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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy continues to surprise. Just as his invitation to Nawaz Sharif, and the leaders of the other SAARC countries, for his swearing-in ceremony in May 2014 had caught everyone off guard, so too has the sudden momentum towards constructive engagement in recent weeks.
The initial optimism, generated at the time of Modi’s inauguration, was short lived and subsequent attempts at re-engagement also failed to take off the ground amidst the usual spoilers. It may be tempting to not get too excited by the recent developments, especially given the manner in which bilateral relations have unfolded in recent years and particularly since May 2014.
The latest attempt consisting of a series of meetings over the past one month, of which Modi’s Lahore visit is the most recent, may be the strongest signal yet from Modi about his commitment to improving India-Pakistan relations. Contrary to what critics in India, mainly from opposing political parties, may say, this gesture on Modi’s part was necessary, and may have paved the way further for ensuring a sustained dialogue.
Modi’s earlier attempts to reset the terms of engagement between the two countries marked by a new assertiveness in India’s Pakistan policy failed to alter the pattern of bilateral ties. The more “muscular policy” nonetheless created a notion within Pakistan that India was not committed to improving bilateral relations. In fact, far from pushing Pakistan towards addressing India’s core concerns – cross-border terrorism and the trials of the 26/11 accused – it undermined the position of Modi’s counterpart Nawaz Sharif, who since assuming office in May 2013, had sent out strong signals of wanting to engage with India.
In this context, Modi’s supposedly spontaneous visit to Pakistan carries immense symbolic importance. It underscores his determination to push forward greater bilateral engagement despite all existing hurdles. There were signs in early 2015 itself that Modi was willing to restart talks with Pakistan when he sent India’s newly appointed foreign secretary to the country for exploratory talks. The meeting with Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Ufa in July this year was another indicator of Modi’s willingness to re-engage with Pakistan.
The significance of Modi becoming the first Indian prime minister in 11 years to visit Pakistan can also not be stated enough. Manmohan Singh was unable to visit Pakistan even once during his two full tenures, which lent further credibility to Pakistan’s assertions that despite India’s claims of wanting better ties, New Delhi was not willing to walk the talk.
Modi’s Lahore visit gives out a clear message that he is in a far stronger position, as compared to his predecessor, to take such bold political initiatives. The clear mandate secured by Modi in 2014, freeing him from the shackles of coalition partners, has already given him greater manoeuvrability to improve relations with some other neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
At the same time, the meeting by itself cannot be a game-changer. It is, perhaps, best to see the Lahore meeting as yet another ‘pre-talk talks’ following the meetings in Paris, Bangkok and Islamabad over the past one month. Such meetings can help policymakers on both sides work out a proper plan of action for the future. But more importantly, they can help create a certain level of understanding and bonhomie before the formal talks officially commence.
The NSA-level talks in Bangkok, for instance, may be particularly important in that respect. The mention of Kashmir in the statement released following the meeting, far from being a “concession” as Modi’s critics pointed out, reflects New Delhi’s realisation of the importance of addressing some of Pakistan’s concerns to expect anything in return from them. The absence of Kashmir from the Ufa declaration, it should be noted, had created significant backlash in Pakistan, especially for Nawaz Sharif.
There are already reports suggesting efforts on both sides to reduce tensions along the Line of Control and Sharif has given a directive to his ministers to tone down the anti-India remarks. All this taken together may, in fact, generate a more conducive environment for talks.
Naturally, there are no guarantees. Similar momentum in the past has also been derailed. The last time an Indian prime minister visited Lahore in 1999, for instance, the Kargil war followed – an example that has been cited on numerous occasions already. The structural constraints and domestic constituencies that have obstructed relations in the past, continue to exist. It remains to be seen how Modi may react to any provocations in the future. The more immediate challenge for Modi, and Nawaz Sharif, is not to overcome these constraints – that should remain a more long-term goal – but to work around them to maintain and build upon the most recent momentum.
(The author is a Programme Advisor, Peace & Security Policy at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung India. Views expressed by the author are personal and do not reflect those of the organisation to which he is affiliated.)
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