Dulat’s Expose: Secrets Can’t be Treated as Par for the Course

In his book former RAW chief A S Dulat may have divulged more than may be good for him

Former RAW chief A S Dulat reveals in his latest book that the authorities goofed up during the December 1999 hijacking of flight IC-814. (Photo: Reuters)

A recent book on Kashmir, authored by a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has been making headlines in India. The noisy 24/7 TV debates have raised all possible questions on the authenticity of revelations by the author, and as a corollary, moral and ethical issues pertaining to revealing sensitive state secrets that may impinge on current activities.

Given that India does not have either a well-considered policy on declassification of sensitive classified material or the procedure to prosecute those that spill the beans, there has been little or no clarity on these public debates.

Admittedly, sensitive information on making deals with militants/terrorists, using money power to allure misguided elements of society in Kashmir are best consigned to deep vaults meant for them. Nations are often guided by national interests and not by ethics and morality of their actions. This is universally applicable to all nations and it would be naive to assume that they will act in a saintly manner when confronted with situations impinging on the well-being of their respective countries.

Not Bound by Secrecy?

Here is a typical case of a former intelligence officer who, having spent a lifetime in collecting, collating, analysing and disseminating sensitive information, on retirement, is inducted into the Prime Minister’s Office to assist the head of government. Here he wears a political hat which apparently does not bind him to secrecy as much as in his previous assignments. Revealing political narratives may be of historical value. Not so when sensitive dealings with militants or terrorists who continue to be active and relevant are treated as par for the course.

Former RAW head A S Dulat in his latest book slams Indian authorities for handling the Kandahar hijack callously. (Courtesy: ANI)

This whole dilemma can only be addressed if the Official Secrets Act (OSA) is rewritten to include the current realities of an independent and democratic India in her seventh decade of existence. Further, a clear process of declassifying information after a specified period of time needs to be articulated along with penalties for going public on such information. We also need to suitably excise such information that may cause internal or external turbulence if and when revealed. These processes exist in Western democracies. We need not reinvent the wheel.

The hijacking of IC-814 is yet another case in point which has invited unwarranted debates due to the absence of authentic official information, despite a book on the subject authored by the pilot of the aircraft. A S Dulat wittingly or unwittingly termed the operation as a “goof up”.

Official Incapability

The Crisis Management Group (CMG) formed under the chairmanship of the cabinet secretary was responsible for the aircraft not being intercepted at Amritsar. The CMG’s structure and its mandate, which then covered any crisis, natural or manmade, was incapable of reacting to rapidly developing operational scenarios, least of all hijacking and terrorism.

There was no operational facility and fail-safe communication of a permanent nature to enable quick decision making for hijack. Just to get the earmarked members to muster at the airport where only make shift facility existed would have taken well over an hour. Such decisions are best made in well-endowed and functioning operations rooms such as those that exist in the armed forces, more importantly in the vicinity of South Block.

Anxious relatives of passengers on board the hijacked Indian Airlines plane protest, December 27, 1999 (Photo: Reuters)

Information in the public domain indicates that currently the Indian Air Force facility has been earmarked for such operations. This is a positive development which needs to be publicised to assuage fears on repeat incidents of the type.

Hopefully, CMG members have now been carefully selected for their operational profile rather than their administrative achievements. Unlike relief operations for natural disaster where almost all bureaucrats from the ministries concerned are required for mobilisation, these operations need a small and competent team which obtains political clearance where required on a real time basis.

It is not unusual for countries to learn lessons and evolve institutional mechanisms to correct inadequacies. What is counterproductive is to deny such information to the general public based on archaic laws on official secrets.

(The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief, Southern Naval Command)