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On 4 March, the Asian News International (ANI) published an article which was based on an NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation) source saying:
“Just before the Indian Air Force (IAF) struck the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terror camp in Balakot on 26 February, technical surveillance had found 300 mobile phones active at the facility, giving clear indication of the total number of inmates housed there.”
The report was immediately picked by every media. We too reported the news. We believe that NTRO could’ve intercepted 300 active mobile phones. But the information that has come out in the public domain is insufficient.
To get answers to some of these pertinent questions, The Quint spoke to a couple of former NTRO officers. They agreed to speak to us on the condition of anonymity.
A former NTRO officer who had spent his entire life intercepting calls in different parts of the country said:
He further added:
“India has the most advanced technology when it comes to intercepting calls, but the question here is – how did the NTRO know that 300 mobile phones which were active at the particular hour were located inside or in the vicinity of the JeM camp? I don’t believe this and I can explain it too.”
“The most common and successful technology which is used to intercept mobile phones around the world is passive GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) monitoring system,” said the former NTRO officer.
“The range of this system is a few kilometres if at the ground level. Hence, to increase the range, one has to place it on higher ground but on a static and steady platform,” he further added.
Former NTRO officer
The second most important equipment, the former NTRO officer added, required is a directional antenna. This antenna is used to intercept mobile connections in a particular direction. It can be placed at the top of the building or hill to get a good range.
We have the latest technology but technology too has its limitations, added the officer.
Indian Intelligence has confirmed that the JeM camp is spread over an area of 6 acres (0.024 sq kms), much less than a kilometre, in the forest area of Balakot.
Let us assume that we had intercepted active mobile connections up to the range of 80 kms across the border, through the passive GSM monitoring system from a hilltop. We also assume that NTRO experts managed to trace the signals which were placed close to the JeM camps.
But, the question is how did the NTRO manage to filter mobile connections which were present within the JeM camps from those outside it?
Former NTRO officer
The officer further added that since Balakot is a hilly area, getting strong signals from the tower could also be a problem.
The former NTRO officer further added that firstly, intercepting mobile phones is more successful when done from close proximity.
Secondly, interception is possible if the Indian Intelligence or NTRO is in possession of the mobile numbers that they want to intercept.
Former NTRO officer
On this the officer said:
What if NTRO engaged Intelligence agency of some other country to carry out the operation?
(At The Quint, we question everything. Play an active role in shaping our journalism by becoming a member today.)