Bangabandhu and His Legacies

As a populist leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, not unlike his daughter, had a tendency for personalist rule.

Protesters destroy a statue of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka on Monday evening.

(Photo: PTI)

On 15 August 1975, some disaffected officers of the Bangladeshi Army stormed the home of Bangabandhu (Friend of Bengal) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the country, and killed him as well as several members of his family, including children.

Despite his valiant role in the creation of Bangladesh, disaffection with his leadership style and governance had been growing for some time. Some of his difficulties, no doubt, stemmed from his own inexperience with governance.

He had long been a political activist but had not been in any executive positions during the time the country had been East Pakistan.

Furthermore, upon assuming office following the country’s independence, he also had the unenviable task of dealing with segments of Bangladesh’s population, especially members of the ultra-right-wing, Jamaat-i-Islami, which remained loyal to Pakistan.

In a related vein, he had to contend with two critical legacies of the Pakistani state. Political institutions were weak and a democratic political culture sorely lacking.

This was hardly surprising, as the Pakistani state had failed to consolidate political institutions let alone incorporate democratic values into the polity. And even though substantial numbers of East Pakistan’s military had participated in the freedom movement, they were not socialised into a pattern of civil-military relations that had internalised the concept of civilian supremacy.

Consequently, many officers and men in the Bangladeshi armed forces were not wholly willing to submit to an elected, civilian authority.

Furthermore, in 1974, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had to cope with a famine that had resulted from floods, a decline in food aid, and economic mismanagement.

Finally, as a populist leader, he had a tendency for personalist rule. This propensity, some have argued, ultimately culminated in an attraction for authoritarianism. As his authoritarian leanings came to the fore and political corruption in the nascent state became rampant, he increasingly aggrandised political power and even created a paramilitary force, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini, which was personally loyal to him.

Assassination and Military Rule

The sheer weight of these challenges led to growing popular discontent against him and his party, the Awami League. This disaffection ultimately led a handful of military officers to conspire against him and carry out a political assassination.

Following his assassination, two other military coups took place in quick succession. In November of 1975, in a third coup, General Ziaur Rehman seized power and remained in office until 1981, when he too was toppled in yet another military coup.

It was not until another decade later that democracy was restored in the country with Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of General Ziaur Rehman, assuming office.

General Zia and several of his successors, in attempts to legitimise their rule, wrapped themselves in the mantle of Islam, steadily stripping the state of its initial, secular constitutional commitment. Furthermore, they showed scant regard for the rights of the country’s Hindu minority.

Even after military rule came to a close following a popular uprising in 1991, Bangladesh remained, at best, an electoral democracy albeit not without flaws.

Almost 50 years since the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, echoes of his tragic assassination are now reverberating through present-day Bangladesh. On 5 August, his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, who had ruled the country since 2009, was ousted from office following widespread and increasingly violent protests, as Bangabandhu's giant statue in Dhaka was brought down by angry protestors.

Sheikh Hasina's Authoritarian Streak

Unhappiness amongst college students, many of whom face unemployment, started the demonstrations owing to their distress over a decision of her government to reserve thirty percent of government jobs for the relatives and descendants of those who had fought in the war of independence in 1971.

Since most of these individuals were likely to be Awami League sympathisers, it would not only limit employment prospects but also enshrine her party in the government bureaucracy.

Sheikh Hasina, like her father in his last days, had also demonstrated an increasingly authoritarian streak in recent years. She had shown scant regard for institutional procedures, had harassed political opponents, incarcerated her principal political opponent Begum Khaleda Zia on charges of the embezzlement of funds, and had sought to stamp out political dissent.

Most importantly, in January 2024, she won a fourth term in office but with the Opposition boycotting the elections.

In the wake of her forced departure from office and the country, the Bangladeshi military has forged an interim government.

Mohammed Yunus, a Nobel prize-winning social activist, has been made the head of this government and it has been mandated with the task of holding elections. At this juncture, it is unclear when the elections will be held as the country remains in a state of turmoil.

Even when they are held, some of the endemic problems that have dogged Bangladesh since its genesis will remain. The principal one, of course, is the weakness of its political institutions, a legacy that can be traced to the days of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and even earlier to the days of Pakistani rule.

Whether or not a newly elected government can finally grapple with this deep-seated issue will determine the future course of the country’s political trajectory.

(Sumit Ganguly holds the Tagore Chair and is Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Indiana University, Bloomington, and is a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)