In Russia’s Periphery: A Note on Defence Consultations Between Armenia and India

Pinaka Multi‐Barrel Rocket System. Image used for representation only.

(File Photo)

On 14 May, the first defence consultations between the Ministries of Defence of Armenia and India were held at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia. The meeting was chaired by the Head of the Department of Defence Policy and International Cooperation, Levon Ayvazyan, and the Joint Secretary for International Cooperation Ministry of Defence of India, Vishwesh Negi.

The consultations were also attended by the Indian Ambassador to Armenia, Nilakshi Saha Sinha, and the recently posted Indian Defence Attaché, Brigadier General Naveen Nijhawan.

According to the Armenian Defence Ministry, the meeting marked the "Inaugural Official Consultation Session" between the defence ministries of India and Armenia. Discussions encompassed the existing collaboration status between Armenia and India in military technology and training domains, alongside future developmental prospects, including military-technical, military education and combat training of personnel, exchange of experience, and others, were discussed.

The Armenia-India Defence Ministries 2024-2025 Cooperation Plan was also signed. Furthermore, an agreement was reached to form a collaborative task force.

Military cooperation between Armenia and India has been developing rather dynamically since at least 2020, when Armenia procured four Swathi Mobile Radar Systems, totaling $40 million. In 2022, Armenian Defence Minister Mr Papikyan visited India. The same year, Yerevan placed an order in India for Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank missiles and ammunition valued at approximately $245 million.

Armenia ordered 90 advanced towed artillery systems (ATAGS) worth $155.5 million from India, with the first batch of six 155-millimetre towed howitzers delivered in August 2023. Yerevan also ordered $41 million worth of anti-UAV defence systems from Indian company Zen Anti-Drone System (ZADS) and a tactical wheeled vehicle-mounted 155 millimetre/39 MArG howitzer system developed by Indian Kalyani Strategic Systems.

Meanwhile, Armenia's armed forces are also undergoing reforms, and collaboration with India will also include capacity building for them.

In an interview with Armenpress, Ambassador Sinha said, "...Defence cooperation is not only defence technical cooperation, but also we are looking at capacity building. On both fronts, whether it is military-technical cooperation or training and capacity building, both those fronts are proceeding very well. ...I think the prospects for our military cooperation are indeed very good and we are working to further strengthen it."

Armenia's Turn Towards India Comes at a Particularly Critical Juncture

Armenia emerged as a sovereign state from the debris of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The strategic significance of the South Caucasus is determined first of all by its location - often characterised as a buffer zone between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. It is also often perceived as a bridge between Asia and Europe. The region’s natural resources, energy pipelines, and transport corridors have often resulted in competition by different powers to extend their spheres of influence.

Lying in the post-Soviet space, it is also in Russia’s strategic backyard. While Armenian strategic thinkers understand that located as it is, on Russia’s periphery, they must manage relations with Moscow carefully, they also find the portrayal of the region simply as part of Russia’s periphery is reductive and does not do justice to its principal defining characteristics.

Landlocked as the country is, it has cordial relations with only two neighbouring states - Iran and Georgia. It does not have any diplomatic relations with Turkey, its other giant neighbour, and it just lost the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to fellow ex-Soviet state of Azerbaijan after a 20-year-long conflict. Russia, with which Armenia does not share a direct border, has benefitted from net security providers since 1991. As such, Armenia has been both a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) - Moscow-led military bloc and the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

However, geography and the loosening of Moscow's control, characteristic of the Soviet era, has meant that the region's historical and trade ties with regions like the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean are not just reviving but also expanding.

While India neither belongs to the Middle East nor to the Eastern Mediterranean, there is a rich history with Armenia. Much before the partition and the creation of Pakistan, it was a natural destination for Armenian traders and merchants crossing over from neighbouring Iran. Decades before many Indians learnt to spot Armenia on the map, Armenians across the world knew about Calcutta (Kolkata) where a vibrant Armenian community continues to thrive, and Chennai, where Armenian expatriates had published the first draft constitution of a dream of a free homeland back in the 19th century. These naturally found a resonance during the years of Indo-Soviet friendship.

Despite Russia’s efforts to end the war in Artsakh in 2020, and Russian peacekeeping forces stationed there, the perceived inaction of the Russian-led CSTO against the background of Azerbaijan’s incursion into the territory of Armenia in 2021 and border transgressions later has strained Armenia's relations with Russia.

Why Armenia Has Been Seeking to Diversify Its Defence and Security Partnerships

As Russia faces new challenges in the region - with its military support to Azerbaijan Turkey has maneuvered itself to become the second-most powerful regional player after Russia - the fear in Yerevan is that Russia is accommodating and calibrating its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey in ways that may not serve Yerevan's interest. Furthermore, Russia and Turkey have also been coordinating regarding grain shipments through the Black Sea and, as a NATO member, have taken a more nuanced stand on the Ukraine conflict.

The government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been trying to distance itself from the CSTO, saying it has "frozen" Armenia's relations with the bloc. More recently, Armenia asked Russian troops guarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the international airport in Yerevan to leave as it began the process of delimitation of the common border with both governments beginning talks in Kazakhstan. Russian peacekeeping troops in Nagorno-Karabakh have also been withdrawn from there as the enclave reverted back to Azerbaijan.

In such a scenario, Armenia has been seeking to diversify its defence and security partnerships. However, its turn to the West, particularly France and the US, at this juncture may not be entirely viable. Russia's relations with the West, especially NATO, have broken down completely, and the Ukraine conflict is possibly at a watershed moment. With Russia’s gains on the battlefield, the world is staring at a spectre of possibly direct NATO involvement. Meanwhile, in spite of its discontent with Russia, Armenia still continues to be dependent both militarily and economically on its former ally.

Russian border guards continue to be stationed on Armenia’s borders with both Turkey and Iran. Russia also maintains its 102nd military base in Gyumri in Armenia, close to the Turkish border. At least 80 per cent of Armenia’s defence procurement is from Russia.

Russia continues to be Armenia's largest trading partner. The country has benefitted handsomely from trade with Russia under sanctions. According to Armenia's National Statistics Committee, trade between the two countries for January-August 2023 surpassed $4.16 billion, an increase of 56.3 per cent as compared to the same period for the previous year.

For the first time, Armenian exports to Russia at $2.3 billion exceeded its imports which stood at $2 billion. 37 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade is with the EAEU, much lower than with the EU or US. Russia also has a monopoly over gas supplies to the country, and hundreds of Armenian migrants travel to Russia for work. In 2022, remittances from Russia accounted for 3.6 billion dollars out of the total 5.1 billion entering the country.

In this context, India is a "safe" partner, with which Armenia can cultivate close defence and military ties, given India's close relations, including in defence and strategic partnership, with Russia. Earlier, Armenian officials have told this author that they have not encountered any Russian objections to the defence supplies provided by India to it. Furthermore, Armenia's pivot to India can pay both countries rich geopolitical and geo-economic dividends.

(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. She tweets @aditijan. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)