After Hague Ruling on South China Sea, ‘Chexit’ Not an Option

China is hinting at ‘Chexit’ to claim territoriality in the South China Sea, writes C Uday Bhaskar.

All eyes will be on Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on Friday (15 July)  in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, where he is attending the 11th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit.
While the ASEM agenda is important in its own right, the subtext for the international community will be less about Brexit and more about a potential Chexit – post the Hague ruling on the South China Sea.

The 12 July ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) over the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between the Philippines and China has unambiguously rejected the historical claim advanced by Beijing. Furthermore, the ruling has also rejected the Chinese concept of extending territoriality to the maritime domain and has upheld the validity of the 1982 UNCLOS – the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.

China’s Angry Reaction

Beijing has reacted very angrily over the last two days after this ruling and from President Xi Jinping downwards – the mood has been one of unbridled defiance and an intemperate rejection of the international tribunal. The Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Liu Zhenmin referred to the possibility that the SCS could turn into a ‘cradle of war’ and  this was differently echoed by the Communist party media outlets within China and by envoys abroad.

The central message is that China will take recourse to military means, if required, to defend its territorial claims even if they have been totally rejected by the PCA.

In a sign of how extreme and angry the mood in Beijing is over the Hague ruling, Liu cast aspersions on the integrity of the five judges, and in an unprecedented and shameful breach of protocol suggested that  financial inducement had led to the final outcome against China. In public remarks that have not been repudiated, Liu  observed:  “These judges are paid, so who’s really behind this tribunal? Who was paying them? Was it the Philippines or some other country?”

These remarks went viral among social media groups that have been tracking  the ruling and the reaction from Beijing. And the dominant line was : ‘Has China lost it?’

Beginning of ‘Chexit’

The more muted exigency that has been raised is whether an angry Beijing will decide to quit the UNCLOS – which it had ratified in June 1996 – and will this be the beginning of ‘Chexit’, a China that petulantly begins to exit  from the lattice of globalisation ?

Thus, the Ulan Bator meeting will be significant to note how the SCS and the Hague ruling are brought up by the participants and whether Chinese PM Li Keqiang will be able to offer a more conciliatory response than what has been on display over the last few days.

It appears that there is a churn going on in Beijing over the SCS, wherein the hardliners are urging President Xi to stand firm and up the ante by announcing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and carrying out high visibility military manoeuvres. On the other side, regional naval exercises have seen the Philippines engaging with Japan, ostensibly in counter-piracy ops but the signalling is fraught with high-octane tension.

Coming to Terms with Reality

The less visible constituency in Beijing, the one that favours a return to the peaceful and smiling China equivalent, has long sought an external policy that is more accommodating and flexible. One gets a sense of this duality in another statement from Liu who in response to the ADIZ replied: “On whether China will set up an air defence zone over the South China Sea, what we have to make clear first is that China has the right to... But whether we need one in the South China Sea depends on the level of threats we face.”

Having reiterated China’s ‘right’, which the Hague ruling rejected, the vice-minister added: “We hope that other countries don’t use this opportunity to threaten China, and hope that other countries can work hard with China, meet us halfway, and maintain the South China Sea’s peace and stability and not turn the South China Sea into a source of war.”

The tenor here is more conciliatory and the halfway meeting option could be inventively explored by ASEAN and China. Beijing may take umbrage at the issue being raised at Ulan Bator that  will be perceived as a loss of face for President Xi, and hence, the ASEM proceedings will be instructive about the manner in which a post-Hague China relates to the larger global comity.

Isolation Not an Option

Whatever be the index of bruised nationalist sentiment in Beijing, Chexit is not a viable option for China. The prevailing nature of globalisation in the economic, trade and fiscal domain is so complex, multi-layered and dense that a major economic power cannot even visualise such isolation in a meaningful manner.

Conversely, for the rest of the global community a sullen China that decides to de-link from the politico-strategic framework of the early 21st century and which gets into a petulant huddle with North Korea and Pakistan is an equally undesirable exigency. China represents a potential number one GDP nation for the world and is critical to global economic vitality.

In short, neither China nor the global community can sever themselves from the ‘other’ without causing grave and irreparable damage to their core socio-economic security and well-being.

Thus, the challenge at Ulan Bator and beyond – perhaps at the September G20 summit that China will host – is to nurture a politico-diplomatic ecosystem that will mitigate any kind of Chexit option, even while ensuring that an equitable halfway meeting is enabled between Beijing and its uneasy interlocutors.

(The writer is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies. He can be reached at @theUdayB)

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