayor of Delhi), Balraj Khanna (former Deputy Mayor of Delhi), and Madan Lal Khurana (former Chief Minister of Delhi), were the political stalwarts in Delhi at that time. In 1967, Jan Sangh even won 6 out of Delhi’s 7 parliamentary seats.
In an attempt to curtail the power of Jan Sangh in Delhi, in the 1972 elections to Metropolitan Council, Indira Gandhi (then riding high on her enviable military conquests) herself campaigned door-to-door in Patel Nagar—a Sangh bastion—but was unable to defeat VK Malhotra from there.
Even after the dissolution of Jan Sangh and formation of BJP in 1980, its writ run large in Delhi as LK Advani soon became Chairman of the Metropolitan Council.
After the constitutional amendments of 1991, in the assembly elections held in 1993, BJP again won a comfortable majority, wresting power in both the legislative assembly and municipal corporation. But in 1996 it was to go out of power, never to come back again.
BJP’s singular political dominance in Delhi for over 4 decades, from the 50s to late 90s, is a story of doughty state leaders who had, backed by the indomitable spirit of Punjabi refugees, consecrated themselves to the cause of creating a viable alternative to Congress, and succeeded gloriously.
BJP’s Delhi unit, today, is abjectly colourless and rudderless.
First, the Delhi unit represents a picture of false unity of political interests that are inherently opposed to each other. The state president is a Purvanchali; former state presidents represent the Bania faction; and some not so prominent leaders represent the Punjabi refugees, Gurjars, and Dalits. Banias do not like Punjabi Refugees who upended their applecart after Independence and the opprobrium of refugees for them is mutual; both of them dislike the Purvanchalis, viewing them as migrants who have, essentially, encroached upon Delhi’s land, resources, and culture. This explains the frequent and ugly factionalism in the Delhi unit, for so many years.
Second, except Manoj Tiwari, who has an undeniable mass following (sometimes bordering on reverence) amongst the state’s Purvanchali populace, the Delhi unit boasts of a distinctively un-illustrious galaxy of leaders who would not be able to get even their closest friends to vote for them if push came to shove.
Third, by making personal attacks on Kejriwal, BJP is making the same fatal mistake that Congress made with PM Modi - personal attacks on a person who is all too happy to claim martyrdom and spin it into something politically advantageous.
Fourth, even though voters rarely vote on governance or lack thereof, BJP’s record in running Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), where it has been in power for the past 15 years, is blighted by apathy and inefficiency - both in equal measure.
Last but not the least, too many gaffes and foot-in-mouth syndrome(s) by Delhi’s BJP leaders—“…we will finish subsidy on water and electricity…”; “…we will deliberately violate odd-even rules…”—do not help BJP’s cause; rather create an image of unpopularity, unpredictability and unreliability.
All this and more has created a political space, again, for Kejriwal who was smarting from the debacle his party suffered at the hands of PM Modi in the Lok Sabha elections of 2019. He is announcing one populist scheme after another, almost every week, to consolidate his vote-bank of poor and lower middle-class, and finds the battlefield either empty or made up of diminutive political leaders who can match him in neither popularity nor wily.
If this continues, it is more than likely that we will see a repeat of Haryana, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand, in Delhi too. BJP’s no-show in Delhi, so far, has propelled Kejriwal to pole position in the run-up to the Assembly elections.
(Pranav Jain is an independent columnist. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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