The Generals of Pakistan: Army Chief Asim Munir’s Charm Offensive in the US

It has always been about transactional interests between Pakistan and the US and never about the naturality of ties.

The behind-the-scenes role played by the dour and serious General Munir in securing ‘loans’ from traditional lending countries, is the worst-kept secret.

(Photo: ISPR Pakistan)

When someone asked the devious General Zia-ul-Haq if he was going to kill the tallest politician whom he had just deposed in a coup d’état (ironically called, Operation Fairplay), he answered half-sincerely, “Mein Bhutto Sahib ko kaisey maar sakta hoon? Woh to merey mohsin hain.” (How can I kill Bhutto Sahib? He is my benefactor).

But the folks who had tracked Zia’s trajectory to power knew better than to believe the wily General and the streets of Pakistan were agog with slogans like, "Amrika ne kutta palla, vardi walla vardi walla" (Americans have a loyal dog, the one in uniform, the one in uniform) implying that the Americans would invariably let the dodgy General have his way, as long as it furthered American interests.

It has always been about transactional 'interests’ between Pakistan and the United States, and never about the naturality of the relationship. In such equations, the mismatch of personal sensibilities of those in charge doesn’t matter, only mutual 'interests’ do.

US Has Been an Enabler to Pakistan’s Excesses

Washington had silently watched General Yahya Khan’s genocide in East Pakistan (later, Bangladesh) because Islamabad was importantly facilitating secret talks with China. Later, General Haq regressed the Pakistani narrative into undemocratic, illiberal, and shariaised moorings by emerging as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism, and a providential quid pro quo emerged.

In September 2001, Washington DC legitimised yet another Military coup by a Pakistan General, Pervez Musharraf, as he ironically signed up Pakistan for War on Terror in Afghanistan (contradicting Pakistan’s historical role in creating the Taliban), as both sides needed each other. 'Interests’ superseded all other concerns.

Today, Pakistan is caught in an unprecedented vortex of its own doing and is struggling to keep afloat. The coffers are empty, inflation is going through the roof, society is imploding with religious extremism, and terror 'nurseries’ nurtured for years are turning on the State – the tinderbox of Pakistan could realistically spiral towards a 'failed state’ unless a complete reset is undertaken.

However, given the current lay of the land, the desperately sought reset is impossible by the current lot of discredited politicians (be it the corrupt dynasts from Bhutto-Sharif clans or the reckless anarchist in Imran Khan) who are given to certain inherent compulsions. Whereas the all-powerful clergy has been at the helm of vitiating and weaponising the environment, recklessly.

Yet again, this virtually leaves the relatively moderate and stable institution of the Pakistan 'establishment’ (Military) to step in, overtly or covertly, to navigate Pakistan through the minefield that it finds itself in.

The Generals Know Imran’s 'Anti-West’ Stand is Unviable

Given the cards dealt with in terms of the options available in Pakistan, and the serendipitous 'interest’ for Washington DC to have some foothold in the restive region (given the abandonment of Afghanistan and its consequential after effects) – propping the Pakistani 'establishment’ as a stabiliser and re-initiator in the region makes good sense.

The Pakistani Generals are well-versed in the unreliability of their politicos, the pernicious effect of dalliances with the clergy, and the increasing unpopularity of becoming beholden to the Chinese, therefore, the 'normalising’ of relations with traditional ally ie, the US, comes with immense obvious and collateral benefits.

It additionally warms up the Arab Sheikhdoms to loosen their purse strings and also impacts the crucial multilateral platforms like International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) et al positively.

The Generals know that the plausible return of the theatrical grandstanding by the decidedly 'anti-west’ stand of the temperamental Imran Khan (still the most popular civilian leader) is tantamount to further isolationism and emboldening religiosity, and above all the guaranteed institutional diminishment of the Pakistani 'establishment’ (as the vainglorious 'Taliban Khan’ has a beef to settle with the institution).

Cornered with bloody and routine attacks all along the unrecognised Durand Line, besides handling the Baloch insurgency, the Pakistani military needs all the help it can muster to hit back in the lawless regions of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and unforgiving swathes of Baluchistan with its unruly Sardars.

Even if it cannot openly admit it for reasons of sovereign pride, the return of 'lock-fire-takeout’ abilities of American drones/missiles to hit elements of the Pakistan facing, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or its metastasised affiliates, would be practically welcomed.

Pakistan-US Ties: An Intermittent Saga?

2023 has been the deadliest year for terror attacks on Pakistani Military and its intensity is only worsening (last week saw the deadliest attack with 23 Pakistani soldiers killed in a single attack in the Dera Ismail Khan district).

In a complete U-turn of optics, from visuals of a couple of years back of the-then Pakistani DG-ISI Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (sacked since then) sipping tea with the Afghan Taliban before the formation of the new Taliban cabinet to a situation now where the Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir is on a charm offensive to the US to beseech support as an ‘ally’, is a déjà vu that has been seen frequently in Pak-US relations.

General Munir has been frenetically calling up the who’s who like the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defence Lloyd J Austin, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Q Brown etc, during his visit.

A sign of his extra-constitutional mandate is his active engagement with the monied Pakistani diaspora and assuring them of the benefits and security of their investments in Pakistan through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) – a clear example of the expanded economic agenda afforded by the General.

The behind-the-scenes role played by the dour and serious General Munir in securing ‘loans’ from traditional lending countries, is the worst-kept secret. Virtually everyone recognises that the real power in Pakistan is not vested in the 'dummy’ caretaker government but in the garrison township of Rawalpindi with the Army House (residence of the Pakistani Military Chief) as the most powerful address in Pakistan.

The Generals have conclusively taken over and the caretaker government is a familiar façade, hence the importance of the Pakistani Chief’s visit to Washington DC (seemingly an impossibility under the Imran Khan Government, a couple of years back).

That the Pakistani Generals are the best bet as of now, the sermonising platitudes of democracy, notwithstanding. The impending national elections in February are only for public consumption, as irrespective of the outcome, the real levers will stay with the Generals.

That the ‘Haffaz’ (memorised Quran by heart) and relatively unknown General Asim Munir is not 'Westernised’ or flamboyant like Yahya Khan or Pervez Musharraf does not really matter, as neither was General Zia-ul-Haq who for all his piousness made the strongest and unlikely alliance with the US.

History repeats itself, and Pakistani Generals are back on the saddle with Uncle Sam, and there are good reasons or 'interests’ on both sides for the same.

(The author is a Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)