Some Evident Lapses in Uri Call for Immediate Remedial Action

Uri attack exposes some glaring loopholes in security of the army bases, writes Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain.

Uri terror attack was another instance of institutional failure, that has failed to equip soldiers with modern facilities. (Photo: Lijumol Joseph/ The Quint)

One of the most professionally satisfying experiences of my life was the two years I spent in command of the Kala Pahar Brigade at Uri. This brigade occupies and defends some crucial areas of our country.

At first, a few basics for the reader. It was through the Uri salient that the kabalis (tribals) advanced towards Baramulla and Srinagar in 1947, triggering the first Indo-Pak war. It was here again, in 1965, that Major Ranjit Dayal led the assault on Haji Pir (in PoK) which won him the Mahavir Chakra. Even without wars this is the area where the longest, most intense artillery duels have been fought across the LoC making the then Commander, Brig (later Lt Gen) Jasbir Lidder, coin the famous credo, “when Uri rumbles, Chakothi crumbles”. Chakothi, of course is located on the PoK side of the LoC.

Also Read: To Pressure Pak, India’s Reaction to Uri Must Be Sober, Not Shrill

Soldiers guard outside the army base which was attacked by JeM militants in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, 19 September 2016. (Photo: PTI)

Importance of the Uri Brigade

People are surprised when they learn that in midst of today’s paralysis of the Valley, Uri is ‘fully functional’ and its Gujjar and Pahari population remains steadfastly Indian. So, we have the paradox of a loyal border population in a sector, heavily used by Pak-trained terrorists for infiltration. There has been no resident terrorist activity for almost 27 years but there has been much infiltration from the PoK. This brings transitory terror activity in its wake and a few of the hill folk accept money to guide the terrorists to their destinations.

The Brigade HQ is the permanent institution here while the units come for a maximum of two years. The relationship of the brigade with the people is such that it takes ownership of everyone’s problems. During the 2005 earthquake, it was the brigade which despite its own suffering became the rallying point for rescue and relief operations for all.

Also Read: No Nation Must Stumble Into War: Lessons from Op Parakram Post Uri

No Boundary Wall in the Garrison Town

The sneak attack in the morning of 18 September has not been against expectations. While one can find fault at the tactical level with tactical security drills, the number of sentries and the like, that is hardly significant. The malaise is in the thinking and that includes my own.

The road to the border cuts through the garrison and is used by all civilian motor and pedestrian traffic, though with strict checking and control.

Even at the height of sneak terror attacks in 1999-2003, it was not considered a priority to construct a boundary wall for this garrison. The assumption was that terror attacks would take place in the Valley while action at the LoC would be artillery and small arms duels between the two armies. The garrison is 6 kms crow flight from the LoC.

Uri has never had resident militancy. The brigade prides itself on its conventional war fighting and ‘No War No Peace’ roles on the LoC, the rear has been perceived as less important. Since security is a basic principle of war, operational prudence demands equal focus on the Brigade HQ on the basis that no areas are safe.

Also Read: Uri Attack: Remember the Names, Faces, the People They Left Behind

A map of the Uri camp which was attacked by JeM militants on 18 September 2016. (Photo: Aaqib Raza Khan/The Quint)

Beefing up Security at Bases

• Despite being a garrison town, Uri doesn’t have a boundary wall, though there is a road to the border that cuts through it.
  
• Due to a reduction in the number of terrorists since 2003, the security of garrisons like Uri may have been diluted.
  
• Even the army bases should be well-equipped technologically to avert risks of any kind.
  
• Institutional failure lies in not allocating enough funds for security walls, cameras or even mini drones.
  

Dilution in Security

There were times 13 years ago when we kept the entire HQ awake at night with commanders at all levels checking security. But that was when the strength of terrorists in the hinterland was over 3,000 or more, when there was no LoC fence and even counter infiltration was weak. With reduced terrorist strength, an obstacle system and effective counter infiltration posture, the security of garrisons in places like Uri may have diluted to an extent.

It is good to remember that the prime responsibility lies at the LoC where the maximum strength must be with minimal strength at the bases, the supposedly ‘comfy’ location. The bases should be technologically secured to enable this concept, where the frontline soldier can come and rest.

Also Read: Uri Attack: We’ll Pick Our Own Time & Place to Respond, Says Army

Beefing Up Security at Army Bases

That is where the ‘deficit’ arises. Both in the past and now, there should have been a greater push for technology to enable security but remember, this needs much more money. In budgeting, he who thumps the hardest gets his share fastest. Unfortunately, that is where the institutional error is. These garrisons need security walls, cameras and even minidrones. Surveillance devices needed at the LoC are as much required at the HQ.

Institutional Failure

With reference to intelligence, you do not need specific inputs. A study of history, the pattern of activity and the current situation gives adequate deductions: that something spectacular will be aimed by the adversary, it will be in the vicinity of the LoC as deep operations have become difficult, and a lucrative target will be the choice.

Uri stares at you as a deduction. But circumstances can dictate against a situation and that is exactly what happened on the fateful morning of 18 September 2016. That is why I never blame individuals in-charge today but rather the institutional failing over a period of time.

Need for Better Deployment

The question everyone is asking is ‘why were the troops in tents?’ The answer, a new unit had arrived into the garrison in full strength, it would spend two to three days here, before it commenced progressive deployment for on-the-job training.

The administrative base caters for accommodation for rear elements of the LoC and therefore, the new strength about to be inducted to the LoC stays two to three days in tents. The outgoing unit would similarly do that on its way out. That the tents caught fire and that they were not of fire retardant material is neither for me to answer nor for the current hierarchy of the Uri Brigade.

(The writer, a former GOC of the army’s 15 Corps, is former commander of the Uri-based Kala Pahar Brigade. He is now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group. He can be reached at @atahasnain53)

Also Read: No Nation Must Stumble Into War: Lessons from Op Parakram Post Uri