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The world was stunned by the most recent terror attack in Nice on Bastille Day, when a 31-year-old French national of Tunisian origin, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, rammed his 19-tonne truck into a merry-making crowd, killing 84 and injuring over 50. It is the most grotesque terror attack in recent times.
More
significantly, this is a novel modus operandi adopted by a lone wolf. He just
needed a truck to kill. No training, no fire arms, no accomplice, no serious
planning and no expertise to carry out the misadventure. As ISIS had claimed that he was their militant, he may have been well-indoctrinated and radicalised, possibly by the ISIS and his motivation was to kill only and it was a ‘mission accomplished’.
ISIS is
losing its steam in Iraq and Syria and therefore, it’s looking for newer grounds
and fresh methods to remain alive and kicking. With stepped-up intelligence and
vigil by countries such as France and Belgium especially, the Islamic terrorists are
taking recourse to such methods where the impact of killing is maximum, use of manpower is minimal and propaganda is at its hilt to derive the mileage. This pattern
seems to be in vogue and may be more demonstrative in the terror attacks,
already in the pipeline.
If France and Belgium are sitting ducks, then India’s vulnerability with respect to such lone wolf attacks is much higher. These modus operandi are likely to be out-of-the-text-book killings — highly innovative with an element of surprise being the most fundamental.
India has countless religious congregations and they are held almost every day. Also, they remain the softest targets. And with the existence of umpteen sleeper cells, overt and covert outfits waiting in the wings to strike, a single radicalised terrorist might just ram a truck into a rapturous crowd inflicting most devastating damage. Policing such gatherings has become routine, bringing in complacency and intelligence inputs seem to be stale and just run-of-the-mill. These factors heighten the vulnerability.
Conversely, closer to the airports, there
are CISF check-points. At the barriers, the inside of the vehicles are not checked.
At best, they ask if the occupants are indeed going to the airport. The
occupant may just show an airline ticket or a passport to the sentry and access
the airport’s entry point. The vehicle could be explosives-laden, and then could
easily be detonated at the closest perimeter of the bustling airport, causing
innumerable casualties.
Then
there are thousands of railway stations with millions travelling 24x7.
Access control at the railway entry points are below par and one can smuggle in
material and cause explosions on the busy platform or target prestigious trains
like Shatabdi and Rajdhani. The gravity of effects of such attacks
hardly needs any elaboration. Damage will be incalculable.
We are
aware that the terrorists always have the advantage of striking without notice and
we become wiser, albeit temporarily, only after the colossal damage is done.
Railways need extra vigilance and alertness and so do each vulnerable location.
It is, however, doubtful if all areas could be effectively policed given
the inadequate anti-terror structure to deal with such emerging security
challenges.
Busy market places are
yet another target area where a lone wolf can cause mayhem by emptying his
magazines and melting into the crowd or by carrying out a suicide attack.
Agencies
need to exercise abundant caution from drone attacks too. Though skies are
thought to be well secured, a single drone can wreak havoc. Such alerts call
for anticipation and ceaseless vigilance to remain ahead of the methods likely to be employed by terrorists.
Other than beefing up the physical security led by actionable intelligence, intelligence agencies must continuously think of foiling chances of subversion into the security forces. These are specific for the security of the VVIPs and to secure occasions like Republic Day parades when the alertness merit fullest attention.
Anwar Sadat, former President of Egypt, was killed in
1981 by a saluting tank as the security forces did not anticipate such a
novel method. Rajiv Gandhi was hit by a guard in Colombo
in 1987 while inspecting a guard of honour. None of the security personnel
could foresee such an event. That was literally a case of
getting caught off guard.
There are
numerous cases like these where the terrorists outwitted the security. Hence, in
this ongoing battle of wits, security set-ups must be seen to be a deterrent and
more alert than the terrorists. This may not completely exterminate terror but
will instill a sense of security and confidence amongst the people or else a la
Nice will be a routine affair than an exception.
(The
writer is a retired IPS officer, a security analyst and TV commentator on anti-terror
issues. He can be reached at @Shantanu2818)
Also read:
Beyond Nice Attack: New-Age Weapons of Terror and Emerging Threats
It’s a Miracle Over-Crowded India Doesn’t Invite Nice-Like Attacks
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