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In the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election, political analysts focused considerable attention on white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump.
Less examined was the critical role of the Catholic vote in the three Great Lakes states that tipped the Electoral College in Trump’s favor – Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Trump won each of those states by narrow margins, but with strong Catholic support, especially among white Catholics.
In 2020, could the Catholic vote once again be a key to the outcome of presidential campaign? As Professor Ryan P Burge writes in Christianity Today, to win re-election, Trump might be able to afford to lose some evangelical votes, but he definitely cannot afford to lose Catholic votes.
There are about 51 million adult Catholics in the United States, representing almost 25 percent of the national electorate.
The Latino vote decreased by about 3 percent compared to 2012 and in addition, Donald Trump received about 10 percent more of the Latino Catholic vote than did Mitt Romney in 2012.
But Trump also benefited from a long trend in the white Christian vote for the Republican Party.
In 2012, GOP nominee Mitt Romney won 78 percent of white Evangelicals, whereas in 2008 Republican John McCain received 73 percent. Trump fared even better in 2016, with 81 percent. In 2008 and 2012, 56 percent of white Catholics voted for the GOP presidential nominee and that percentage increased to 60 percent in 2016.
Given these varied results, it is hard to imagine the Catholic vote as a monolithic force, and indeed, it remains strong split between the major parties. However, it is important to understand the diversity of US Catholics and the challenges that any candidate faces when seeking to appeal to them.
Once composed of an immigrant underclass that moved to the city centers, joined labor unions and voted for the Democratic Party, second- and third-generation Catholics have become more educated and economically successful, and many settled in the suburbs and became more conservative.
Beginning in the 1970s, with the support of abortion rights by Democrats (including 1972 presidential nominee George McGovern) and the Supreme Court decision in Roe v Wade, many Catholics came to feel that the Democratic Party no longer represented them.
To capitalize on this trend, Republican strategists targeted Catholics in the Northeast and Midwest and white Evangelicals in the South on moral values.
From 1980 to 2000, only one Democratic presidential candidate won a strong majority of the Catholic vote: Bill Clinton, when he was re-elected in 1996.
Catholic identity was important in the past. In 1960, Catholic support was overwhelming for Democrat John F Kennedy, a Catholic. But as time went on, that identity mattered less and less. By 2004, the next time a major party presidential nominee was a Catholic, Democrat John Kerry, he lost the Catholic vote to a Methodist, George W Bush.
The church hierarchy in the United States is usually reluctant to offer signals of voting preferences, although some bishops try. And even when certain bishops offer such signals, few Catholic voters listen. Indeed, there is no evidence that church leaders are in any way effective at delivering Catholic votes for one political party or the other.
As for the possible impact of Pope Francis, despite his overall popularity with US Catholics, there is no evidence that his voice has any impact at all on how they vote. Indeed, in 2016 the Pope criticised Trump’s proposed border wall with Mexico, but Trump still won the overall Catholic vote.
Like the rest of the electorate, Catholics have become increasingly independent of the political parties. The trend among partisans is increased Republicanism among white Catholics and increased support for Democrats among new immigrant, non-white Catholics.
While the fortunes of the GOP improved as some Catholics abandoned the Democratic Party, there is now some evidence that they’re moving away from Trump – and that could potentially be his undoing.
Trump’s anti-immigration campaign rhetoric has also translated into policies that are deeply offensive to many Latino voters, who have even stronger motivation to oppose him than in 2016.
Organizations such as the Pew Research Center project that the vote of religious groups in 2020 should broadly match those in 2016. For example, data from the weekly Data for Progress survey suggests that the voting intentions of mainline (non-evangelical) white Protestants will most likely be comparable to the 2016 data.
Democrat Hillary Clinton received 41 percent of the vote in this bloc, and Joe Biden should fare just as well. Trump currently is polling around 47 percent for this group, with about 10 percent undecided. It is possible that the mainline Protestant vote does not deviate much from 2016.
A similar finding regarding white Catholics emerged from the survey by the Public Religion Research Institute.
Despite its critical role in the US elections, the Catholic vote remains in the shadow of the many analyses of evangelical voters. That is a mistake, as Catholic voters can be a key to the outcomes of national elections, especially given the concentrations of Catholics in many of the most competitive states in the Electoral College. As we move toward Election Day, media and other campaign observers would do well to keep a close eye on the all-important Catholic vote.
(This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article here.)
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