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The dismissal of the Awami League-led government and the increasing possibility of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) winning in the forthcoming general elections in Bangladesh have triggered speculation that the separatist outfits from India’s northeast could reestablish their bases in the country.
If sources are to be believed, there is jubilation among some sections of the separatist camp over the possibility of their return to Bangladesh. Pitching a tent in that country opens up avenues for networking with foreign governments and agencies, procuring weapons and investing funds to sustain the separatist campaign. Except for sources of weapons, the other facilities are non-existent in Myanmar.
The linkages of the separatist insurgent outfits in India’s northeast with Bangladesh go back several decades when the country was still a part of Pakistan. In the late 1950s, Pakistan allowed the Naga National Council (NNC) to set up office in Dhaka and training camps in Sylhet. It was from East Pakistan that NNC president Angami Zapu Phizo arranged a fake El Salvadoran passport to reach Switzerland and subsequently to London a few months later.
All these facilities came to an abrupt end after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The MNF transferred all its assets to the contiguous region of Arakan in Myanmar. It was not until the late 1970s that rebel groups from India’s northeast were able to set foot in Bangladesh again. The MNF resurfaced in Bangladesh and there was also the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), an organisation from Tripura that established camps in the CHT region. Their presence came to an end in the late 1980s when these twin outfits inked peace agreements with the Indian government.
The third phase began in the mid-1980s when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from Manipur succeeded in securing hideouts among the Meitei population in Bangladesh’s Sylhet district. Following in the footsteps of the PLA were at least six other groups from Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and Tripura that were able to carve out a network in the country. However, only four outfits among them – the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Twipra (NLFT) – were able to set up camps at different locations for training new recruits.
From the late 1970s till 2009, no separatist outfit from the northeast faced any threat from successive governments in Bangladesh. New Delhi’s repeated pleas to Dhaka for a crackdown fell on deaf ears which were true as much with the BNP as they were with the Awami League.
Many insurgent groups developed links with high-ranking political functionaries from all parties, ministers and government officials. They invested funds in businesses and projects although the quantum of these investments may not have been as colossal as speculated by a section of the Indian media. In 1993, ULFA chief of staff Paresh Baruah was put behind bars by the country’s external intelligence agency, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), for illegal transhipment of weapons from Romania but set free within two months without any charges against him.
The trigger for this episode came from the disappearance of activist Sanjoy Ghose from Assam’s Majuli which hogged media headlines and prompted New Delhi to lobby with Dhaka for the arrest of the ULFA leaders. It was also during this regime that more functionaries of the separatist groups procured fake passports in Bangladesh for the journey to Pakistan to avail training.
Some retired government officials and journalists in Dhaka were of the view that there were two primary reasons that prompted the Awami League-led government to crack the whip on the rebel groups from the northeast in 2009.
The first was the government’s genuine willingness to improve ties with India. Second, the government wanted to eliminate Islamist outfits and the network of Pakistan’s ISI from the country. The ULFA and the NDFB topped the list among all the separatist outfits that had cultivated intimate ties with the ISI and the pro-Pakistan cliques in the security agencies. Still, the ULFA’s Paresh Baruah managed to escape from the country ahead of the crackdown after he was tipped off by a senior officer in an intelligence agency.
The situation in the northeast has undergone a vast change since the 1990s. Many of the groups that had hideouts and camps in Bangladesh earlier are no longer in existence. The NDFB was disbanded after an accord with the government five years ago. The pro-talks faction of the ULFA headed by former chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa followed suit with a similar agreement last year. The anti-talks faction led by supremo Paresh Baruah still has camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region but is facing a resource crunch in terms of funds and cadres.
As a survival tactic, these groups have joined hands with the military regime and have occasionally carried out attacks against the resistance groups in Sagaing Region. The PLA is the biggest in terms of resources and network and the only outfit that could possibly make efforts to strengthen its presence in Bangladesh.
However, in all likelihood, the separatist groups may not be allowed to operate as brazenly as they did in Bangladesh two decades ago. There is a greater possibility of the ULFA and the PLA investing funds in the country and stationing their representatives covertly. The Chittagong Arms Haul on 2 April 2004 and the subsequent probe by the Awami League government had rattled the entire political and security establishment in the country. The consignment of weapons was arranged by Pakistan’s ISI under the ULFA’s banner as an investigation by this correspondent has revealed.
The probe resulted in the conviction of the ULFA’s then chief of staff Paresh Baruah who was awarded capital punishment along with 13 other people including ex-ministers Lutfozzaman Babar (BNP) and Motiur Rahman Nizami (Jamaat-e-Islami) and former top intelligence officials.
There were rumours among some sections of people in Bangladesh that the grenades were sourced by the assassins from the ULFA. But the probe could not unearth any evidence linking the ULFA to the incident. The damage, however, to the ULFA and other separatist outfits was done as they ended up severely tarnishing their image in the country.
Whichever party wins in the forthcoming general elections would certainly be extra cautious with separatist outfits from the northeast. Currently, there is an undercurrent of resentment against India but no government in Bangladesh can afford to adopt policies against and ignore the interests of the big neighbour indefinitely.
(Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a senior journalist in Assam and author of ULFA: The Mirage of Dawn. This is an opinion article and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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