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(This article was first published on 19 November 2020. It has been republished from The Quint's archives in the run-up to the third anniversary of the decriminalisation of homosexuality in India on 6 September.)
“Certain changes transpire with time without the court’s intervention however, it is upon the courts to accommodate such changes and protect that right to change.”
India’s journey towards recognition of rights of the LGBTQIA+ is marked with the landmark judgments of NALSA, Naz Foundation and Navtej Singh Johar but there still is a long way to go as far as equality in substance and fact is concerned.
The petitions for a right to marriage filed before the Delhi High Court have again highlighted the intersecting paths of societal morality and constitutional morality.
They could well turn out to be India’s version of the Obergefell v Hodges case in the US – where the Supreme Court recognised the right of same-sex couples to marriage – and perhaps may be even more significant in India given the way marriage is viewed in our country.
Despite Navtej Singh Johar (the Section 377 case), marriage in India continues to retain its moral and cultural origins in which lies the deeply rooted idea of heterosexual exclusivity of marriage where homosexuals are at best offered a mediated solution of “live-in.”
This narrow view of marriage as a concept is often propped up using arguments about inheritance rights and personal laws, which are presented as hurdles to recognise spousal rights of homosexuals.
This isn’t just a matter of opinion or perspective, but a technical point. Spousal rights are an outcome of a legally recognised union and in India today, there indeed is no foundational legal requirement for such union to be exclusively heterosexual.
It has been argued by some that the Supreme Court, while delivering its verdict reading down Section 377, has very carefully denied any pronouncement conferring a right of marriage on homosexual couples.
However, the text of the judgment shows that this isn’t quite so cut and dried. Take for instance these words by the then Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra in his opinion at para 155 where after an analysis of the right to privacy, he said:
CJI Misra’s opinion highlights that a ‘union’ is a manner of companionship in every sense be it physical, mental, sexual or emotional, which applies to all citizens – which appears to recognise the right of the LGBT community to consensual companionship.
In the light of this, those harping on Navtej Singh Johar as exclusively Section 377-oriented should reconsider their stance as the apex court did not actually remain entirely silent on this point.
Marriage is this one phenomenon, which indeed has legal recognition and incidents but not a legal definition. Even the personal laws defining the manner and requisites for a valid marriage don’t define marriage itself. Hence, these requisites in themselves are seen as marriage.
For example, the Hindu Marriage Act under Section 5 lays down conditions for a valid marriage between two Hindus. In absence of definition what then has led to the assumption that marriage is indeed a union of male and a female alone? The answer more likely will be customs on the basis of which personal laws are formed.
However, the Indian legal jurisprudence around marriage seems to have taken the liberty to deviate from customs to recognise marriages which per se have no customary recognition through the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
This Act also doesn’t define marriage and does away with the requirement/condition that two individuals getting married must belong to same religion.
This has in a way paved a path to the conclusion that conditions of marriage in themselves, embedded in the personal laws or customs, aren’t the only means of recognition of marriage as a legal union. For if so, removal of the condition of homogenous religion for marriage from the Special Marriage Act, would have rendered the unions legally valid but short of marriage.
Hence, the legislature by way of making a law can choose to recognise certain unions as marriages even if they aren’t originating customarily. To put it simply and illustratively, conditions for a valid contract and what is a contract don’t have same answers as, the former is derived from Section 10 while the latter is defined u/s 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
The theory of social constructionism views marriage as an evolving, dynamic, social institution without rigid essential characteristics. In India, from abolition of child marriages to acceptance of inter-caste and interfaith marriages trace that evolution.
The prohibition was embedded in the argument of “essentialism of marriage” as defined by State along with the power dynamics into play which allowed oppression of the weaker whether it was women, minority or backward classes.
In Loving vs Virginia, the US Supreme Court upheld interracial marriages recognising marriage as a civil right, denying the argument that god didn’t intend mixture of race by marriage.
My next argument is based on the premise that, spousal rights are an outcome of a legally recognised union, and marriage must primarily be seen as a legal union subsequently acquiring its personal/religious colour.
In a society governed by rule of law and upholding constitutional morality, to have a legally recognised right ie right to choose a partner of own choice being governed by social dictates of morality seems rather oxymoronic.
The Supreme Court in its Hadiya judgment has unequivocally expressed that, social values and morals have their own space but aren’t above the constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Exercising a choice contrary to religious morality isn’t suppression of any religious beliefs rather accommodation of individuals in a pluralist society. However, to deny it solely on customary/religious ground would amount to subsuming religious/personal moral code of few into the constitutional morality governing the rest.
Furthermore, marriage offers a number of other legal recognitions and benefits like nomination in insurance, gratuity, pension where spouses are entitled to receive the benefit post death/disability of the other spouse.
When marriage gives certain rights/benefits to the spouse and even certain obligations, to only view it as a religious/customary institution would be untenable.
Arguing that marriage has origins in religious customs thus, can solely be governed by personal laws creates an anomalous situation for those individuals identifying themselves as agnostics or atheists having no religious affiliations.
In Obergefell vs Hodges, the US Supreme Court has succinctly highlighted the religious, historic, sociocultural and legal landscapes that marriage traverses, however after reading right to marriage as an aspect of autonomy and liberty, no individual could have been denied it without due process.
In Puttaswamy, the court has recognised marriage, procreation, family as part of privacy of an individual.
Denying it to LGBTQIA+ community would result in a legal blackhole where:
To deny the right to marriage or to suggest that Navtej Singh Johar doesn’t provide basis for claiming such a right is to argue that only “qualified individual autonomy of homosexuals” was recognised by the Supreme Court.
The cage was opened with the liberty to keep only one foot outside while the other remained caught between the bars. Such argument simply fails to stand the test of legality.
(The author is pursuing law at Symbiosis Law School, Pune. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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Published: 19 Nov 2020,08:34 AM IST