India’s Combat Air Power – Worrisome Deficiencies

High-level assertions run in the face of the government’s 2009 politico-strategic directive to the armed forces.

Air Force Vice Chief BS ‘Tony’ Dhanoa’s assertion the other day on India’s combat air power in operational capability (numbers and quality) not being “adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front scenario” should cause no surprise.

Air Chief Arup Raha too has been repeatedly expressing his “anguish at depleting combat aircraft numbers and the inordinate delays in new inductions”.

These high-level assertions run in the face of the government’s politico-strategic directive to the armed forces in 2009 to be operationally prepared for a collusive China-Pakistan military threat.

Progressive phase out of IAF’s workhorse, the Mig 21 fleet, has resulted in the draw-down of its combat strength from 40 squadrons to 33 today. The number would reduce to 22 in a decade. The sanctioned strength for a two-front scenario is 42 squadrons. Over the years, successive Air Force Chiefs have been drawing attention to this looming crisis of numbers. Dwindling capability of IAF, the country’s sword arm of conventional deterrence, has led to the widening of its combat air power gap with China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and a substantial reduction in IAF’s decades-long deterrent value.

Against every benchmark PLAAF is far ahead: combat numbers, throw-weight, and operational infrastructure in Lanzhou (facing Ladakh) and Chengdu (facing the North East). This not only jeopardises IAF’s ability to achieve a modicum of air dominance in critical areas during a conflict, so vital for its air campaign, but makes for severe constraints on the operations of the ground and naval forces. Determined pursuit by Pakistan Air Force (PAF) of what has been termed its two-front – China-US assisted –modernisation, as evidenced by the recent US decision to supply PAF advanced air-to-air missile equipped F16s, with more on the anvil, has exacerbated the situation.

IAF’s planned three-tiered low-medium-heavy combat force mix has of late run into rough weather. While the situation in the high-endurance, long-range and air dominance-centric heavy segment, inhabited by Sukhoi 30 MKI is stable, the numbers in the ‘low’ and ‘medium’ category present a dismal picture.

Induction of the indigenous Tejas Mk1A fighter (eventual number 126), to replace the light-weight, fast-reaction Mig 21s and Mig 27s has been inordinately delayed. IAF needs these low and medium weight combat jets in order to play the all-important role of crippling the adversary’s infrastructure, especially in the Himalayan terrain of the North and Northeast. The nub of the problem is the decades-long practice of research-production agencies overestimating indigenous capability and delivery time lines. It is this “overpromise-under deliver” syndrome, never questioned by political leadership that has brought the IAF to this sorry pass. As a flagship programme for energising India’s fledgling aerospace industry, Tejas has doubtless shown promise. But the devil is in the detail: IAF has received only one Tejas for trials (emphasis added) out of the 40 contracted for and adequately funded in 2007 and 2011. It would be well over a decade before operationally-configured aircraft in adequate numbers are handed in to the IAF to meet its serious deficiencies.

The state of IAF’s medium-size multi-role segment is no better. Selection, and induction of 126 French Rafale fighters, after a decade-long exacting and tortuous process, was undone with the Prime Minister’s dramatic announcement (in Paris in April 2015) that only 36 Rafales for about $7-8 billion would be procured on a “fast-track” basis under an inter-governmental agreement (IGA).

Even after signing of the IGA in January 2016 the induction is mired in disagreement over French liabilities on performance and delivery guarantees.

Which begs the larger question: whatever happens to the remainder 90-odd Rafale equivalents the IAF urgently needs? There is a stony silence from the Government.

But, on the positive side, as the Air Chief has reportedly said, the option of a new Make in India initiative for manufacture of a second line of combat jets is being vigorously pursued.

Another decade-long combat aircraft induction that has gone nowhere is the India-Russia collaborative project for the FGFA. This system represents the acme of advanced technology – centric air power for air dominance and effects-based force applications in future battle-spaces.

It combines advanced stealth, cruise without after-burner, super manoeuvrability, data fusion and multi-sensor integration. The initial design contract was signed in 2010. But the final design contract, under negotiation since 2012, is mired in issues of numbers, costing and the need for higher Indian work share. Meanwhile, the planned induction of about 250 aircraft has got reduced to 127 and IAF may well face a Rafale-like procurement – in this case of possibly just 65 flyaway aircraft. The jury is still out.

In sum, it does appear that only three fast-track Governmental initiatives can help IAF address its shortfall in combat force numbers during its decade of vulnerability (2016-2026), and help it address its combat force challenges in two-front war-fighting and in support of Army’s and Navy’s war plans. One: procurement of at least 90 Rafales/equivalents. Two: stepping up delivery of Tejas Mk 1A on order and the envisaged second line of combat jets and, lastly, early resolution of issues relating to the induction of the FGFA. Air Vice Marshal (retd) Kapil Kak is the founding Additional Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi (2001-2012).